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studies that PT performance fluctuates and is underpinned by two dimensions:
(1) the ability to handle conflicts between our egocentric perspective and another
person’s perspective and (2) the relative priority given to the processing of the
egocentric perspective over another person’s perspective. We have highlighted
the effects of task instructions, emotions, and motivation on PT performance. We
also found that each of the two dimensions underlying PT can be specifically
affected or associated with factors such as guilt, shame, narcissism, and self-
reported PT habits. Finally, we found that individuals strongly vary independently
on both dimensions so that some people are more or less efficient at perspectives
conflict handling and others are altercentric (i.e. prioritizing the other person’s
perspective) or egocentric perspecti...
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Résumé 
 
 
Nos performances de prise de perspective (PdP) sont largement considérées et mesurées 
comme une capacité statique et unidimensionnelle. Cette thèse a pour objectif de démontrer 
que nos performances de PdP fluctuent et sont sous-tendues par deux dimensions : (1) notre 
capacité à gérer les conflits entre notre perspective égocentrique et celle d’une autre 
personne et (2) la priorité relative donnée au traitement de notre perspective égocentrique 
par rapport à celle d’une autre personne. Nous avons mis en évidence l’influence des 
instructions, des émotions, et de la motivation sur nos performances de PdP. Nous avons 
également montré que chacune des dimensions peut être spécifiquement influencée ou 
associée avec des facteurs tels que la culpabilité, la honte, le narcissisme, et les habitudes 
auto-rapportées de PdP. Enfin, nous avons montré que les individus diffèrent fortement les 
uns des autres sur les deux dimensions de telle sorte que certaines personnes sont plus ou 
moins aptes à gérer les conflits de perspectives et d’autres sont particulièrement 
altercentriques (.i.e. qui traitent en priorité le point de vue de l’autre) ou égocentriques. 
Globalement, au travers de notre étude de ce qui influence nos performances de PdP, nous 
avons démontré la pertinence théorique et l’intérêt d’étudier la PdP comme une capacité 
dynamique et multidimensionnelle.  
 
Abstract 
 
 
Perspective-taking (PT) performance is widely considered and assessed as a static and one-
dimensional ability. This thesis provides evidence across 4 studies that PT performance 
fluctuates and is underpinned by two dimensions: (1) the ability to handle conflicts between 
our egocentric perspective and another person’s perspective and (2) the relative priority 
given to the processing of the egocentric perspective over another person’s perspective. We 
have highlighted the effects of task instructions, emotions, and motivation on PT 
performance. We also found that each of the two dimensions underlying PT can be 
specifically affected or associated with factors such as guilt, shame, narcissism, and self-
reported PT habits. Finally, we found that individuals strongly vary independently on both 
dimensions so that some people are more or less efficient at perspectives conflict handling 
and others are altercentric (i.e. prioritizing the other person’s perspective) or egocentric 
perspective-takers. Overall, while investigating what influences PT performance, we 
demonstrated the theoretical relevance and usefulness of studying PT as a dynamic and 
multidimensional ability.  
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General introduction 
 
We have – of course – no immediate experience of what other men feel; so the only way 
we can get an idea of what someone else is feeling is by thinking about what we would feel 
if we were in his situation … Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, 1759 
 
There is a world invisible to us. This world encompasses the intentions, desires, beliefs, 
and emotions of other human beings. We have no access to what others are thinking nor 
any means to ascertain that they are actually thinking. When did we realize that this 
invisible world exists? When did we start to understand that other people’s sounds and 
movements are ruled by abstract representations such as intentions, beliefs, and knowledge? 
The answer is still far from clear, because we have no access to what children are thinking 
(Heyes, 2014a; Scholl & Leslie, 2001; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Nevertheless, 
developmental psychologists have designed tests to assess whether children impute mental 
states to other social agents. I will present the two historically most famous tests. The first 
test is called the False Belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and consists in asking children 
where another child named Maxi will look for his chocolate after they have seen that, while 
Maxi was away, his mother moved the chocolate from where Maxi had put it (location A) 
to another place (location B). To pass this test, children must indicate that Maxi will 
erroneously go to location A to find his chocolate despite the fact that they know that the 
chocolate is in location B. The second test is called the Three Mountains task (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1948) and consists in asking children facing a miniature model of three mountains 
how a doll sitting at the other side of the model sees the three mountains. To pass this test, 
children must pick the card depicting how the three mountains look from the doll’s 
differing visual perspective. Successful performance in these two tasks is assumed to reflect 
the ability to impute mental states and to understand that others may have mental 
experiences of their own that are thus different from what we know or see from our 
egocentric perspective. This ability has received several names depending on the fields of 
the researchers who have studied it. Theory of mind (ToM), perspective taking (PT), 
mentalizing, folk psychology, and cognitive empathy are, in descending order, the terms 
most often used to refer to this ability. In practice and in this thesis, ToM refers to the 
general ability to ascribe mental states to others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) whereas PT 
refers to the ability to non-egocentrically ascribe mental states to others. ToM and PT thus 
particularly refer to the inferential process and the capacity to decentre from the egocentric 
perspective, respectively. Throughout my thesis, I will present my work that is essentially 
related to PT but I will also often refer to ToM as an umbrella concept that includes PT as a 
specific ability among others. Finally, a close neighbour to PT and ToM is empathy in the 
sense that empathy allows to feel and understand the emotional state of another person 
(Preston & de Waal, 2002). However, PT and ToM are not about feeling but understanding 
General introduction 
and refer to the understanding of all mental states rather than emotional states only. The 
division between affective and cognitive empathy is sometimes adopted to clearly 
dissociate the ability to feel another person’s emotional state (also referred to as emotional 
contagion) and the ability to understand another person’s emotional state, respectively 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). 
If a child performs successfully in either the False Belief task or the Three mountains 
task, it is assumed that the child has acquired a mature ToM ability. However, tasks 
assessing mental state inference have varying orders of sophistication and assess different 
facets of ToM. Thus, while six-year old children have good performance in the False Belief 
task, they may have poor performance in another ToM task. For example, in a task called 
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994), six-year-old children face more difficulties when asked 
what a war prisoner who wants to mislead the enemy about the location of his army will say 
if he knows that the enemy knows he will be lying. Accordingly, at this age ToM and PT 
abilities are still developing and it is not until adulthood that successful performance in 
complex tasks is expected. Adulthood is thus considered as the end point of ToM and PT 
development.  
1. Are adults flawless perspective-takers? 
For decades, in order to study the development of children’s PT ability, developmental 
psychologists designed tasks in which adults systematically displayed ceiling performance. 
Studies from developmental psychology have consistently shown that adults are able to 
succeed on relatively complex PT tasks. This observation was not deemed surprising given 
that adulthood was considered as the end point of PT development. However, researchers 
from social psychology have shown that adults do not always fully exploit their full-fledged 
PT ability and make social judgments that are egocentrically biased. This egocentric bias 
has received several names such as the curse of knowledge, the illusion of transparency, or 
the false consensus effect. The illusion of transparency describes adults’ tendency to 
overestimate how transparent to others are their mental states such as their emotions 
(Gilovich et al., 1998) and their preferences in negotiations (Boven, Gilovich, & Medvec, 
2003). The curse of knowledge describes adults’ failure to completely ignore privileged 
knowledge when asked to the take the perspective of a naïve person when making estimates 
concerning, for examples, the likelihood of historical events (Fischhoff, 1975), earnings of 
a company (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989), the sarcasm of a message (Keysar, 
1994), the value of a company’s share (Keysar, Ginzel, & Bazerman, 1995), or the meaning 
of unfamiliar idioms (Keysar & Bly, 1995). The false-consensus effect describes adults’ 
tendency to overestimate the extent to which other people share their own characteristics, 
opinions and decisions such as the decision to contest a fine (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) 
or their answers in a personality test (Krueger & Clement, 1994). Other similar biases in 
social psychology have been reported (Epley & Caruso, 2008; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 
2003) but they all describe adults’ tendency to rely on what they think or experience from 
their egocentric perspective to infer other people’s mental states.  
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It would therefore seem that adults are far from flawless perspective-takers. But why are 
we not always using our full-fledged PT ability? A dominant interpretation originates from 
the discovery that, to avoid effortful and lengthy thinking, humans often reason by making 
approximations, called heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Egocentric biases have 
been proposed to originated from the tendency to use two of these heuristics: the anchoring 
and the accessibility heuristics (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Together, 
they refer to the tendency to rely on the most accessible source of information as a basis, or 
anchor, to make estimates about particular topics irrespectively of the relevance of the 
anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, when asked to estimate the number of 
African countries in the United Nations, healthy adults tended to provide an estimate close 
to a random number they had just obtained on a wheel of fortune (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Applied to PT, the egocentric perspective is viewed as the most accessible source of 
information, which serves as an anchor for inferring others’ mental states.  
In parallel to social psychology, interest for PT among healthy adults emerged also from 
cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. The analysis of word utterances and eye-
movements in real-time conversations and of reaction times (RTs) under time-pressured 
situations allowed to reveal subtle egocentric biases, which are often referred to as 
egocentric errors or egocentric interferences. For example, studies from cognitive 
psychology show that adults tend to be slower at judging what another person might 
perceive or think when what they experience or think from their egocentric perspective is 
conflicting with the other person’s perspective relatively to when perspectives are not 
conflicting (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Samson et al., 2010; A. D. R. Surtees 
& Apperly, 2012).  
Similarly, studies from psycholinguistics show that adults often indicate objects to 
another person by referring to descriptions irrelevant to the addressee’s understanding 
(Heller, Gorman, & Tanenhaus, 2012; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Kaland, Krahmer, & 
Swerts, 2011; Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006; Wu & Keysar, 2007b) or that adults tend 
to look at objects that a speaker cannot see in response to a speaker’ reference to another 
object (see Figure 1; Barr, 2008; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Keysar, Barr, 
Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). In line with social psychologists, these 
findings have been interpreted as resulting from the natural use of the egocentric frame of 
reference to infer what others are talking about because it is a cognitively less costly 
strategy and because potential egocentric mishaps can be adjusted afterwards if needed 
(Keysar et al., 2000, 2003).  
General introduction 
 
Figure 1. Experimental setup of a PT task used in psycholinguistics, reproduced from Wardlow Lane 
et al. (2006). The participant is the speaker and he must ask the addressee to give him the small 
triangle while having privileged knowledge that there is also a big triangle. Note that in a similar 
setup used by Keysar et al. (2000) the participant is the addressee and the big triangle is hidden to the 
speaker’s (here called director) visual perspective.  
To sum up, although adults have a full-fledged PT ability, there is a vast amount of 
findings showing that adults are not flawless perspective-takers because they are 
egocentrically biased. The dominant interpretation is that “One’s own perspective is 
typically immediate, automatic, and easy, whereas reasoning about another’s perspective is 
typically slow, deliberate, and difficult.” (Epley & Caruso, 2008). Critically, the theoretical 
consensus assumes that PT is a one-dimensional ability since the unique and key ability 
considered to underpin PT performance is the ability to adjust the egocentric mental state 
initially imputed to adequate it with a more plausible estimate of someone else’s mental 
state; this adjustment is cognitively effortful and therefore not always made (Epley et al., 
2004; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Tamir & Mitchell, 2010).  
2. What influences adults’ performance in taking another 
person’s perspective? 
Numerous studies from developmental psychology have investigated what factors could 
influence PT performance in children. These studies have highlighted that according to 
their differences in terms of age, country, socio-economical level, parenting practice, verbal 
ability, fantasy play, or executive functioning, children could have strikingly different PT 
performances (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Farrant, Devine, Maybery, & 
Fletcher, 2012; Hughes et al., 2012; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Wellman et al., 2001).  
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In contrast, the investigation of differences in PT among healthy adults originated 
essentially from social psychology and was essentially studied in relation to trait-like, or 
enduring, characteristics such as personality traits or behavioural tendencies. These studies 
assessed PT almost exclusively by means of questionnaires measuring self-reported 
perspective-taking habits. The most widely-used questionnaire on perspective taking is the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (IRI; Davis, 1980). The IRI provides scores of agreement on 
several statements related to empathic experiences and habits, including 7 statements 
specifically related to PT (referred to as PT-IRI). For example, one of these 7 statements is 
“I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision”. In the non-
clinical population, PT-IRI scores are positively correlated with individual differences in 
measures of self-esteem (Davis, 1983), proneness to experience guilt (Joireman, 2004; 
Leith & Baumeister, 1998), prosocial behaviour (Carlo, Allen, & Buhman, 1999), 
propensity to forgive (Rizkalla, Wertheim, & Hodgson, 2008), age (O’Brien, Konrath, 
Grühn, & Hagen, 2013), the level of glutamate in the prefrontal cortex (Montag, Schubert, 
Heinz, & Gallinat, 2008), the likelihood of choosing the psychology major (Harton & 
Lyons, 2003) and the likelihood of reaching a deal in negotiations (Galinsky, Maddux, 
Gilin, & White, 2008). Furthermore, IRI-PT scores are negatively correlated with 
individual differences in measures of proneness to anger (Mohr, Howells, Gerace, Day, & 
Wharton, 2007), dispositional hostility (Loudin, Loukas, & Robinson, 2003; Richardson, 
Hammock, Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994), narcissism (Delič, Novak, Kovačič, & Avsec, 
2011; Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014), avoiding attachment (Corcoran & Mallinckrodt, 
2000), alexithymia (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010), destructive 
conflict resolution (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998) and social dominance orientation (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
In contrast to questionnaire studies, individual differences in PT performance measured 
through behavioural tasks in the non-clinical adult population are scarce: PT performance 
has been positively associated with executive functioning (working memory and inhibitory 
control; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Wardlow, 2013), relationship 
satisfaction and closeness (Schröder-Abé & Schütz, 2011), and cultural interdependence 
(China vs. USA; Wu & Keysar, 2007a) and negatively associated with aging (T. P. German 
& Hehman, 2006), schizotypy (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999, 2001) and alexithymia (Wastell 
& Taylor, 2002). Irrespective of the method, however, given that PT was measured to 
predict scores on static trait-like characteristics or dispositions, it was implicitly assumed 
that PT itself was a static trait-like characteristic or disposition. In addition, individual 
differences have so far been captured through single scores of PT, where individuals could 
vary only along a one-dimensional continuum and could be classified as either poor or good 
perspective-takers.  
The view that the ability to take another person’s perspective is static and one-
dimensional seems however to be progressively more compromised in regard of some more 
recent findings. The findings compromising the view of PT as a static and one-dimensional 
ability are reviewed in turns in the two following sections. 
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3. Beyond a static view  
 Research from developmental psychology has focused on the development of 
children’s PT abilities (i.e., what they are able to do) and, given the high diversity of tasks 
and task variations used, some researchers have looked at the influence of the PT tasks 
parameters as potential transient situational factors influencing PT performance. For 
example, a meta-analysis of children’s performance in the False Belief task revealed that, 
irrespectively of their age, the level of active engagement of children in the story and the 
level of salience of the protagonist’s false belief (e.g., whether it is stated in the test 
question that the protagonist has a belief or whether a thought bubble is drawn over the 
protagonist in the drawing version of False Belief test to indicate that the protagonist has a 
belief) significantly influenced children’s performance (Wellman et al., 2001)  
In social psychology, PT performance has been theorized with regard to heuristics 
theory and therefore has been measured as a tendency (i.e., what healthy adults actually do 
usually; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Paradoxically, however, given the important focus 
on individual differences, very few studies looked at the influence of transient factors on 
adult PT performance. Nevertheless, the malleability of PT performance has been largely 
supported by demonstrations that PT performance can be altered following priming 
manipulations or direct PT instructions.  
PT performance was found to be influenced under priming manipulations such as when 
priming a sense of high or low power (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), a low 
versus high social status (Rutherford, 2004), a focus on perceptual dissimilarities versus 
similarities (Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011), or the benefits of 
multiculturalism versus colour-blindness (Todd & Galinsky, 2012). 
Further evidence of malleability comes from the studies that exploited PT as an 
independent variable by explicitly instructing participants to make the effort of engaging in 
taking another person’s or another group’s perspective (for a review, see Todd & Galinsky, 
2014). Accordingly, participants who received explicit perspective-taking instructions 
(versus no instruction or objective perspective instructions) before describing, watching, or 
reading about another person or group’s life or characteristics were found to provide less 
stereotypic descriptions (Dovidio et al., 2004; Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2010), to express 
more stereotypic descriptions or behaviours (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Galinsky, 
Wang, & Ku, 2008; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2013), to have more positive attitudes towards the 
other person or group (Batson, Polycarpou, Harmon-Jones, & Imhoff, 1997; Bruneau & 
Saxe, 2012; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003), to show more 
positive implicit associations with other person or group (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & 
Galinsky, 2011; Todd & Burgmer, 2013), to be more likely to acknowledge inequalities or 
discriminations towards another group (Todd, Bodenhausen, & Galinsky, 2012), to be more 
willing to engage in contact with negatively-stereotyped or stigmatized individuals (C. S. 
Wang, Kenneth, Ku, & Galinsky, 2014), to more automatically imitate an out-group 
member’s movements (Müller et al., 2011), or to perceive another person or group as more 
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similar or close (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; 
Laurent & Myers, 2011).  
Altogether, empirical evidence from social psychology clearly supports the idea that PT 
performance is malleable but the influential factors investigated so far are experimental 
methods that do not reflect real-life transient factors; which therefore does not directly 
compromise the view that our everyday PT performance is stable, or static. 
However, in psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology, a few recent studies have 
looked at three important transient situational factors: the cognitive resource availability of 
executive functions, the salience of egocentric information, and the overlap of information 
between perspectives. Firstly, in situations where participants performed a task taxing 
working memory or inhibitory control prior to or in parallel with a PT task, participants 
were found with poorer PT performance (Fennis, 2011; T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; 
Lin et al., 2010; Newton & de Villiers, 2007; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). 
Secondly, adults were found with poorer PT performance when increasing the salience of 
egocentric information (privileged knowledge) by increasing the motivation to conceal 
privileged information (Kaland et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2006; Lane & Liersch, 2012) or 
increasing the requirement to pay attention to egocentric information (Lane & Ferreira, 
2008). Thirdly, Wu and Keysar (2007b) showed that increasing the degree of perceived 
overlap between the egocentric and another person’s visual perspective increased adults’ 
failure to not refer to privileged information. Altogether, these findings are informative 
about the underlying factors that may influence PT performance (and are discussed in the 
next section) but are relatively opaque to point out real-life situations through which PT 
performance may change. 
Finally, the most direct demonstration that PT performance fluctuates in everyday life 
comes from two studies that looked at the impact of individuals’ emotional state on PT 
performance. The first study induced feelings of sadness or happiness and found poorer PT 
performance among the participants of the happiness induction condition (Converse, Lin, 
Keysar, & Epley, 2008). The second study induced feelings of guilt and shame and found 
better PT performance among the participants of the guilt induction condition (Yang, Yang, 
& Chiou, 2010). 
To sum up, previous studies largely focused on individual differences or on 
manipulating PT through explicit instructions. Hence, very few studies have highlighted the 
dynamic nature of PT performance in the sense that one can have different PT 
performances from one everyday life situation to another and from one moment to another. 
This thesis aims to explore this new avenue of research. 
4. Beyond a one-dimensional view  
Whereas in social psychology PT performance was thought to be determined uniquely 
by our ability to adequately adjust our initial reliance upon our egocentric perspective 
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(Epley et al., 2004; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Tamir & Mitchell, 2010), multidimensional 
conceptions of PT had been proposed early on in developmental psychology. The most 
influential model has been formulated by Leslie (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; 
Leslie, 1987). Leslie proposed that there are two central abilities underpinning PT: an 
innate and modular ToM ability, called ToM Mechanism (ToMM), that allows us to pay 
attention to people and infer mental states from their behaviour based on the most salient 
information, and a later developing domain-general ability, called Selection Process (SP), 
that allows us to select what information to use to infer mental states thanks to executive 
functioning. Given that the most salient information is always considered to be one’s own 
mental state (i.e., egocentric perspective), when one’s own mental state cannot explain 
another person’s behaviour (e.g., in the False Belief task), it is proposed that the SP 
intervenes by inhibiting the salient egocentric information (e.g., I know the chocolate is in 
location B) to select an alternative and more suitable mental state to impute (e.g., Maxi 
believes that the chocolate is in location A). However, it must be acknowledged that there is 
an on-going debate about whether the ToMM is innate and whether children’s ability to 
pass the False Belief test results from the maturity of the SP (performance hypothesis; 
Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Fodor, 1992; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Some authors argue 
that there is no innate ToM module and therefore propose that the children’s ability to pass 
the False Belief test results from a conceptual change occurring in the development that 
allows children to represent others’ mental states as independent from their own reality, that 
is to say, from their own egocentric view of the world (competence hypothesis; Perner, 
1995; Wellman et al., 2001). 
Irrespective of whether ToM is innate or not, Leslie’s model is a one-dimensional model 
when applied to adults since the ToMM is supposed to be fully developed at adulthood. 
One exception concerns the SP, which refers to the same effortful and controlled 
adjustment process proposed by several social psychologists (Epley et al., 2004) and 
underpinned by executive functions (T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; Lin et al., 2010). 
Importantly, and in line with interpretations from social psychology and psycholinguistics, 
this model assumes that our egocentric perspective is the most salient candidate mental 
state imputed to others. 
However, some recent studies conducted on infants and adults suggest that the 
egocentric perspective is not always the most salient mental state. Instead, the perspective 
of another person, which we call the altercentric perspective (alter means “other” in Latin), 
might be equally or more salient than the egocentric perspective. Experiments conducted on 
infants, with therefore immature executive functioning to inhibit their egocentric 
perspective, have revealed that these infants behaved as if they had imputed a non-
egocentric mental state to a social agent. The first study to provide such evidence comes 
from Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) who showed that 15-months infants were less surprised 
(as measured by looking times) to see a social agent looking for an object in the location 
where the social agent erroneously believed the object was than in the location where only 
the infants knew the object was. This finding led authors to infer that the infants had 
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understood that the social agent has a false belief about the location of the object and thus 
expected he would go to the wrong location. Similar findings were found with slight 
variations of the False Belief task (for a review, see Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) by 
measuring anticipatory looking (Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011; 
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), violations of expectations (looking times; Kovács, 
Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; 
Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007), or which 
location the infants will go to help the social agent holding the false belief (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). In sum, infants 
behaved as if they had correctly imputed to a social agent a mental state that was 
conflicting with their reality of the world. Importantly, given that infants have immature 
executive functioning and are limited in their ability to select information, they process 
information that is the most salient (or accessible) to them. Consequently, infants must have 
been able to infer the social agent’s mental states because the information needed to 
construe the social agent’s mental state was more salient (and therefore prioritized) than the 
information pertaining to their egocentric view of the world.  
In adults, studies have also reported findings supporting a low salience of the egocentric 
perspective relatively to the altercentric perspective (i.e., the perspective of another person). 
Given that adults do possess mature EF, evidence comes from the observation that adults 
seem to automatically compute another person’s mental state. This automatic computation 
of another person’s mental state has been evidenced in two PT tasks: the False Belief task 
(Kovács et al., 2010; Schneider, Nott, & Dux, 2014; van der Wel, Sebanz, Knoblich, & 
Wel, 2014) and the dot visual PT task (Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban, Catmur, 
Coughlan Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2013; A. D. R. Surtees & Apperly, 2012), which is an 
adaptation of the Three Mountains task designed by Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948). For 
example, Kovács et al. (2010) have instructed participants to press a key when they see a 
ball revealed behind a screen. Before that box is removed, they see if the ball gets behind 
the screen and an irrelevant social agent could sometimes see or not see where the ball 
eventually went. When the social agent could not see it, the agent held a false belief of 
whether the ball is behind the screen or not. Although whether the ball gets behind the 
screen was not predictive of whether the ball would be behind the screen once the screen 
was removed, participants were faster to detect the ball when they had previously seen the 
ball getting behind the screen than when the ball did not get behind the screen. The key 
finding was that they were also faster when the social agent had seen the ball getting behind 
the screen despite the fact that, after the agent left the scene, they had seen that the ball 
eventually left the screen before the screen was removed. This finding was suggested to 
reflect that the social agent’s belief was automatically computed and influenced 
participants’ behaviour. In the same line of evidence, Samson et al. (2010) have shown that 
adults were slower and made more errors when making judgments about their egocentric 
visual experience when another person, irrelevant to the task (in Experiment 3), had a 
different visual experience; which suggests that what another person could see was 
automatically computed and influenced participants’ behaviour as if what the other person 
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was seeing confused their judgement about their egocentric visual experience. These 
studies, along with several replications (McCleery, Surtees, Graham, Richards, & Apperly, 
2011; Qureshi et al., 2010; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Senju, Southgate, 
White, & Frith, 2009; A. D. R. Surtees & Apperly, 2012) and similar findings on other 
tasks (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; Zwickel, 2009), strongly support the view that the 
altercentric perspective is sometimes automatically computed. 
These findings suggesting appropriate PT performance in infants and automatic PT in 
adults have been recently accounted for in a multidimensional model proposed by Apperly 
and Butterfill (2009; see also Mitchell, Currie, & Ziegler, 2009). Following this model, PT 
is underpinned by two independent systems: A slow, deliberate, difficult but also more 
controlled and flexible system, and a rapid, automatic, efficient but cognitively limited and 
non-flexible system (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; see also Gilbert, 1989; Satpute & 
Lieberman, 2006). The second system is specialized to attend, construe, and remember 
unique associations between a social agent, the object he interacts with, and the location of 
the interaction. These associations, called registrations, would form a sufficient basis for 
infants to pass several PT tasks and for adults to automatically construe what another 
person thinks or experiences. These associations are not mental state per se and can be used 
in a cognitively limited range of PT situations. Importantly, the same children were found 
with opposing performance in the same false belief task depending on whether anticipatory 
looking or verbal responses were measured (Clements & Perner, 1994); which was 
interpreted as evidence that the efficient and flexible systems are independent (see also 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001; for a review, see Schneider, Slaughter, & 
Dux, 2014). Although this model provides an elegant account of the recent findings and is 
multidimensional, the two systems are expected to intervene alone, one for each type of PT. 
Therefore, this dual-system model is actually composed of two disconnected one-
dimensional accounts of PT performance. 
An alternative (but quite complementary) account to the findings of infants’ success on 
PT tasks and adults’ automatic PT is that these findings reflect situations in which the 
egocentric information was less or as salient as the information needed to construe the 
altercentric perspective. Although the egocentric perspective is consensually viewed as an 
invariable obstacle to take another person’s perspective because of its high accessibility 
(Epley et al., 2004) or its high salience (Leslie et al., 2004), several studies managed to 
change the salience (or accessibility) of the information pertaining to our egocentric 
perspective. For examples, increasing the requirement to pay attention to the egocentric 
information (Kaland et al., 2011; Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Lane et al., 2006; Lane & Liersch, 
2012) and making egocentric information accessible only once the altercentric perspective 
has been inferred (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & 
Humphreys, 2005; van der Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011) 
affected PT performance. Based on these encouraging preliminary findings, we propose to 
investigate whether the view that the egocentric perspective is always the most salient 
source of information for mental state inference by manipulating what information 
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individuals are required to pay attention to (Chapter 2) and by capturing PT performances 
that are specifically due to the relative salience of the egocentric and altercentric 
perspectives (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
If we were to provide evidence that manipulating and assessing the relative salience of 
information pertaining to the egocentric and altercentric perspectives is possible, 
meaningful, and predictive of PT performance, we would find a new dimension 
underpinning PT performance that has never been assessed before. The salience of 
information is however unlikely to be fully predictive of adult PT performance given that 
this salience can be modified in a top-down controlled fashion by executive functions 
abilities when, for instance, the egocentric perspective is salient and conflicts with the 
altercentric perspective (T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; Lin et al., 2010). Therefore, our 
ability to modify this salience (i.e., to suppress irrelevant information and select relevant 
information) to overcome conflicts between perspectives is a critical additional dimension 
that should be assessed along with the relative salience of the egocentric and altercentric 
perspectives. This two-dimensional account would be able to explain PT performance both 
in terms of the domain-general ability to inhibit the egocentric perspective and in terms of 
the relative salience of the egocentric and altercentric perspectives. Introducing and 
investigating the predictive strength of this multidimensional account is the second main 
objective of this thesis.  
In the two following sections I introduce the main experimental task of the thesis and its 
theoretical relevance to the objectives of my thesis.  
5. Visual perspective taking 
There is mounting evidence that, irrespective of the mental state to infer, PT 
performance is often dependent on the ability to handle our conflicting egocentric 
perspective and I have proposed in addition that the relative salience of the egocentric and 
someone else’s perspective should be another critical dimension underpinning PT 
performance irrespective of the mental state to infer. However, we have seen so far that PT 
entails the inference of many different mental states; they can be beliefs, knowledge, 
intentions, and visual, tactile or emotional experiences. Thus, the inferential process can be 
very different depending on the mental state to infer. Accordingly, the inferential process 
might be facilitated if the perspective-taker has already (1) some knowledge or experience 
of what the other person is experiencing, (2) learned many of the infinite causal relations 
proper to the social domain (e.g., if someone slams a door, it means that something or 
someone angered him), or (3) good reasoning skills to apprehend the other person’s 
situation in its full complexity. The dependence on these other abilities should strongly vary 
following the type of mental state to infer; which impedes the study of PT. Hence, an 
adequate measure of PT performance should aim to reduce the complexity of the inferential 
process to its minimum. This is why visual perspectives-taking (VPT) is probably one of 
the most adequate types of PT to study. 
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The inferential process of what another person is looking at is considered to develop the 
earliest (Flavell, 2004) and has even been proposed to be largely modular and innate 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995). Accordingly, in their first year, infants pay more attention to the eyes 
than other parts of the face (Maurer, 1985) and start to follow where others’ eyes are 
looking (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). During their second year, they follow less another 
person’s head turns towards an object when the person cannot see the object such as when 
the person is blindfolded or when an opaque screen occlude his line of sight (Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2002; Butler, Caron, & Brooks, 2000). Moreover, two-year-old children check 
whether adults look where they point (Butterworth, 1991; Franco & Butterworth, 1996) and 
actively put their drawings in adults’ line of sight (Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977). 
Successful VPT performance (i.e., the ability to non-egocentrically infer the other 
person’s visual perspective) was initially evidenced with the Three Mountains test among 
seven-year-old children (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948) but successful VPT was also found, later 
on, in four- and even two-year-old children in a simplified version of this test (Flavell, 
Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2006). This discrepancy of PT 
performance across different versions of VPT tasks led Flavell and collaborators (1981) to 
distinguish two levels of VPT complexity: Level 1 VPT allows inferring which objects 
someone else can or cannot see and level 2 VPT allows inferring how an object looks from 
someone else’s visual perspective (e.g. whether a “9” looks like a “6” to someone else’s 
perspective). Level 1 VPT requires a very basic inferential process, which consists in 
drawing a mental line (of sight) from a person to an object to judge whether the object is 
visible from his visual perspective (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Level 1 VPT is found in 
two-year-old children (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Moll & Tomasello, 2006) 
and among several non-human primates (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Shillito, 
Shumaker, Gallup Jr, & Beck, 2005), mammals such as dogs (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 
2004; Hare, Brown, Williamson, & Tomasello, 2002), marmosets (Burkart & Heschl, 2007) 
and goats (Kaminski, Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), and even among some bird species 
(Emery & Clayton, 2004). In contrast, level 2 VPT requires a more cognitively effortful 
inferential process because the perspective-taker must mentally rotate to align with another 
person’s visual perspective (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; A. 
Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013); which is probably why level 2 VPT is not found in 
children under 4 years of age (Flavell et al., 1981; Masangkay et al., 1974) and has never 
been found in other species. 
To sum up, level 1 VPT is likely to be the type of PT that is best suited to study the core 
mechanisms or dimensions underpinning PT performance because the inferential process of 
level 1 VPT is very basic and efficient and thus less prone to be influenced by experimental 
factors, which would otherwise reduce the generalizability of our findings to other types of 
PT. 
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6. The dot visual perspective-taking task 
 From the beginning to the end of this thesis I consistently used the dot VPT task 
designed by Samson et al. (2010), which will be referred to as the VPT task in this thesis. 
The main interests of this task are twofold: First, it measures level 1 VPT, which we have 
seen is the form of PT best suited to optimize the generalizability of our potential findings 
to other forms of PT. Second, it allows to separately assess the two dimensions 
underpinning PT we focus on.  
In the VPT task, participants are instructed to make judgments from either their own or 
someone else’s visual perspective in situations where both perspectives are either 
conflicting (i.e., inconsistent) or consistent (see Figure 2 for details). By contrasting 
orthogonally the perspective taken (self-perspective vs. other-perspective) and whether 
what is visible from both perspectives is different or not (consistent vs. inconsistent), we 
could obtain two measures of PT performance that respectively and specifically assess the 
ability to handle conflicting perspectives and the relative priority given to the egocentric 
and altercentric perspective (for a detailed technical explanation of how the VPT task assess 
the latter dimension, see Appendix A).  
 
Figure 2. Examples of trials used in the VPT task in the different experimental conditions. 
Participants were asked to judge whether the number prompt (ranging from 0 to 3) matches the 
number of discs visible from the prompted perspective, which could be either their own perspective 
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(self-perspective condition) or the perspective of the person in the room (other-perspective condition). 
The other person and the participants could see either the same number of discs (consistent condition) 
or a different number of discs (inconsistent condition).  
Performance along these two dimensions is measured through reaction times (RT) and 
error rates (ER). Longer RTs and/or a higher ER when the egocentric and altercentric 
perspectives are inconsistent than when they are consistent reflect the higher difficulty, or 
cognitive cost, in handling the conflict between perspectives. Longer RTs and/or a higher 
ER when prompted to take the self- perspective than when instructed to take the other 
person’s perspective reflect a relative higher difficulty, or cognitive cost, in taking the 
egocentric perspective over the altercentric perspective. However, because there is no 
baseline condition in this experimental task design, the latter observation could also be 
framed as a lower difficulty, or cognitive cost in taking the altercentric perspective over the 
egocentric perspective. 
At the individual or group level, expected effects on performance can be found on RTs, 
on ERs, on both measures, or on neither of them. Variability between these 4 patterns of 
findings is namely driven by the fact that, from one situation to another and from one 
individual to another, individuals may favour speed over accuracy, or inversely, in their 
goal to attain successful performance (e.g., Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003). Moreover, 
the size and direction of an effect found on one measure may need to be revised downward 
or upward if the opposite effect or the same effect is found on the other measure, 
respectively. One way to tackle this issue is to use the inverse efficiency score (IES) 
because it combines ERs and RTs by weighting the average RT by the ER (IES = RT / (1-
ER); Townsend & Ashby, 1978). More specifically, using the IES allows to take into 
account the potential speed-accuracy trade-offs, to homogenize the different patterns of 
speed-accuracy trade-offs within a group of individuals, and to compare several groups via 
a unique measure. However, the IES presents the main disadvantage that its variability is 
increased because it adds up the sampling error of the two measures and because the RTs 
are non-linearly multiplied (almost exponentially) as the ERs increase (e.g., an increment of 
ER from .10 to .20 and from .40 to .50 increases the RT by 69 ms and 167 ms, 
respectively). This non-linear multiplication of RTs led Bruyer and Brysbaert (2011) to 
argue that the use of the IES should be avoided if the average ER is beyond .10 and when 
the results found on the RTs and ERs are not in line with those found on the IESs (Bruyer 
& Brysbaert, 2011). If these two criteria are met, the analysis of performance on the VPT 
task will be complemented by analyses on IESs to compare performances between different 
groups of individuals. 
7. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis had two main objectives. The first was to investigate the dynamic nature of 
PT performance in the sense that one can have different PT performances from one 
situation to another and from one moment to another. This new avenue of research would 
challenge the widespread view that PT is a static (or trait-like) characteristic and that it 
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should be studied as such. The second objective was to investigate whether the ability to 
handle conflicting perspectives and the relative salience of the egocentric versus another 
person’s perspective are two core dimensions underpinning PT performance. Providing 
evidence of the possibility and usefulness of this two-dimensional account of PT would 
challenge the widespread view that PT is a unitary construct and that it should be studied as 
such. 
In Chapter 2, we tested across 3 experiments the role of 3 situational factors in 
explaining why what another person is looking at interferes more strongly with our 
judgement of what we see in the VPT task than in the gaze cueing paradigm (i.e., a task 
where participants must detect or identify an object located either within or outside the line 
of sight of an irrelevant gazing stimulus). In Experiment 1 we looked at the role of the 
visual stimuli of the VPT task that could have a different visual salience and may have 
boosted the interference. In Experiment 2 we looked at the role of the higher task 
complexity of the VPT task and in Experiment 3 we tested the role of task instructions in 
influencing the attentional deployment onto another person. This study therefore explored 
the role of situational factors in influencing PT performance. If such an influence were 
found, it would support the view that PT performance varies from one situation to another 
and is therefore a dynamic ability. 
In Chapter 3, we tested across 2 experiments how inducing an emotional state of guilt, 
anger, or shame would affect PT performance relatively to individuals induced in a neutral 
state. Given that emotions are typically transient and recurrent states of the mind, evidence 
that guilt, anger, or shame impacts on PT performance would support the view that PT is a 
dynamic ability. Moreover, as PT performance was measured with the VPT task, we also 
tested whether emotions would affect overall performance (main effect of emotions) or 
specifically one of the two dimensions we proposed to underpin PT performance. If 
emotions were to impact specifically one of the dimensions, it would add some theoretical 
and ecological validity to the two-dimensional account. 
In Chapter 4, we tested whether and how narcissism affects VPT performance. 
Narcissism has been consistently negatively association with self-reported PT habits. 
However, previous studies suggest that PT performance can be enhanced when providing to 
participants the motivation to engage in PT. Here, we explored whether the tendency to 
report less PT habits might actually be driven by motivational factors, which could further 
highlight the dynamic nature of PT. In addition, because narcissists are characterized for 
their highly self-interested behaviour, we examined whether narcissism would be 
specifically associated with differences in the relative salience of the egocentric and 
altercentric perspectives rather than with the other dimension or the overall performance on 
the VPT task. 
In Chapter 5, we tested the specific hypothesis that there exists a significant and 
independent amount of inter-individual variability in both dimensions. To test this 
hypothesis, we examined how a large number of participants who completed the VPT task 
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would cluster following an algorithm aiming to maximize the explanation of PT inter-
individual variability. If we were to find that both dimensions are necessary to describe how 
individuals cluster and differ in terms of PT performance, it would suggest that inter-
individual differences in PT performance (which was traditionally scored along a one-
dimensional poor-to good performance continuum) should be scaled up in a two-
dimensional space defined by the ability to handle conflicting perspectives and the relative 
salience of the egocentric and altercentric perspectives. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss the theoretical implications of our findings within and 
outside the field of PT. 
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What triggers the computation of what 
other people are looking at? Revisiting 
the automaticity hypothesis 
 
 
 Computing what other people are looking at plays a central role in human interactions as it 
helps understanding what other people want, are about to do, know, or talk about. Two 
separate lines of research have suggested that such computation occurs automatically. In the 
context of a visual perspective-taking task in which participants are asked to make 
judgments based on their own visual perception in the presence of another perceiver, it has 
been shown that participants automatically compute what the other person is seeing. In the 
context of an attention orienting paradigm in which participants have to detect a target 
preceded by a face with averted gaze, it has been shown that participants’ attention is 
automatically shifted in the same direction where the other person is gazing at. Intriguingly, 
the sensitivity to what someone else is looking at is much higher and more robust in the 
context of the visual perspective-taking paradigm than in the context of the gaze cueing 
paradigm. The current study examined the origin of this difference in three experiments. 
The results showed that the higher robustness of the sensitivity to someone else’s gaze in 
the visual perspective-taking paradigm is not due to a difference in visual settings 
(Experiment 1) or task complexity (Experiment 2) but that it is caused by how attention is 
deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Our results provide important 
insights into the conditions in which we compute what another person is looking at, and 
qualify the automaticity of this computation. 
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1. Introduction 
Our ability to compute what people see, known as visual perspective taking (VPT), 
offers us very useful information during our social interactions (Baron-Cohen, 1995); it 
helps understanding what other people talk about, what they like or dislike, what they 
intend to do, and what knowledge or beliefs of the world they form. Thus, VPT is an 
essential building block of “Theory of Mind”, that is, our ability to reason about other 
people's mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
The most basic form of VPT, also referred to as level 1 VPT, allows to infer which 
objects someone else can or cannot see (as opposed to level 2 VPT which allows to infer 
that an object may have a different appearance to someone else; Flavell et al., 1981). Level 
1 VPT is known to be an early developing ability in children (Flavell et al., 1981) and is 
available even to nonhuman species (e.g., Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000). It has 
also been proposed that level 1 VPT is achieved via the computation of the other person’s 
line of sight (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; A. D. R. Surtees, 
Apperly, & Samson, 2013) and that such computation occurs automatically (Samson et al., 
2010). For example, Samson et al. (2010) showed participants pictures of a room with discs 
pinned on the left and/or right wall and a centrally positioned human avatar facing either 
the left or the right wall. The discs were displayed in such a way that on half of the trials, 
some of these discs were not visible to the avatar. The authors found that when the 
participants were asked to verify the number of discs they could see from their own point of 
view, they were slowed down and less accurate in their judgments when the number of 
discs in the room did not match the number of discs that the avatar could see, suggesting 
that participants automatically processed what the avatar could see even when it was not 
relevant for their judgment.  
Interestingly, in a parallel line of research it has been shown that our attention is 
reflexively oriented towards what someone else is looking at. This phenomenon is typically 
observed in a gaze cueing paradigm where participants are faster at detecting or identifying 
an object when it appears in the gaze direction of a preceding social cue (e.g., eye gaze or 
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head orientation) than when it appears in the opposite direction (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen 
& Kingstone, 1998a; Hietanen, 1999, 2002; Langton & Bruce, 1999). This attentional 
cueing is thought to occur automatically in that participants are sensitive to what another 
person is looking at even when the gaze direction is non-predictive of where the target 
object will appear (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998a; Mansfield, Farroni, & 
Johnson, 2003). 
The level 1 VPT and gaze cueing phenomena have been studied in separate lines of 
research, and it is not entirely clear yet whether these two phenomena share common 
underlying mechanisms. In other words, do participants compute a “mental” state (what the 
gazer “sees”) or do they simply extract a directional feature that orients attention? 
Furthermore, do they compute the same information in both types of paradigms? There is 
so far no straightforward answer to these questions. On the one hand, some evidence 
suggests that participants compute a “seeing” mental state when observing the gazer in the 
gaze cueing paradigm. Teufel et al. (2010) have shown, for example, that when the gazer 
wore goggles that were told to be opaque, participants’ processing of a subsequent target 
was much less affected by the gazer’s head orientation than when the gazer wore similar 
goggles that were told to be transparent. This indicates that participants extract more than 
just the directional cue when observing the gazer in the gaze cueing paradigm. On the other 
hand, it has been shown that cues devoid of mental states (such as an arrow) can produce 
similar effects as a human avatar when participants judge their own visual experience in the 
VPT paradigm (Santiesteban et al., 2013). This suggests that directional information alone 
could be sufficient to orient attention in the VPT paradigm, although this does not directly 
demonstrate that participants did not compute the “seeing” mental state in addition to the 
directional information when presented with a human avatar. Further research is needed to 
clarify this issue. 
Besides the open question as to the nature of the mechanisms underlying level 1 VPT 
and the gaze cueing phenomena, there is a puzzling difference in the empirical evidence 
reported by these two strands of research: the sensitivity to what someone else is looking at 
(even when this should be ignored) is much bigger and robust in the context of the VPT 
paradigm than in the context of the gaze cueing paradigm. This bigger sensitivity is 
demonstrated by the fact that, when the gazer faces the location opposite to the target, 
participants’ reaction times (RTs) are delayed by 16 ms (M = 394 vs. 410 ms) in the gaze 
cueing paradigm (an average calculated based on the 28 studies reviewed by Lachat, Conty, 
Hugueville, & George, 2012) whereas the delay is three times that (47-64 ms; M = 592 vs. 
645 ms) in the VPT paradigm (McCleery et al., 2011; Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et 
al., 2013). The higher robustness is demonstrated by the fact that in the VPT paradigm the 
influence of what the other person is looking at is found when the gazing avatar is 
presented simultaneously with the object(s) to be processed, while in the gaze cueing 
paradigm, the influence of what the other person is looking at is only found when the gaze 
cue is presented between 50 and 800 ms prior to the object (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 
2007) but not when the gaze cue is presented simultaneously with the object (i.e., with a 
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Stimulus-Onset Asynchrony (SOA) of 0 ms ; Xu, Tanaka, & Mineault, 2012). In other 
words, in the gaze cueing paradigm (unlike in the VPT paradigm), the gazer has to be 
presented first alone without the competition of other objects to capture attention. This 
suggests that the priority the attentional system given to the gazer is higher in the VPT 
paradigm than in the classic gaze cueing paradigm. Understanding the origin of this 
difference may shed light on the conditions that trigger our sensitivity to what someone else 
is looking at. This is the aim of the current study. 
A closer examination of the discrepant features across the VPT and classic gaze cueing 
paradigms highlighted three elements that could play a causal role in yielding bigger and 
more robust sensitivity to what someone else is looking at in the VPT compared to the gaze 
cuing paradigm. 
The first discrepant element is related to the nature of the stimuli used in the two 
paradigms. Visual salience (e.g. luminance contrast) is known to influence the bottom-up 
processes that capture our attention to certain features of the scene (Treisman & Gelade, 
1980). The absolute visual salience of the gazer as well as its relative salience compared to 
other elements in the scene may thus have an impact on the extent to which attention is 
captured by the gazer and what he is looking at. The stimuli of the VPT paradigm are quite 
different to the ones that are classically used in the gaze cueing paradigm in that the avatar 
contrasts sharply in terms of luminance (i.e. dark hair and black shirt) with the rest of the 
scene (i.e. bright blue walls and bright red discs pinned on the wall). It is thus possible that 
the visual appearance of the stimuli of the VPT paradigm were more optimal to orient 
attention to the gazer and then to what he is looking at. The visual salience of the 
directional information of the gazer is another factor that may boost our sensitivity to what 
another person is looking at. Accordingly, the directional information of the gaze is found 
to be more salient when several directional cues are oriented in the same direction than in 
opposite directions (Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000; Langton, 2000; but see Hietanen, 1999, 
2002; Pomianowska, Germeys, Verfaillie, & Newell, 2011). The stimuli of the VPT 
paradigm distinguish themselves from the ones used in the classic gaze cueing paradigm in 
that the directional information is conveyed by a full body avatar whose head and body are 
congruently oriented sideways at 90° angle. This congruent combination of directional 
information may increase the salience of the directional information and thus our sensitivity 
to another person’s direction of gaze.  
The second element is the overall level of task complexity across both paradigms. The 
overall reaction times for participants to judge their own perspective in the VPT paradigm 
are about 100 to 300 ms longer than the overall reaction times to detect or identify the 
target in the classic gaze cueing paradigm (Frischen et al., 2007). The longer processing 
time in the VPT paradigm may provide critical extra time for computing the gaze direction 
of the avatar and prioritizing attention to what the other person is looking at.  
Finally, the third element relates to the differing task instructions across the two 
paradigms. Task instructions are known to influence how attention is deployed on the task 
Gaze computation triggers 
stimuli (Posner, 1980). In the gaze cueing paradigm, participants are asked to detect or 
identify an object. Thus, the task instructions do not direct attention to the gazer but to the 
surrounding objects. In the VPT paradigm, participants are asked to judge what they see. 
Even though this instruction does not directly direct the participants’ attention to the gazer 
and should also direct attention to the surrounding objects, it has been consistently shown 
that the mere fact of asking participants to focus on their own perspective naturally directs 
attention to the other person because they construe their perspective as distinct from the 
other person’s perspective (Gendolla & Wicklund, 2009; Hass, 1984; Scaffidi Abbate, 
Isgró, Wicklund, & Boca, 2006; Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983, 1984). 
In a series of three experiments, we examined whether each of these elements plays a 
causal role in boosting the sensitivity to what someone else is looking at. The boosted 
sensitivity to what someone else is looking at was here operationalized as the presence of 
an effect of gaze direction at an SOA of 0 ms, indicating a higher priority given to the gazer 
and what he is looking at compared to any other stimulus presented simultaneously. 
Experiment 1 tested for the role of visual salience (luminance contrast and directional 
information) by using the same stimuli as the ones used in the VPT paradigm by Samson et 
al. (2010) in a gaze cueing paradigm. Experiment 2 examined the role of task complexity 
by equating the overall accuracy and response times across the VPT and the gaze cueing 
paradigms. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the effects of task instructions by equating the 
attentional deployment onto the gazer across the VPT and the gaze cueing paradigms. All 3 
experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the Psychological Sciences 
Research Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain. 
2. Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 aimed to test the hypothesis that the stimuli used in the VPT 
paradigm (Samson et al., 2010) were more optimal to attract attention to the gazer and what 
he is looking at than the stimuli classically used in the gaze cueing paradigm (e.g., Driver et 
al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998: Hietanen, 1999) in term of visual salience (i.e., 
luminance contrast, and directional information). In order to test this hypothesis, we 
developed a gaze cueing task with the visual stimuli of the VPT task. We also manipulated 
the onset of the target relative to the presentation of the gaze cue with, on half of the trials, 
the target objects appearing simultaneously with the gaze cue (SOA = 0 ms) and, on the 
other half of the trials, the target objects appearing 300 ms after the gaze cue. We expect to 
replicate in the 300-ms SOA condition the findings that participants will be faster to 
process the targets when these appear in a location congruent with the location the gazer is 
looking at compared to when the targets appear at the opposite location (e.g., Driver et al., 
1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998a; Friesen, Moore, & Kingstone, 2005). Furthermore, if 
the visual appearance of the stimuli of the VPT task is what explains the higher sensitivity 
to what another person is looking at in the VPT paradigm, we should also find in our 
modified gaze cueing task a gaze congruency effect in the 0-ms SOA condition. 
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2.1  Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-six healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated 
in the experiment in return of 5 euros (21 females, mean age: 24.22, age range: 18-31).  
 
2.1.2 Apparatus.  
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor (1024x768, 85 Hz, Dell M782p) with the 
E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) running on a Dell 
Pentium 4 (2.8 GHz) computer. Participants sat at a distance of approximately 40 cm from 
the screen. 
2.1.3 Stimuli and procedure.  
For each trial, participants saw first a fixation cross displayed for 750 ms followed by a 
500-ms blank. They then saw a scene (19° x 11.5°) with an avatar (the gazer: 1.5° x 8°) 
positioned in the centre of a blue room. The avatar was always gender congruent with the 
participants’ gender. The avatar faced either the left or the right wall (see Figure 1). One or 
two red discs (the target object(s); 0.7° x 1.5° each, 1:1 probability) were presented on one 
of the lateral walls at 6.5° from the gazer. Participants were instructed to press “1” or “2” 
on the numerical keypad when respectively 1 or 2 red discs were pinned on the wall. 
Directly following the participant’s response, a feedback “Correct”, “Incorrect”, or “No 
response” was presented for 1 s. A “No response” feedback was presented after 2 s had 
elapsed without a response from the participant.  
On half of the trials, the discs were displayed simultaneously with the gazer and the 
background walls (0-ms SOA condition) whereas in the other half of the trials the red 
disc(s) appeared 300 ms after the presentation of the gazer and the background walls (300-
ms SOA condition). Furthermore, on half of the trials, the discs were presented in the 
location the gazer was looking at (congruent gaze condition) whereas on the other half of 
the trials, the discs appeared on the opposite wall (incongruent gaze condition). Forty-eight 
trials were presented in each of the four conditions that resulted from this 2 (SOA) x 2 
(Congruency) design. The trials were presented in random order across 2 blocks of 96 trials 
preceded by a 32 trials practice block. The task lasted approximately 12 minutes. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the gaze cueing task of Experiment 1. 
On this trial, participants had to press on the key “2” because two discs were visible in the room. The 
last screen displayed the feedback about participant’s accuracy of response. 
2.2  Result 
One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the group and 
was thus removed from the analyses.  
2.2.1 Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (1.36% of the data) and response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.02% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when computing the RTs.  
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on median RTs. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 13.838, MSE = 2,116, p = 
.001, ηp² = .366, with slower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a 
significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 480.578, MSE = 118,198, p < .001, ηp² = .952, 
with slower performances in the 0-ms SOA condition than in the 300-ms SOA condition, 
and a significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 22.564, MSE = 3,080, p 
< .001, ηp² = .485.  
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As we were specifically interested in measuring the participants’ sensitivity to what a 
gazer is looking at, we computed a gaze congruency index by subtracting the mean RT on 
congruent gaze trials from the mean RT on incongruent trials. The gaze congruency index 
was not different from 0 in the 0-ms condition, t (24) < 1, p = .519, but significantly 
different from 0 in the 300-ms SOA condition, t (24) = 5.288, p < .001 (see Figure 2).  
2.2.2 Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on error rates. The ANOVA revealed 
no significant effect (all Fs < 1, all ps > .425; see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the gaze cueing task of Experiment 1 as a 
function of SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for pairwise 
comparisons. *** = p < .001. 
These results replicate previous findings (e.g., Driver et al. 1999; Friesen, Moore, & 
Kingstone, 2005; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) indicating that participants were sensitive to 
what a gazer is looking at and showed a gaze cueing effect when using an SOA of 300 ms. 
Most importantly, despite the fact that we used the visual stimuli proper to the VPT task, 
we found no evidence of gaze cueing at an SOA of 0 ms. The nature of the stimuli used in 
the VPT task is thus not what boosts the sensitivity to what another person is looking at. 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed to test the hypothesis that the task complexity of the VPT task 
allows for extra time for the influence of the gazing avatar to start and modulate the task 
performance. In order to test this hypothesis, we developed a gaze cueing task and VPT 
task that were matched in terms of working memory load and task difficulty and hence 
overall response time. We also ensured that the stimuli used in the VPT and the gaze cueing 
tasks were matched in terms of visual appearance. Furthermore, like in Experiment 1, we 
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manipulated the SOA (0 ms versus 300 ms). We expected to find in the VPT task a 
sensitivity to what another person is looking at irrespective of the SOA (although the VPT 
had never been implemented before with an SOA of 300 ms). We also expected to replicate 
this sensitivity in the gaze cueing paradigm at an SOA of 300 ms but the critical question 
was whether this sensitivity would now also be found at an SOA of 0 ms. If the increased 
task complexity of the novel gaze cueing task delays participants’ responses and through 
this gives a better opportunity for attention to be attracted to the gazer and what he is 
looking at, then we should find a significant sensitivity to what a gazer is looking at with an 
SOA of 0 ms in the gaze cueing task.  
3.1  Method 
3.1.1 Participants.  
52 healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the 
experiment in return of 8 euros and were randomly allocated to either the gaze cueing task 
condition (17 females, mean age: 21.50, age range: 18-30) or the VPT task condition (17 
females, mean age: 21.57, age range: 18-28) with a total of 26 participants in each 
condition. 
3.1.2 Apparatus.  
Identical to Experiment 1. 
3.1.3 Stimuli and procedure. 
The gaze cueing task.  
Participants were presented with similar room displays as the ones used in Experiment 
1. The room included one centrally positioned avatar facing either the left or the right wall 
and no discs1 on the walls or one to two discs pinned on one of the walls. There were two 
main changes to the task (see Figure 2). (A series of pilot tests indicated that these were 
efficient ways to match the overall response times and task complexity across the gaze 
cueing and VPT tasks). Firstly, the discs were not red anymore but were black with a fine 
red or green contour. Secondly, the participants were asked to verify whether two prompts 
presented before the room was displayed matched the content of the room. The sequence of 
events within a trial closely matched the sequence of events in the classic VPT task 
(Samson et al., 2010). More specifically, participants were first shown a colour prompt for 
750 ms indicating which discs they had to take into account (“RED” meant that participants 
should only take into account the black discs with a red contour while “GREEN” meant that 
they had to take into account the black discs with a green contour). After a 500-ms blank 
screen, participants were presented with a number prompt (ranging from 0 to 2) for 750 ms. 
                                                 
 
1
 The trials without disc were used as catch trials. 
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After a 500-ms blank screen, the room was displayed and the participants were asked to 
indicate whether the number prompt matched the number of discs with the prompted colour 
contour displayed in the room by pressing the upward arrow (yes) or downward arrow key 
(no). For example, following the prompts “RED” and “2”, participants had to say whether 
there were two black discs with a red contour in the room or not (“yes” or “no”). A 50-ms 
auditory signal was displayed informing when participants could respond. This feature was 
added to prevent participants from confusing trials from the 0-ms SOA condition with no 
disc in the room with trials from the 300 ms SOA condition (in which the appearance of the 
discs is delayed). Directly following the participant’s response, a feedback “Correct”, 
“Incorrect”, or “No response” was presented for 1 s. A “No response” feedback was 
presented after 2 s had elapsed without a response from the participant.  
On one half of the trials, the black disc(s) were displayed simultaneously with the gazer 
and the background walls (0-ms SOA condition) whereas on the other half of the trials the 
black disc(s) appeared 300 ms after the presentation of the scene (300-ms SOA condition). 
Furthermore, on half of the trials, the target discs appeared at the location gazed at 
(congruent gaze condition) whereas on the other half of the trials, the discs appeared on the 
opposite wall (incongruent gaze condition). There were 32 matching trials and 32 
mismatching trials in each of the 4 experimental conditions (2 (SOA) x 2 (Congruency)). 
The two types of colour prompts (“RED” or “GREEN”) were equally distributed across all 
experimental conditions. As in the original VPT paradigm, mismatching trials were 
discarded from the analysis due to concerns that they may artificially inflate the gaze 
congruency effect (the number prompts in the mismatching trials of the congruent gaze 
condition do not correspond to either the number of red, green or total number of discs and 
are thus particularly easy to reject). In addition, 64 filler trials with no disc or with discs on 
the two lateral walls were added to balance the occurrences of each number prompt (0, 1, or 
2) across conditions; these filler trials were removed from the analyses. The trials were 
presented in random order across 4 blocks of 80 trials preceded by a 40 trials practice 
block. The task lasted approximately 32 minutes. 
The VPT task.  
The VPT task was identical to the gaze cueing task except that the colour prompt was 
replaced by a perspective prompt indicating which perspective participants had to judge 
(“YOU” or “SHE”/“HE”). Participants had hence to judge whether the number prompt 
matched the number of discs that either they themselves (critical self-perspective trials) or 
the avatar (filler other-perspective trials)2 could see (see Figure 3). The colour of the disc 
contours varied as in the gaze cueing task but was not relevant for the VPT task. The gaze 
                                                 
 
2
 Filler other-perspective trials are included to ensure that participants maintain a perspective-taking mind-
set. If only self-perspective-taking trials are included, participants after a certain time risk to construe the 
task more like in the gaze cueing task (counting the dots) rather than as a perspective-taking task (what do 
“I” see). 
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congruent condition corresponded to trials where participants had to judge their own 
perspective (“YOU” prompts) and where the discs appeared in the line of sight of the 
avatar. The gaze incongruent condition corresponded to trials where participants had to 
judge their own perspective (“YOU” prompts) and where the discs appeared on the 
opposite wall to the one the avatar was gazing at. The design (2 (SOA) x 2 (Congruency)) 
was identical to the gaze cueing task, including in terms of the number of matching, 
mismatching, and filler trials, which were identically distributed across the 4 experimental 
conditions. The two types of perspective prompts (“YOU” or “HE”/“SHE”) were equally 
distributed across all experimental conditions. The task lasted approximately 32 minutes. 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the gaze cueing task of Experiment 2. 
On this trial, participants had to judge whether there was one disc with a red border (see magnified 
view of the discs used) visible in the room. The last screen displayed the feedback about participant’s 
accuracy of response. 
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3.2  Result 
3.2.1 The VPT task. 
One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the group and 
was thus removed from analyses. As a reminder, only self-perspective trials were taken into 
account as these are the trials where computing what the avatar sees is task-irrelevant. The 
results of the full analysis of the VPT task replicate the original task (Samson et al., 2010) 
and are reported in Appendix 1. 
Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (3.19% of the data) and response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.24% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when computing the 
median RTs.  
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on median RTs. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 15.995, MSE = 39,204, p = 
.001, ηp² = .204, with slower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a 
significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 41.204, MSE = 207,025, p < .001, ηp² = .632, 
with slower performances in the 0-ms SOA condition than in the 300-ms SOA condition, 
and a non-significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 1.222, MSE = 
3,147, p = .280, ηp² = .048.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1, we computed a gaze congruency 
index by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from that on incongruent trials. The 
gaze congruency index was significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and the 300-ms 
SOA conditions, t (24) = 3.284, p = .003, t (24) = 2.226, p = .036, respectively (see Figure 
4).  
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the visual perspective-taking task of 
Experiment 2 as a function of SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
for pairwise comparisons. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
Two participants’ congruency indexes were 3 SD higher than the mean congruency index of 
the group; these participants were thus removed from analyses.  
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on ERs. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 22) = 6.894, MSE = .010, p = .015, ηp² = .239, 
with lower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a non-significant 
main effect of SOA, F (1, 22) < 1, MSE = .001, p = .580, ηp² = .014, and a non-significant 
Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 22) < 1, MSE = .001, p = .874, ηp² = .001.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1, we computed a gaze congruency 
index by subtracting the mean ER in congruent trials from that in incongruent trials. The 
gaze congruency index was close to significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and the 
300-ms SOA conditions, t (22) = 1.908, p = .069, t (22) = 1.699, p = .103, respectively (see 
Figure 4).  
These results replicate that, in the VPT task, we are sensitive to what a gazer is looking 
at an SOA of 0 ms and, in addition, shows for the first time that this effect is maintained 
when the SOA is increased to 300 ms.  
3.2.2 The gaze cueing task.  
One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the group. 
Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (0.74% of the data) and response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.09% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when computing the 
median RTs. Two participants’ congruency indexes were 3 SD higher than the mean 
congruency index of the group and were thus removed from analyses. 
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on median RTs. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 22) = 5.621, MSE = 3,537, p = .027, 
ηp² = .204, with slower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a 
significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 22) = 76.351, MSE = 61,906, p < .001, ηp² = .776, 
with slower performances in the 0-ms SOA condition than in the 300-ms condition, and a 
significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 22) = 10.404, MSE = 4,375, p = 
.004, ηp² = .321.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1, we computed a gaze congruency 
index by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from that on incongruent trials. The 
gaze congruency index was not different from 0 in the 0-ms condition, t (22) < 1, p = .833, 
but significantly different from 0 in the 300-ms SOA condition, t (22) = 3.751, p = .001 
(see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the gaze cueing task of Experiment 2 as a 
function of SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for pairwise 
comparisons. ** = p < .01. 
Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the group and 
three participants’ congruency index were 3 SD higher than the mean congruency index of 
the group; these participants were thus removed from analyses.  
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on ERs. The ANOVA revealed 
no significant effect (all Fs < 1.337, all ps > .260; see Figure 5).  
3.2.3 Tasks comparison. 
 In order to verify that the gaze cueing and VPT tasks were matched in terms of task 
difficulty we compared the overall performance between the two tasks on RTs and ER. 
Participants’ responses were slower but more often accurate in the gaze cueing task than in 
the VPT task, t (48) = 1.635, p = .108, t (48) = 4.369, p < .001, respectively. Because there 
was a clear difference in the speed-accuracy trade-off between the two tasks and because 
the mean ERs of both tasks were below .10, we performed the same comparison on the 
inverse efficiency scores (IES), which combines the two measures of performance 
(formula: IES = RT/(1-ER)). The overall IES performance in the gaze cueing task (M = 
614) was not significantly different from the overall performance in the VPT task (M = 
578), t (48) < 1, p = .334. 
In sum, our results replicate the findings that, in the gaze cueing task, participants are 
sensitive to what another person is looking at and showed a gaze-cuing effect with an SOA 
of 300 ms (e.g., Driver et al. 1999; Friesen, et al., 2005; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) despite 
the unusual increase in working memory load and overall task difficulty. Importantly, 
however, there was no sensitivity to what the gazer was looking at with an SOA of 0 ms. 
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Consequently, the hypothesis according to which the task complexity or the working 
memory load of the VPT task allows more time for our sensitivity to another person’s gaze 
to emerge is not supported. 
4. Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aimed to test the hypothesis that the different task instructions across the 
classic gaze cueing paradigm and the VPT paradigm lead to a different top-down 
attentional deployment on the scene. Through the perspective-taking instructions of the 
VPT task, attention would be deployed on the scene in such a way that it encompasses the 
gazer (and hence what he is looking at) even when participants judge their own perspective. 
Several studies suggest that this may result from the fact that perspective taking is about 
differentiating the self from another and that even when we think about the self, attention is 
naturally drawn to the other (e.g., Abbate et al., 2006; Gendolla & Wicklund, 2009; Hass, 
1984; Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). In contrast, the instructions of a classic gaze cueing 
task only draw attention to the objects present in a scene. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
modified the gaze cueing task so that attention is artificially drawn to the location of the 
avatar (importantly however, without explicitly asking to pay attention to the avatar). This 
was achieved by superimposing the instruction prompts on the avatar. We again 
manipulated the SOA (0 versus 300 ms) and closely matched all the trial events across the 
gaze cueing and the VPT tasks. We expected to replicate the sensitivity to what another 
person is looking at in the VPT task irrespectively of the SOA; we also expected to find this 
sensitivity in the gaze cueing task when the SOA is 300 ms and the crucial question is 
whether our task modifications are sufficient to now find this sensitivity also at an SOA of 
0 ms. 
4.1  Method 
4.1.1 Participants.  
Fifty healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the 
experiment in return of 8 euros and were randomly allocated between the gaze cueing task 
condition (19 females, mean age: 21.70, age range: 18-28) and VPT task condition (19 
females, mean age: 22.10, age range: 18-30) with a total of 25 participants in each 
condition.  
4.1.2 Apparatus.  
Identical to Experiment 1. 
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4.1.3 Stimuli and procedure.  
The gaze cueing task.  
Participants were presented with the same stimuli and instructions as in Experiment 2 
except for four changes made to the task. Firstly, the discs were not black with a red or 
green contour but were fully coloured in red or green (see Figure 3). Secondly, the colour 
and number prompts were not presented before the room was displayed but were presented 
simultaneously with the room, superimposed on the avatar’s chest. This was done to force 
attention to be deployed on the avatar (without referring to perspective taking, however). 
Thirdly, the “GREEN” colour prompt was changed to “ALL” and meant that participants 
had to take into account all colours of discs. For example, participants were shown the 
room, read “ALL 2” on the avatar’s chest, and thus had to say whether there were two discs 
in the room or not, no matter their colour. This change was made to match more closely the 
effects of the perspective prompts on attention deployment (“ALL” matching the “SELF” 
prompt by encompassing all discs and “RED” matching the “SHE”/“HE” prompt by 
encompassing sometimes only a subset of discs). Fourthly, the discs displayed on the same 
wall were either all red or all green to reduce the cognitive demand of selective attention in 
the “RED” colour instruction condition (otherwise, the green disc would have been a 
nearby, and thus potent, distractor). 
The design (2 (SOA: 0 vs. 300 ms) x 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent gaze)) 
was identical to Experiment 2, including in terms of the number of matching, mismatching, 
and filler trials, which were identically distributed across the 4 experimental conditions. 
The two types of colour prompts (“RED” or “ALL”) were equally distributed across all 
experimental conditions. The task lasted approximately 22 minutes and contained 4 blocks 
of 80 trials preceded by a practice block of 24 trials. 
The VPT task.  
Participants were presented with same stimuli as the gaze cueing task of this experiment 
but with the prompts of the VPT task of Experiment 2. For example, participants were 
shown the room, read “YOU 2” on the avatar’s chest, and thus had to say whether they 
could see from their own perspective two discs in the room or not.  
The design (2 (SOA: 0 vs. 300 ms) x 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongruent gaze)) 
was identical to Experiment 2, including in terms of the number of matching, mismatching, 
and filler trials, which were identically distributed across the 4 experimental conditions. 
The two types of perspective prompts (“YOU” or “SHE”/“HE”) were equally distributed 
across all experimental conditions. The task lasted approximately 22 minutes and contained 
4 blocks of 80 trials preceded by a practice block of 24 trials. 
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Figure 6. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the gaze cueing task of Experiment 3. 
On this trial, participants had to judge whether there were two red discs visible in the room. The last 
screen displayed the feedback about participant’s accuracy of response. 
4.2  Result 
4.2.1 The VPT task.  
As a reminder, only self-perspective trials were taken into account as these are the trials 
where computing what the avatar sees is task-irrelevant. The results of the full analysis of 
the VPT task replicate the original task (Samson et al., 2010) and are reported in Appendix 
1. 
Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (5.25% of the data) and response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.03% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when computing the 
median RTs.  
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on median RTs. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 54.716, MSE = 309,136, p < 
.001, ηp² = .695, with slower responses in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a 
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significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 205.559, MSE = 1,255,296, p < .001, ηp² = .895, 
with slower responses in the 0-ms SOA condition than in the 300-ms condition, and a 
significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 8.603, MSE = 23,286, p = 
.007, ηp² = .264.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1 and 2, we computed a gaze 
congruency index by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from that on incongruent 
trials. The gaze congruency index was significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and 
the 300-ms SOA conditions, t (24) = 7.949, p < .001, t (24) = 4.308, p < .001, respectively 
(see Figure 7). Moreover, the gaze congruency index was significantly higher in the 0-ms 
SOA condition than in the 300-ms SOA condition, t (24) = 2.933, p = .007. 
 
Figure 7. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the visual perspective-taking task of 
Experiment 3 as a function of SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
for pairwise comparisons. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. 
Error rates. 
 Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on ERs. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 14.113, MSE = .051, p = .001, ηp² = .370, 
with lower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a non-significant 
main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) < 1, MSE = .002, p = .484, ηp² = .021, and a non-significant 
Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 2.752, MSE = .006, p = .110, ηp² = .103.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted on RTs, we computed a gaze congruency index by 
subtracting the mean ER on congruent trials from that on incongruent trials. The gaze 
congruency index was close to significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and the 300-
ms SOA conditions, t (24) = 3.507, p = .002, t (24) = 2.388, p = .025, respectively (see 
Figure 7). 
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Ins sum, these results replicate the findings that participants are sensitive to what a 
gazer is looking at both at an SOA of 0 ms and 300 ms but, in addition, these results show 
that this sensitivity is stronger at an SOA of 0 ms than at an SOA of 300 ms (see Figure 9). 
4.2.2 The gaze cueing task.  
Trials with the red colour instruction when only green discs were presented (i.e., 25% of 
all trials) were removed from the analyses because it was too difficult to press “yes” when 
zero red disc was presented (accuracy was 3 SD below the mean overall accuracy level). 
Reaction times. 
 Erroneous responses (2.09% of the data) and response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.02% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when computing the 
median RTs. 
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on median RTs. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 23.471, MSE = 21,550, p < 
.001, ηp² = .494, with slower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a 
significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 519.219, MSE = 1,012,639, p < .001, ηp² = .956, 
with slower performances in the 0-ms SOA condition than in the 300-ms condition, and a 
non-significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 1.037, MSE = 1,697, p = 
.319, ηp² = .041.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted in Experiment 1 and 2, we computed a gaze 
congruency index by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from that on incongruent 
trials. The gaze congruency index was significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and 
the 300-ms SOA conditions, t (24) = 3.704, p = .001, t (24) = 2.097, p = .047, respectively 
(see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the gaze cueing task of Experiment 3 as a 
function of SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for pairwise 
comparisons. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
A 2 (Congruency) x 2 (SOA) ANOVA was conducted on ERs. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 11.340, MSE = .004, p = .003, ηp² = .321, 
with lower performances in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, a non-significant 
main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) < 1, MSE = .001, p = .579, ηp² = .013, and a non-significant 
Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) < 1, MSE = .001, p = .558, ηp² = .014.  
Similarly to the analyses conducted on RTs, we computed a gaze congruency index by 
subtracting the mean ER on congruent trials from that on incongruent trials. The gaze 
congruency index was close to significantly different from 0 both in the 0-ms and the 300-
ms SOA conditions, t (24) = 1.769, p = .090, t (24) = 2.009, p = .056, respectively (see 
Figure 8).  
In sum, these results replicate the finding that participants are sensitive to what a gazer 
is looking at with an SOA of 300 ms (e.g., Driver et al. 1999; Friesen, et al., 2005; Friesen 
& Kingstone, 1998). Importantly, however, this sensitivity, that is to say the gaze cueing 
effect, was found for the first time with an SOA of 0 ms. This finding strongly supports the 
hypothesis that drawing attention to the location of the gazer through task instructions 
boosts participants’ sensitivity to what another person is looking at (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Gaze congruency indexes (Incongruent – Congruent gaze trials subtraction) as a function of 
Task (gaze cueing vs. perspective taking), Experiment (1, 2, 3), and Stimulus-Onset Asynchrony 
(SOA: 0-ms vs. 300-ms). For the purpose of between-experiment comparisons and because the mean 
ER was below .10, indexes were calculated from the inverse efficiency scores (IES; formula: RT/(1-
ER)). Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 (selected 
comparisons).  
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5. General discussion 
Across 3 experiments in which participants completed a gaze cueing task, our results 
replicated the well-known finding that participants perform better in identifying a target 
presented in the line of sight of a gazer than a target presented outside of its line of sight 
when the gazer is presented 300 ms prior to the target (i.e., with an SOA of 300 ms; Driver 
et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Furthermore, we replicated in Experiments 2 and 
3 that, in a VPT paradigm, sensitivity to another person’s gaze direction can be observed 
not only when the gazer is presented prior to the target but even when the gazer is presented 
simultaneously with the target (i.e., with an SOA of 0 ms; McCleery et al., 2011; Samson et 
al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013; Surtees & Apperly, 2012). Most importantly, we 
showed, however, that the presence of a gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms in the 
gaze cueing paradigm cannot be systematically found despite that we matched the gaze 
cueing task in terms of stimuli saliency (Experiment 1) or task difficulty (Experiment 2) 
with the VPT task. The gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms was only found in the 
gaze cueing task when the instructions specifically directed participants’ attention to the 
avatar’s location by having a part of the instructions superimposed on the avatar 
(Experiment 3). Altogether, this pattern of results provides important insights into the 
conditions in which we process where/what another person is looking at.  
On the one hand, our results show that once attention is drawn to a person (even when 
there is no explicit instruction to take into account that person’s visual experience), what is 
in the line of sight of the person is automatically computed and influences judgments we 
make about what we ourselves see. This is truly independent of whether participants are 
placed in a gaze cueing or a VPT task. Importantly, however, our results show that whether 
attention is drawn to the person in the first place is context-dependent: the social mind-set 
created by a perspective-taking task (even when participants are only required to judge their 
own perspective) seems to naturally draw attention to the other person whereas in a gaze 
cueing task, attention has to be drawn by external factors such as the prior presentation of 
the gazer alone without competing stimuli (as with the classic 300-ms SOA) or the 
presentation of task-relevant information in the same location as the avatar (as in 
Experiment 3). This means that it is not the mere presence of another person in our field of 
view that triggers attentional orienting or line of sight computation but the mere fact of 
looking at or attending to another person. This has implications for the question of the 
automaticity with which we compute what someone else is looking at. 
Automaticity is a complex concept in cognitive sciences which is best examined when 
measurable characteristics are defined (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Three important 
characteristics of automaticity that are often examined are the following: (1) whether the 
process is unintentional (i.e., “uncontrolled in terms of the goal to engage in the process”, 
p. 309), (2) whether the process is efficient (or effortless; i.e., “consumes little or no 
processing resources or attentional capacity”, p. 317), and (3) whether the process is 
stimulus driven (i.e., “produced by the mere presence of the stimulus”, p. 308). Firstly and 
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in relation to the first characteristic, there is evidence that the computation of what someone 
else is looking at occurs even when it is not necessary to do so for the task and even at the 
cost of task performance: in both the gaze cueing task and the critical self-perspective trials 
of the VPT task of this study, participants were not instructed to pay attention to the gazer, 
the gaze direction was not predictive of the location of the targets, and error feedbacks were 
given to participants so that they were made aware of the interference they were 
experiencing. Despite these factors, participants still computed what the gazer was looking 
at. Note that in our VPT task we did not use the clearest condition to show unintentional 
processing because the task also included trials in which participants were asked to judge 
the avatar’s perspective and, hence, even if the avatar’s perspective was not relevant for the 
critical self-perspective trials, it was nevertheless relevant at other moments in the task. 
Importantly, however, previous studies that have used the VPT paradigm have shown that 
participants compute what the avatar sees even when throughout the whole experience they 
are only required to judge their own perspective (Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 
2013). Thus, all together, the results support the notion that participants compute what 
another person is looking at “unintentionally”.  
Secondly, it has been shown in previous studies with both the gaze cueing and the VPT 
paradigms that the computation of what someone else is looking at is not suppressed or 
down-modulated when participants are in a dual-task situation, supporting the view that the 
computation is “effortless” (Hayward & Ristic, 2013; Law, Langton, & Logie, 2010; 
Qureshi et al., 2010). 
Finally, regarding the triggering conditions, our results clearly show that the mere 
presence of the other person is not sufficient to trigger the computation of what that person 
is looking at. Hence, computing what another person is looking at is not stimulus-driven but 
context-dependent. Thus, in a situation where a person is surrounded by objects (like a 
classic gaze cueing task at an SOA of 0 ms), attention is probably distributed across the 
scene and this does not seem to be sufficient to trigger the computation of what another 
person is looking at. Instead, attention needs to prioritize the gazing person before the 
computation of what the gazing person is looking at can happen. The prioritization can be 
achieved in at least 3 contexts. First, in the context of the VPT task, attention seems to be 
narrowed down to the gazing person because of its high relevance for the perspective-
taking instructions. The high relevance seems to suffice to prioritize the processing of the 
gazing person over the processing of the competing peripheral target and would explain 
why there is a gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms with the VPT task. Second, in the 
context of the classic gaze cueing paradigm with an SOA of at least 50 ms, attention is 
narrowed down to the gazing person because it appears first alone without competing 
objects in the scene, which is why we consistently found a gaze congruency effect at an 
SOA of 300 ms across all experiments. Third, in the context of goal-relevant information 
placed on the same location as the gazing person, attention is narrowed down to the area of 
the gazing person in order to read the instructions. This also seems to be sufficient to 
prioritize the processing of the gazing person over the competing peripheral target and 
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explains why we found a gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms with the gaze cueing 
task in Experiment 3. In sum, the computation of what another person is looking at does not 
seem to occur when the gazing person and the peripheral target appear simultaneously 
unless attention is narrowed down to the gazing person through the influence of social or 
non-social factors.  
Interestingly, the mere fact of judging one’s own visual perspective is sufficient to 
trigger the computation of what another person is seeing. Following the seminal finding of 
Hass (1984), Wicklund and colleagues (Abbate et al., 2006; Gendolla & Wicklund, 2009; 
Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983, 1984) have repeatedly shown that when we are asked to 
focus on ourselves, we are more prompt to take another person’s perspective. These authors 
stated that such self-focus exacerbates our awareness of how distinct we are from others 
and how we are perceived by others, which increases the salience of the other person’s 
perspective (Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). This latter view is line with the observation 
that young children who fail to take another person’s visual perspective are those who fail 
to differentiate the self from others (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Flavell et 
al., 1981). Altogether, it seems likely that, in the VPT paradigm, when participants are 
explicitly asked to take their own visual perspective, they are put in a social mind-set that 
increases the salience of the gazer and thus the amount of attention deployed on it.  
Finally, while our study speaks to the question of the conditions that trigger the 
computation of where/what another person is looking at, our results leave open for future 
research important follow-up questions. Firstly, when people compute what another is 
looking at, what exactly do they compute? Do they simply extract directional information 
or do they infer a mental state (“seeing”), or both? Some studies have started to look into 
this issue but the results are not yet clear-cut (Santiesteban et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2010). 
Secondly, are the factors that trigger the computation of what another person is looking at 
(VPT1) sufficient to also trigger the computation of how someone else sees a scene 
(VPT2)? VPT2 is usually seen as a more complex form of perspective taking than VPT1, as 
it takes longer to develop in children (Masangkay et al., 1974) and relies on different 
cognitive mechanisms, such as mental body rotation (A. Surtees et al., 2013; A. D. R. 
Surtees et al., 2013). It is thus possible that VPT1 and VPT2 also differ in terms of their 
triggering factors. 
6. Conclusion 
Humans are sensitive to what other people are looking at. This has been evidenced in a 
gaze cueing paradigm in which participants are less efficient in processing objects when 
these appear in a location incongruent with the location another person is looking at (e.g., 
Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Friesen et al., 2005; Hietanen, 1999, 2002) 
and in a VPT task in which participants are less efficient at processing the objects visible 
from their own visual perspective when these are not visible from someone else’s 
perspective (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013; Surtees & 
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Apperly, 2012). Interestingly, the sensitivity to what the other person is looking at is higher 
and more robust in the VPT paradigm than the gaze cueing paradigm. We showed that this 
can be explained by how attention is deployed on the other person in relation to the task-
goal and more specifically, that the social mind-set induced by perspective-taking 
instructions provides a powerful contextual trigger. 
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7. Appendix 1 
7.1  Results at the VPT task in Experiment 2 
One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the group and 
was thus removed from the analyses.  
7.1.1 Reaction times.  
The ANOVA 2 (Perspective instruction: self- vs. other-perspective) x 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) x SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms) conducted on the median RTs 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 31.314, MSE = 485,752, p < 
.001, ηp² = .566, with faster responses on congruent perspectives trials than on incongruent 
perspectives trials, a main effect of Perspective, F (1, 24) = 8.375, MSE = 62,994, p = .008, 
ηp² = .259, with participants being faster at judging from their own perspective than the 
avatar’s perspective, a significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 59.584, MSE = 493,173, 
p < .001, ηp² = .713, with faster responses on SOA 300-ms trials than on SOA 0-ms trials, 
and a significant Congruency x Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 23.673, MSE = 
173,843, p < .001, ηp² = .497, with a higher effect of Congruency on other-perspective trials 
than on self-perspective trials and faster and slower responses on other-perspective trials 
than self-perspectives trials in the congruent and incongruent trials, respectively. Other 
interactions were not significant (all ps > .265). These results replicate the finding of the 
original study by Samson et al. (2010). 
7.1.2 Error rates.  
The ANOVA 2 (Perspective instruction: self- vs. other-perspective) x 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) x SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms) conducted on the ERs revealed a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 36.933, MSE = .263, p < .001, ηp² = .606, 
with less errors on congruent perspectives trials than on incongruent perspectives trials, a 
main effect of Perspective, F (1, 24) = 13.245, MSE = .057, p = .001, ηp² = .356, with 
participants making less errors at judging from their own perspective than the avatar’s 
perspective, a marginal main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 4.112, MSE = .020, p = .054, ηp² = 
.146, with less errors on SOA 300-ms trials than on SOA 0-ms trials, and a significant 
Congruency x Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 13.395, MSE = .070, p < .001, ηp² 
= .367, with a higher effect of Congruency on other-perspective trials than on self-
perspective trials and less and more errors on other-perspective trials than self-perspectives 
trials in the congruent and incongruent trials, respectively. Other interactions were not 
significant (all ps > .255). These results replicate the finding of the original study by 
Samson et al. (2010). 
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7.2  Results at the VPT task in Experiment 3 
7.2.1 Reaction times.  
The ANOVA 2 (Perspective instruction: self- vs. other-perspective) x 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) x SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms) conducted on the median RTs 
revealed a significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 135.089, MSE = 1,966,144, p 
< .001, ηp² = .849, with faster responses on congruent perspectives trials than on 
incongruent perspectives trials, a marginal effect of Perspective, F (1, 24) = 3.914, MSE = 
32,665, p = .059, ηp² = .140, with participants being faster at judging from their own 
perspective than the avatar’s perspective, a significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 24) = 
491.796, MSE = 2,347,077, p < .001, ηp² = .953, with faster responses on SOA 300-ms 
trials than on SOA 0-ms trials, a significant Congruency x Perspective interaction effect, F 
(1, 24) = 102.080, MSE = 379,320, p < .001, ηp² = .810, with a higher effect of Congruency 
on other-perspective trials than on self-perspective trials and faster and slower responses on 
other-perspective trials than self-perspectives trials in the congruent and incongruent trials, 
respectively, and a significant Congruency x SOA interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 8.727, 
MSE = 44,163, p = .007, ηp² = .267, with a higher Congruency effect on SOA 0-ms trials 
than on SOA 300-ms trials. Other interactions were not significant (all ps > .564). These 
results replicate the finding of the original study by Samson et al. (2010). 
7.2.2 Error rates.  
The ANOVA 2 (Perspective instruction: self- vs. other-perspective) x 2 (Congruency: 
congruent vs. incongruent) x SOA (0-ms vs. 300-ms) conducted on the ERs revealed a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F (1, 24) = 36.825, MSE = .558, p < .001, ηp² = .605, 
with less errors on congruent perspectives trials than on incongruent perspectives trials, a 
main effect of Perspective, F (1, 24) = 16.079, MSE = .073, p = .001, ηp² = .401, with 
participants making less errors at judging from their own perspective than the avatar’s 
perspective, and a significant Congruency x Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 24) = 
20.044, MSE = .184, p < .001, ηp² = .455, with a higher effect of Congruency on other-
perspective trials than on self-perspective trials and less and more errors on other-
perspective trials than self-perspectives trials in the congruent and incongruent trials, 
respectively. Other interactions were not significant (all ps > .285). These results replicate 
the finding of the original study by Samson et al. (2010). 
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Effects of guilt, anger, and shame on 
perspective taking 
 
 
 Emotions can make us more or less egocentric. However, it remains unclear whether this 
results from a change in the cognitive control abilities allowing us to put aside our 
conflicting egocentric perspective or whether it results more directly from a change in how 
much attention we allocate to ourselves and other people. We used a visual perspective-
taking task designed to disentangle these two hypotheses and examined the effects of anger 
and guilt. Experiment 1 showed that guilt made participants more other-oriented while 
anger tended to make them more self-centred. These two emotions had, however, no effect 
on the ability to handle conflicting perspectives. Since the method used to induce guilt in 
Experiment 1 also induced feelings of self-incompetence and shame, Experiment 2 aimed at 
isolating the effects of these concomitant feelings. Self-incompetence and shame reduced 
participants’ ability to handle conflicting perspectives but did not make them more other-
oriented. Altogether the results highlight different pathways by which emotional states can 
affect perspective taking. 
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Effects of guilt, anger, and shame on 
perspective taking 
 
 
 
Henryk Bukowski, Dana Samson 
Institut de recherche en sciences psychologiques, Université catholique de Louvain, 
Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium 
1. Introduction 
Anger and guilt are core emotions thought to regulate social interactions. They arise 
from the violation of personal or moral standards which affect self and other judgements 
and have been described as having distinct intrinsic goals (Ausubel, 1955; Baumeister, 
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Haidt, 2003; Hall, 1899; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013; 
Tangney, 1995). Anger towards others is usually described as aiming at punishing or 
threatening another person responsible for a bad action (Haidt, 2003; Izard & Ackerman, 
2000). In contrast, guilt is described as aiming at repairing for one’s own bad action 
through favouring prosocial behaviours (i.e., actions that benefit others, often at a personal 
cost; Batson & Powell, 2003) towards others (Baumeister et al., 1994). A large body of 
evidence supports the proposed link between these two emotions and social interactions. 
For example, guilt feelings have been associated with reparative actions (e.g., Cryder, 
Springer, & Morewedge, 2012; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar, 
Tung Au, & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & Devries, 2007; Nelissen, Leliveld, van Dijk, & 
Zeelenberg, 2011; Regan, 1971) whereas anger feelings have been associated with punitive 
actions (e.g., Bosman, Sutter, & van Winden, 2005; Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; 
Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009a; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).  
As suggested by the studies referred to here above, it is mainly how our social 
behaviour is influenced by anger and guilt that has been studied so far. In contrast, little is 
known as to whether anger and guilt also affect another facet of social interactions, namely 
our ability to take another person’s perspective. Every day we face social situations in 
which, we need to identify the expectations, beliefs, intentions, and feelings of the people 
we interact with in order to adapt our actions adequately. Hence, perspective taking 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Preston & de Waal, 2002) is considered as a critical social 
skill for adaptation and even survival within human societies (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; 
de Waal, 2008). 
So far only two studies have looked directly as to whether our emotional state 
influences perspective-taking performance (Converse et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2010). In the 
first study, Converse and colleagues (2008) reported evidence that people induced to feel 
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happy showed worse perspective-taking performances than those induced to feel sad as 
measured by a false-belief task (in which participants had to estimate where another person 
– who did not share the same knowledge about the location of an object – would look for 
that object) and a referential communication task (in which participants had to interpret 
which object another person – who did not share the same visual perspective – is referring 
to). In both tasks, participants in a happy mood made more egocentric errors. The authors 
suggested that since our own perspective is often readily accessible by default, adopting 
someone else’s perspective is a deliberative process requiring the inhibition of our own 
perspective. In line with previous studies related to the use of deliberate processing under 
positive and negative moods (e.g., Bless, 2001; Forgas, 1995), they stated that happy 
individuals are more likely than sad individuals to not deliberately incorporate knowledge 
about others but rather rely on their default egocentric perspective.  
In the second study, Yang and colleagues (2010) induced guilt and shame feelings 
through an autobiographical recall following which participants were asked to rate how 
sarcastic a note left by a person would be interpreted by another naïve person. Since the 
scenario implied that the note was sarcastic but the naïve recipient had no way to know it, 
participants were assessed for their ability to inhibit their own privileged knowledge of the 
sarcastic nature of the note and to correctly infer that the naïve person would perceive the 
note as sincere. Participants in the guilt condition thought that the note would be perceived 
by the naïve recipient as less sarcastic than those in the neutral induction condition whereas 
participants in the shame condition perceived the note as more sarcastic than participants in 
the neutral induction condition. Yang and colleagues (2010) concluded that guilt leads to an 
increased tendency to engage in perspective taking whereas shame decreases this tendency.  
In sum, there is some evidence that happiness and shame reduce while guilt increases 
participants’ perspective-taking performance. In both studies, however (and in most 
perspective-taking tasks), successful performance does not depend only on participants’ 
tendency to deliberately seek information about others but also on their ability to put aside 
their own conflicting and interfering point of view. Inhibiting our self-perspective is an 
effortful process which relies on general cognitive control abilities (or executive functions), 
such as inhibitory and monitoring skills (Carlson et al., 2002). Therefore it remains unclear 
from previous studies whether the emotional state impacted on general cognitive control 
abilities required to handle the conflicting perspectives or whether the emotional state 
changed directly the degree to which attention is self- versus other-oriented. In the latter 
case, by naturally orienting attention to oneself or someone else, the emotional state would 
indirectly impact on the demands of self-perspective inhibition when the other person’s 
perspective is different to ours (increasing the inhibition demands in case of self-oriented 
attention and decreasing the inhibition demands in case of other-oriented attention). 
The current study had two goals. First, given the opposite effects that anger and guilt 
have on prosocial behaviour, we wanted to examine whether opposite effects would also be 
observed in a perspective-taking task.  
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Secondly, we aimed to clarify the mechanisms through which different negative 
emotions influence perspective taking using a perspective-taking task (Samson et al., 2010) 
in which participants are asked to judge their own and someone else’s visual perspective in 
situations where both perspectives are either consistent or inconsistent. By manipulating 
independently the perspective to judge and the level of conflict between perspectives, this 
design allowed to disentangle whether the emotional state changes the orientation of 
attention towards oneself versus another person (in which case we expected the emotional 
state to interact with the perspective factor) or whether the emotional state affects the 
cognitive control processes necessary to handle conflicting perspectives (in which case we 
expected the emotional state to interact with the consistency factor). In a previous study 
(Qureshi et al., 2010), it was shown that being engaged in a secondary task tapping onto 
inhibitory control while performing the visual perspective-taking task affected how 
participants handled conflicting perspectives but not whether they performed better in 
judging the self or the other person’s perspective (i.e., independently of the perspective to 
take), supporting the view that handling conflicting perspectives requires domain-general 
cognitive control processes (e.g., Fizke, Barthel, Peters, & Rakoczy, 2014; Sabbagh, 
Moses, & Shiverick, 2006).  
To our knowledge, there is so far no direct evidence about the potential effect of anger 
on perspective taking (or “cognitive” empathy, i.e., the ability to infer someone’s mental 
state). However, anger is known to affect cognition by diminishing the likelihood of 
engaging in deliberate processing and by increasing the reliance on heuristic cues (Lerner & 
Tiedens, 2006). Thus, in line with Converse and colleagues (2008), we could expect that 
angry participants would have lower perspective-taking performances when perspective 
taking requires deliberate processing, i.e., when there is a conflict between one’s own and 
someone else’s perspective. Such reduction of perspective-taking performance would 
therefore result from reduced cognitive control abilities to handle conflicting perspectives. 
On the other hand, Singer and colleagues (2006) have shown reduced aversive emotional 
neural responses and increased hedonic neural responses to the pain inflicted to another 
person when participants were angry at this person compared to when they were not angry 
at this person. This finding suggests that anger reduces affective empathy (i.e., the ability to 
emotionally connect with someone else) by making participants more centred on their own 
feelings rather than on the contagious and intruding feelings of suffering felt by the other 
person. Therefore, if such reduction of affective empathy translates to cognitive empathy, it 
could result from a change in the orientation of attention towards oneself versus another 
person rather than a change in cognitive control abilities. Altogether, previous evidence of 
effects of anger on cognition and on affective empathy lead us to expect a reduction of 
perspective-taking performance but it is unclear through which pathway such reduction 
would occur. 
Concerning guilt, Yang and colleagues (2010) showed that guilt increased perspective-
taking performance. Given that guilt is often found to promote prosocial goals and 
described as a relationship-oriented emotion (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 
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1998), one could expect that the effect of guilt on perspective taking results from more 
attention being allocated to the other person than oneself. However, several studies have 
suggested that guilt is in fact a self-focused emotion aiming at repairing one’s own misdeed 
rather than reducing others’ suffering (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer & Leach, 2009). 
The enhanced perspective-taking abilities may thus not be related to the relative weight 
given to oneself and the other person but rather through the cognitive control pathway, by 
increasing the ability to handle conflicting perspectives. This alternative hypothesis is in 
line with some studies that have shown that guilt increases cognitive control and depth of 
cognitive processing (Gangemi & Mancini, 2007; Lassiter, 2012). Altogether, we are still 
missing clear and direct evidence about the pathway through which guilt affects 
perspective-taking. 
Finally, because anger and guilt are known to influence prosocial behaviour, we added a 
prosocial behaviour measure following the perspective-taking task in order to verify 
whether the targeted feelings were successfully induced. Previous studies suggest that anger 
should reduce prosocial behaviour (e.g., Chow et al., 2008; Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009) 
while guilt should increase prosocial behaviour (e.g., Ketelaar et al., 2003; Nelissen et al., 
2007).  
In Experiment 1, participants played an interactive game with another person in order to 
induce contrasting emotional feelings (guilt vs. anger vs. control). We then measured 
participants’ perspective-taking performance with a visual perspective-taking task and their 
prosocial behaviour through their propensities to allocate raffle tickets to the other person 
and a charity. Experiment 2 aimed to isolate the effect of self-incompetence and shame 
which were concomitantly induced with guilt in Experiment 1 in order to ensure that the 
effects of guilt observed in Experiment 1 were truly due to guilt and not a confounding 
emotion. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1  Method 
2.1.1 Participants.  
Fifty-one healthy individuals were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (17 
participants in the guilt condition, 16 participants in the anger condition and 18 participants 
in the control condition). Four participants in the anger condition did not feel anger 
following the induction procedure and were thus replaced by an additional set of 4 
participants who reported anger feelings (27 females, mean age: 21.50, age range: 18-31). 
Participants participated in return of a 1/60 chance to win 150 euros and were also told that 
they would receive an additional monetary compensation which depended upon their 
partner’s performance in a card game. The study was approved by the ethics committee of 
the Psychological Sciences Research Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain.  
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2.1.2 Material and procedure. 
Initial social interaction.  
At the beginning of the experiment, the participant and a female confederate student 
were brought into a room where the experimenter welcomed the two persons and explained 
them the procedures as if they were both naïve participants. After both read the instructions 
and signed the consent forms, the experimenter asked to pick one of his hands which 
concealed a number that determined the order of play in the first game. The confederate 
knew what hand to pick and rapidly made her choice. Then, the two persons completed the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), a questionnaire measuring participants’ 
agreement on a 5-point Likert scale with 28 statements about their personal experiences in 
social and emotional situations. Four subscales of 7 items each assessed participants’ 
tendencies to show empathic concern, perspective taking, fantasy (i.e. self-absorption in 
fictions), and personal distress. While one person was completing the IRI questionnaire, the 
other person was brought in front of a white panel to take 3 photographs. A front view 
photograph provided the portrait used in the Card Picking Game (described below) and two 
sideways photographs (supposedly) provided the stimuli for the visual perspective-taking 
task. The two persons were then brought in two adjacent rooms for the remaining of the 
experiment. 
Emotional induction with the Card Picking Game.  
Participants were asked to complete the Card Picking Game, a computerized pseudo-
interactive card game. The principle of the game was to pick one card among two, knowing 
that only one of the two cards will result in a monetary gain. The winning card showed “+1 
euro” on one of its side and the other card showed “+0 euro” on one of its side. The back 
sides of the two cards were identical. The cards were first shown face up so that participants 
could identify where the winning card was located. The cards were then turned over and 
moved around the screen crossing each other’s path. The participants were led to believe 
that they played with their game partner (i.e. the confederate) over the local network. For 
each trial, when the active player picked the money-winning card, the passive player’s 
monetary reserve was increased by 1 euro. In other words, the participants were led to 
believe that they and their partner were playing for the other player’s earnings (for details 
about how the Card Picking Game was implemented, see the first section of the 
Supplementary information).  
The card game was manipulated in 4 ways. Firstly, irrespective of the card that was 
chosen, the value (+1 or +0) that was shown was predefined depending on the experimental 
condition. Secondly, the speed of movement and the amount of times that the cards crossed 
each other’s path was manipulated so that it was difficult but not impossible to locate the 
winning card. This was done so that participants could not be 100% sure that they choose 
the correct card, thereby decreasing any suspicion that the game was fixed. Thirdly, 
although participants were led to believe that there was a real game partner, the game 
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partner’s rounds were entirely controlled by the computer. Fourthly, a 2 euro bonus feature 
was added to the game: whoever received the bonus could decide to keep it all for 
him/herself, share it with the partner or give it all to the partner. The bonus feature appeared 
on the screen after the 8th trial of the partner’s rounds. Participants were led to believe that 
the game partner was randomly designated to receive the bonus. These features allowed us 
to induce the target emotions.  
For the anger induction, the participant played first and, irrespective of the card chosen, 
the value of the chosen card was always “+1 euro”. This led the participants to believe that 
they performed perfectly on the 8 trials thereby making their partner earn 8 euros. For the 
partner’s rounds, on only 2 out of the 8 trials was the chosen card the winning one. Thus the 
fictive game partner made the participants earn only 2 euros. Moreover, the game partner 
chose to keep the 2 euros bonus for herself. 
For the guilt induction, the partner’s rounds were presented first and, on all 8 trials, the 
chosen card was the winning one which led the participants to believe that the game partner 
made them earn 8 euros. It was then the participants’ turn to play, and on only 2 out of the 8 
trials was the chosen card the winning one. Thus, the participants were led to believe that 
they made their game partner earn only 2 euros. (This procedure was inspired by the 
procedure used by Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009b). Moreover, the game partner chose to 
give half of the 2 euros bonus to the participant. 
For the control condition, the order of play was counterbalanced across participants and 
both the participant and the confederate chose the winning card on 8 out of the 8 trials. 
There was no bonus in the control condition.  
Visual perspective-taking task.  
Immediately following the Card Picking Game, participants were asked to complete a 
visual perspective-taking task (Samson et al., 2010). In the task, participants saw pictures of 
their game partner positioned in the centre of a room with red discs displayed on one or two 
of the side walls (see Figure 1). The game partner was seen sideways facing either the left 
or the right wall; participants were led to believe that these pictures were edited based on 
the two photographs of the partner taken earlier. The principle of the task was to judge 
whether a certain number (ranging from 0 to 3) matched the number of discs visible from 
either the participant’s perspective (self-perspective condition) or from the game partner’s 
perspective (other-perspective condition). The number of discs visible could be the same 
for both perspectives (consistent perspectives condition) or different (inconsistent 
perspectives condition). Furthermore, the digit given could match or mismatch the content 
of the picture from the given perspective. As in the original paradigm, because mismatching 
trials in the consistent condition always displayed digit cues irrelevant to any perspectives 
and thus were particularly easy to process, mismatching trials were unbalanced in terms of 
performance difficulty with matching trials and were thus not analysed. The task included a 
total of 234 trials, evenly spread across experimental conditions and divided into 4 blocks 
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of 52 trials plus a set of 26 practice trials. Like in the original study by Samson and 
colleagues (2010) we included 18 filler trials to avoid anticipatory responses (see the 
original study for details). Trials within each block were presented in a randomized order. 
The task lasted around 20 minutes. 
The task ran on E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA), with the 
exact same timing of events as in the original study by Samson and colleagues (2010; see 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a trial of the inconsistent perspectives / other-perspective condition in the 
visual perspective-taking task. In this trial, participants had to judge whether the game partner saw or 
not 1 disc. The last screen displayed the feedback about participant’s accuracy of response. 
Prosocial behaviour assessment with the Raffle task.  
Once the visual perspective-taking task was completed, participants received 12 raffle 
tickets and were told that each ticket gives one chance out of 720 to win the 150 euros 
prize. Moreover, they were told that the partner did not receive these tickets because only 
the person who played first/second in the Card Picking Game receives the raffle tickets 
(depending on whether the participant was first or second in that game). This justification 
was convincing since it was explicitly stated in the consent form that the tickets would be 
randomly allocated to one of the players based on the number they would pseudo-randomly 
pick from the experimenter’s hands. For each raffle ticket, participants were asked to 
choose among 3 options for the course of action to follow in case the ticket is the winning 
one: (1) keep the prize for themselves, (2) give it to their game partner, (3) give it to the 
Red Cross. The decision was made by ticking the chosen recipient on each ticket. 
Importantly, participants were told that the whole procedure was anonymous and 
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participants were invited to make their choice privately once the examiner had left the room 
by slipping the tickets in a locked wooden box.  
Induction efficacy.  
In order to insure that the emotion inductions were successful, the participants 
completed at the end of the experiment a questionnaire asking about how they felt after the 
Card Picking Game. The participants rated to what extent they felt a series of (1) 12 
emotions (items adapted from Wallbot & Scherer, 1986), (2) 13 body sensations (items 
adapted from Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) and (3) 11 action tendencies (items 
adapted from Youngstrom & Green, 2003). All ratings were made on a 7-point intensity 
scale where 0 meant “Not at all” and 6 meant “Strongly”. Participants were also asked 
questions about how fair and nice they perceived their game partner to be (see all items of 
the questionnaire in the second section of the Supplementary information). 
Debriefing.  
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter revealed and explained the reasons for 
all the deceptive aspects. Each participant was then compensated with 10 euros and one true 
raffle ticket. Participants were invited to rate and comment on the extent to which the 
deceptive aspects (confederate, card game, and raffle ticket sharing) were credible. The 
ratings could go from 0, meaning ‘Not at all convincing’, to 6, meaning ‘Strongly 
convincing’, and averaged above 5 across all conditions and deceptive components.  
2.2  Results 
2.2.1 Induction efficacy.  
All participants in the guilt condition felt guilt at an intensity of at least 2 and none of 
the participants in the control condition felt anger or guilt at an intensity of 2 or above. Four 
participants reported anger feelings below an intensity of 2 and were thus replaced with an 
additional set of 4 participants who felt anger at an intensity of 2 or more. 
All ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of Emotion induction (anger vs. guilt vs. 
control) on the subjective ratings of all emotion items (all ps < .005) but only a marginal 
effect on the ‘attention’ item, F (2,48) = 2.783, p = .072. Participants in the guilt condition 
felt significantly more guilt than the participants in the anger condition, t (31) = 13.948, p < 
.001, and the control condition, t (33) = 18.380, p < .001 (see Figure 2(a)). They also felt 
more shame than the participants in the anger condition, t (31) = 3.885, p = .001, and the 
control condition, t (33) = 9.721, p < .001. Moreover, they judged their game partner as 
fairer, t (31) = 7.403, p < .001, and nicer, t (31) = 6.746, p < .001, than those in the anger 
condition and also nicer, t (33) = 2.485, p = .018, but not fairer, t (33) < 1, p = .536, than 
those in the control condition. Within the guilt condition, participants felt significantly 
more guilt than any other emotion (including shame, all ps < .05; see Figure 2(a)). 
Participants in the anger condition felt more anger, disgust, and disdain than those in the 
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guilt condition, t (31) = 2.281, p = .030, t (31) = 2.800, p = .009, t (31) = 3.453, p = .002, 
respectively, and in the control condition, t (32) = 11.674, p < .001, t (32) = 7.147, p < .001, 
t (32) = 4.616, p < .001, respectively. Within the anger condition, participants felt 
significantly more anger than any other emotion, all ps < .01, except for disgust, t (26) = 
1.246, p = .232, and surprise, t (26) < 1, p = .621, which were nevertheless felt to a smaller 
extent (see Figure 2(a)). 
Participants in the control condition felt more happiness than those in the anger 
condition, t (32) = 6.418, p < .001, and guilt condition, t (33) = 5.385, p < .001. Within the 
control condition, participants felt significantly more happiness than any other emotion, all 
ps < .001, except for amusement, t (17) = 1.327, p = .202, and attention, t (17) < 1, p = 
.681. Altogether, these results suggest that the participants felt the targeted emotional 
feelings (see Figure 2(a)). 
For both the guilt and the anger conditions, participants felt significantly more body 
sensations and action tendencies than participants in the control condition, indicating that 
the manipulation succeeded in inducing emotional “responses”. Participants in the guilt 
condition were more willing to go towards someone or something and to disappear or 
dissolve; those in the anger were more willing to badmouth, to go towards someone or 
something, to kick, hit, or destroy, to yell, scream, or swear; those in the control condition 
were more willing to sing, dance, jump, or laugh (see the second section of the 
Supplementary information for details). 
In summary, the induction of the targeted emotional feelings was overall successful.  
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Figure 2. Means of self-reported emotion ratings in Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b). Error 
bars represent standard errors. * = p < .05, ** = p < .0, *** = p < .001.  
2.2.2 Equivalence of participants’ characteristics across the 
three experimental conditions.  
The 51 participants were evenly distributed in terms of gender, χ² (2, 51) < 1, p = .838, 
and age, F (2, 47) < 1, MSE = 2.257, p = .725, η² = .014, across the anger, the guilt and the 
control conditions. Furthermore, the 3 experimental groups did not differ in terms of their 
overall IRI score, F (2, 48) < 1, p = .474, η² = .031, nor on any of its subscales, all Fs < 
1.685, all ps > .195, and were thus evenly distributed across conditions in terms of 
dispositional empathy.  
2.2.3 Visual perspective-taking task. 
 Similarly to the study by Samson and colleagues (2010), only matching trials were 
taken into account for the analyses.  
Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (5.25% of the data), response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (0.49% of the data) as well as RTs beyond 2.5 SD of the mean RT of the 
experimental condition (3.3% of the data) were eliminated from the data set. 
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A 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted with the Consistency between the two perspectives 
(consistent vs. inconsistent perspectives) and the Perspective to judge (self- vs. other-
perspective) as within-subject variables, and the Emotion (anger vs. guilt vs. control) as a 
between-subject variable. In line with the results reported in the original study (Samson et 
al., 2010), the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 48) = 
51.872, MSE = 226,346, p < .001, ηp² = .19, with faster responses in consistent than 
inconsistent perspectives trials, no significant main effect of Perspective, F (1, 48) < 1, 
MSE = 1,073, p = .606, ηp² = .006, and a significant Consistency x Perspective interaction 
effect, F (1, 48) = 33.478, MSE = 85,229, p < .001, ηp² = .411, with a larger Consistency 
effect when participants judged the other person’s perspective than their own perspective. 
These results replicate all the effects found in the original study (Samson et al., 2010) and 
show that the task was properly completed.  
Of particular interest to the current study were any effects of Emotion (see Figures 3 
and 4(a)). The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F (2, 48) = 1.140, MSE = 
132,977, p = .328, ηp² = .045. However, the Perspective x Emotion interaction was 
significant, F (2, 48) = 4.580, MSE = 18,241, p = .015, ηp² = .160. No other interaction was 
significant (Consistency x Emotion: F (2, 48) < 1, MSE = 2,803, p = .530, ηp² = .026; 
Perspective x Consistency x Emotion: F (2, 48) = 2.170, MSE = 5,525, p = .125, ηp² = 
.083).  
To explore the Perspective x Emotion interaction effect, we conducted separate paired-t 
tests for each Emotion condition to test the effect of Perspective. There was a significant 
effect of Perspective among the participants in the guilt condition, t (16) = 2.516, p = .023, 
d = 0.61, with a 44 ms advantage when taking their partner’s perspective. There was no 
significant effect of Perspective among the participants in the anger condition, t (15) = 
1.113, p = .283, d = 0.28, and in the control condition, t (17) < 1, p = .538, d = 0.13. In 
order to compare the Perspective effects between the emotion conditions, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted on the perspective differences (i.e., mean RT of self-perspective 
trials minus mean RT of other-perspective trials) with the Emotion as a between-subjects 
variable. There was a significant effect of Emotion on the perspective differences, F (2, 48) 
= 4.514, MSE = 34,529, p = .016, η² = .158. Planned contrasts revealed a significantly 
higher mean RT perspective difference in the guilt condition than in the anger condition, t 
(48) = 2.718, p = .009, d = 0.98, and the control condition, t (48) = 2.467, p = .017, d = 
0.86. The mean RT perspective difference was not significantly different between the anger 
and control condition, t (48) < 1, p = .745, d = 0.12. 
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Figure 3. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the visual perspective-taking task of 
Experiment 1 as a function of the Perspective, Consistency, and Emotion conditions. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
A 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on the error rates (ER) with the Consistency between 
the two perspectives and the Perspective to judge as within-subject variables, and the 
Emotion as a between-subject variable. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Consistency, F (1, 48) = 43.584, MSE = .136, p < .001, ηp² = .476, with better performances 
in consistent than inconsistent perspectives trials, no significant main effect of Perspective, 
F (1, 48) < 1, MSE = .002, p = .379, ηp² = .016, and a significant Consistency x Perspective 
interaction effect, F (1, 48) = 8.388, MSE = .019, p = .006, ηp² = .149, with a larger 
Consistency effect when participants judged the other person’s perspective than their own 
perspective. These results replicate all the effects found in the original study and show that 
the task was properly completed.  
Of particular interest to the current study were any effects of Emotion (see Figures 3 
and 4(a)). The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F (2, 48) < 1, MSE = .004, p = 
.506, ηp² =.028, and the Emotion did not significantly interact with any of the other 
variables (Perspective x Emotion: F (2, 48) = 1.835, MSE = .005, p = .171, ηp² = .071; 
Consistency x Emotion: F (2, 48) < 1, MSE = .002, p = .563, ηp² = .024; Perspective x 
Consistency x Emotion: F (2, 48) < 1, MSE = .002, p = .493, ηp² = .029).  
To make inspect whether there was a speed-accuracy trade-off in our results, we 
explored the Perspective x Emotion interaction. We conducted separate paired-t-tests for 
each Emotion condition to test the effect of Perspective. There were no significant effects 
of Perspective (anger: t (15) = 1.735, p = .103, d = 0.43; guilt: t (16) < 1, p = .422, d = 0.20; 
control: t (17) < 1, p = .928, d = 0.02). The participants in the guilt condition showed the 
highest other-perspective advantage, with 0.74% less errors at judging from their partner’s 
perspective relatively to their own perspective. The participants in control and anger 
conditions made respectively 0.12% less errors and 2.47% more errors at judging from their 
partner’s perspective relatively to their own perspective. These results suggest that the 
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perspective effects found in the anger, control, and guilt conditions in the RT analyses were 
not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Figure 4. (a) Other-perspective advantage (self-perspective vs. other-perspective) and (b) interference 
due to perspectives conflict (inconsistent perspective vs. consistent perspective) of the participants in 
the visual perspective-taking task as a function of Experiment and Emotion conditions. For the 
purpose of between-subjects comparisons and because the mean ER was below .10, indexes were 
calculated from the inverse efficiency scores (IES; formula: RT/(1-ER)). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. * = p .05, ** = p < .01. 
2.2.4 Raffle task.  
We conducted separate ANOVAs on the number of tickets (out of the 12 given to them) 
that participants allocated to each of the 3 possible recipients (the participant him/herself 
vs. his/her game partner vs. the Red Cross), with the Emotion as a between-subject variable 
(see Figure 5). There was a significant main effect of Emotion on the number of tickets 
allocated to the game partner, F (2, 48) = 8.921, MSE = 31.503, p = .001, η² = .271, but 
there was no significant effect of Emotion on the number of tickets allocated to the Red 
Cross, F (2, 48) < 1, MSE = 5.696, p = .412, η² = .036, and only a marginal effect for 
allocation to themselves, F (2, 48) = 2.716, MSE = 29.042, p = .076, η² = .102. Planned 
contrasts revealed that participants allocated more tickets to their partner in the guilt 
condition, M = 2.765, SD = 2.488, than in the anger condition, M = 0, SD = 0, t (48) = 
4.224, p < .001, d = 1.52, and than in the control condition, M = 1.444, SD = 2.036, t (48) = 
2.077, p = .043, d = 0.72. Moreover, participants in the anger condition allocated less 
tickets to their partner than the participants in the control condition, t (48) = 2.237, p = .030, 
d = 0.79. Concerning ticket allocations to themselves, participants in the anger condition 
kept significantly more tickets than of those in the guilt condition, t (48) = 2.104, p = .041, 
d = 0.76, and marginally more than those in the control condition, t (48) = 1.953, p = .057, 
d = 0.69. 
In sum, these results suggest that the participants’ propensity to behave prosocially was 
not modulated in terms of altruism in the broad sense (i.e. giving to a charity) but 
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specifically when the opportunity to behave prosocially was directed towards their game 
partner, that is, a recipient related to the felt emotional state. Participants’ propensity to 
behave prosocially towards their partner was higher in the guilt condition and lower in the 
anger condition compared to the control condition. 
 
Figure 5. Number of raffle tickets that participants allocated to their partner, the Red Cross, and 
themselves in Experiment 1 and 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. * = p < .05, ** = p 
< .01.  
2.3  Intermediary discussion 
Contrasting profiles across participants in the guilt and anger conditions were found 
both in the visual perspective-taking and the Raffle tasks. Participants in the guilt condition 
showed an overall other-perspective advantage (while a trend for a self-perspective 
advantage was observed in the anger condition), and they gave significantly more raffle 
tickets to their game partner than the participants in the anger condition.  
The guilt induction in the Card Picking Game of Experiment 1 was achieved by making 
participants perform badly and unable to reciprocate the amount of money that their game 
partner gave them in the first round. While this procedure successfully induced guilt, it also 
induced a feeling of shame (M = 3.765) probably originating from a feeling of self-
incompetence at the card game. Indeed, feeling incompetent is often associated with shame 
(Ausubel, 1955; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Keltner, 1996; R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & 
Eyre, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). A replication of the guilt induction in a new set of 17 
participants indicated that, indeed, participants felt not only guilt (M = 4.722, SD = 1.320) 
but also shame (M = 3.611, SD = 2.033) and low self-competence (M = 1.000, SD = 1.138; 
on a scale ranging from 0, meaning “Not competent”, to 6, meaning “Highly competent”). 
Congruently, shame was positively associated with guilt, r(18) = .593, p = .009, and 
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negatively associated with self-competence, r(18) = -.407, p = .094, but guilt was not 
associated with self-competence, r(18) = .000, p = 1. (The effects of guilt on the 
perspective-taking task were also replicated, see Appendix 1.) It is thus unclear whether the 
other-oriented perspective-taking performance in the guilt condition found in our study was 
driven by guilt or rather shame/self-incompetence feelings. Experiment 2 aimed at 
specifically inducing feelings of shame/self-incompetence without feelings of guilt to rule 
out that the effects observed in Experiment 1 were due to these concomitant feelings rather 
than guilt. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, with the same dependent variables, 
except that the induction procedure now allowed us to specifically manipulate perceived 
self-competence. 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1  Method 
3.1.1 Participants.  
Thirty-four healthy individuals were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (17 
participants in the shame condition and 17 participants in the control condition). Five 
participants in the shame condition did not feel shame following the induction procedure 
and were thus replaced by an additional set of 5 participants who reported shame feelings 
(19 females, mean age: 21.00, age range: 18-25). Participants participated in return of 16 
euros and a 1/60 chance to win 150 euros. The study was approved by the ethics committee 
of the Psychological Sciences Research Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain.  
3.1.2 Material and procedure.  
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except for the following changes. First, 
participants did not meet their partner (i.e. a female confederate). Instead, they were told 
that the partner had already participated and that her performance during the Card Picking 
Game was filmed and would be shown to them during the experiment. This allowed 
showing the partner acting with care thereby reducing the likelihood that participants would 
judge the partner’s good or bad performance as originating from chance or carelessness. 
Participants’ performance was also filmed, and they were told that this video would be 
shown to their partner when they meet with her after the experiment. This was done to 
increase the deceptive effectiveness by matching the treatment of the participant to those of 
the confederate. Secondly, participants’ earnings were no more dependent on their game 
partner’s performance in the Card Picking Game and the 2 euros bonus was removed. There 
were thus no moral expectations anymore that could have led to guilt or anger. Finally, the 
Card Picking Game had 6 consecutive trials rather than 8 to ensure that the bad 
performance would not appear as worse than chance level and hence suspicious. Together, 
these changes allowed to specifically manipulate perceived competence. 
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In the control/self-competence induction, participants played first and, irrespective of 
the card chosen, the value of the chosen card was always “+2 coins”. This led participants 
to believe that they performed perfectly on the 6 trials and thereby collected 12 coins. They 
then watched the recording of the game partner’s performance. The video showed the game 
partner choosing the winning card only twice on 6 trials and thus collecting 4 coins. In sum, 
participants were led to believe that they were perfectly competent at finding the winning 
card whereas the game partner was incompetent at finding it. 
In the shame/self-incompetence induction, participants played first and, irrespective of 
the card chosen, the value would be “+2 coins” only twice over 6 trials. This led 
participants to believe that they performed poorly, collecting only 4 coins. They then 
watched the recording of the game partner’s performance. The video showed the game 
partner choosing the winning card on the 6 trials and thus collecting 12 coins. In sum, 
participants were led to believe that they were incompetent at finding the winning card 
whereas the game partner was competent at finding it. Such exposure to incompetence was 
aimed at inducing shame (Ausubel, 1955; Keltner, 1996).  
Visual perspective-taking task, raffle task, induction efficacy and debriefing.  
The rest of the procedure went on as in Experiment 1 with the addition of 2 items in the 
exit questionnaire to rate the perceived self- and other-competence. The ratings for 
credibility of the experiment, averaged above 4.55 across all conditions and deceptive 
components.  
3.2  Results 
3.2.1 Induction efficacy.  
None of the participants in the control condition felt shame at an intensity of 2 or above. 
Five participants in the shame condition reported shame feelings below an intensity of 2 
and were thus replaced with an additional set of 5 participants who felt shame at an 
intensity level of 2 or more. 
Relatively to the participants in the control condition, participants in the shame 
condition reported higher emotional intensities on all negative emotions (all ps < .05), with 
shame being felt most strongly, M = 3.352, SD = 1.057, t (32) = 13.077, p < .001 (see 
Figure 2(b)). Relatively to the control condition, participants in the shame condition 
reported less amusement, t (32) = 3.023, p = .005, and happiness, t (32) = 8.628, p < .001, 
more surprise, t (32) = 2.494, p = .018, and a similar level of attention, t (37) < 1, p = .567. 
The level of intensity of guilt in the shame condition of Experiment 2, M = 1.176, SD = 
1.509, was significantly smaller than in the guilt condition of Experiment 1, t (32) = 8.115, 
p < .001, while a similar level of shame was found in both experiments, t (35) < 1, p = .332. 
Participants in the shame condition felt more shame than any other emotion (including 
guilt; all ps < .05) except attention, t (16) < 1, p = 1.000, and surprise, t (16) < 1, p = .361. 
Within the control condition, participants felt more happiness than any other emotion (all ps 
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< .05) except attention, t (16) = 1.900, p = .076. Finally, participants in the shame condition 
perceived themselves as less competent, M = 0.880, SD = 0.600, than their partner, M = 
5.820, SD = 0.829, t (16) = 27.253, p < .001, and than those in the control condition, M = 
5.840, SD = 0.375, t (32) = 28.397, p < .001. Participants in the control condition perceived 
themselves as more competent, M = 5.823, SD = 0.393, than their partner, M = 2.235, SD = 
0.903, t (16) = 12.583, p < .001. 
The analyses conducted on the body sensation and action tendency items showed that 
the participants of the shame condition felt a series of body sensations and actions 
tendencies to a greater extent than those in the control condition, which indicates that the 
shame induction succeeded in inducing emotional “responses”. The participants of the 
shame condition were more willing to avoid or leave, to shelter or protect themselves, to 
yell, scream, or swear (see the second section of the Supplementary information for 
details). 
In summary, the participants of the shame condition did feel shame above all other 
emotions and felt no guilt whereas those in the control condition did not report any feeling 
of shame (see Figure 2(b)).  
3.2.2 Equivalence of participants’ characteristics between the 
two experimental conditions.  
The age of 2 participants was not encoded due to a technical failure. The control and 
shame groups did not differ in terms of age, t (32) < 1, p = .559, or gender, χ² (1, 34) = 
1.074, p = .300. Furthermore, the 2 experimental groups did not differ in terms of their 
overall IRI score, t (32) = < 1, p = .614, nor on any of the IRI subscales, all ps > .260.  
3.2.3 Visual perspective-taking task.  
Reaction times.  
Erroneous responses (5.5% of the data), response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (1.9% of the data), and RTs beyond 2.5 SD of the mean RTs of each 
experimental condition (3.6% of the data) were eliminated from the data set.  
The ANOVA 2 (Perspective) x 2 (Consistency) x 2 (Emotion) revealed a significant 
main effect of Consistency, F (1, 32) = 74.010, MSE = 232,515, p < .001, ηp² = .698, no 
main effect of Perspective, F (1, 32) < 1, MSE = 2,442, p = .473, ηp² = .016, and a 
significant Consistency x Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 32) = 13.617, MSE = 52,490, 
p < .001, ηp² = .299. The directions of the effects were the same as in the original study and 
Experiment 1. 
Of particular interest to the current study were any effects of Emotion (see Figures 6 
and 4(b)). The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F (1, 32) < 1, MSE = 11,102, p = 
.708, ηp² = .004. The Perspective x Emotion interaction was not significant, F (1, 32) < 1, 
MSE = 4,364, p = .339, ηp² = .029, but the Consistency x Emotion interaction was 
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significant, F (1, 32) = 7.832, MSE = 24,605, p = .009, ηp² = .197. Finally, the Perspective x 
Consistency x Emotion interaction was not significant, F (1, 32) < 1, MSE = 333, p = .771, 
ηp² = .003.  
In order to compare the Consistency effects between the shame and control conditions, a 
t test for independent samples was conducted on the consistency differences (i.e., mean RT 
of inconsistent perspectives trials minus mean RT of consistent perspectives trials) with the 
Emotion as a between-subjects variable. There was a significant effect of Emotion on the 
consistency differences, t (32) = 2.757, p = .010, d = 0.97, with a higher interference in the 
shame condition, M = 107.838, SD = 67.394, than in the control condition, M = 56.344, SD 
= 37.248.  
Error rates.  
As for the previous experiment, response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 
2000 ms) were counted as errors. The ANOVA 2 (Perspective) x 2 (Consistency) x 2 
(Emotion) revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 32) = 46.885, MSE = 
.172, p < .001, ηp² = .594, no main effect of Perspective, F (1, 32) = 1.800, MSE = .004, p = 
.189, ηp² = .053, and a significant Consistency x Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 35) = 
8.257, MSE = .011, p = .007, ηp² = .205. The directions of the effects were the same as in 
the original study and Experiment 1. 
Of particular interest to the current study were any effects of Emotion (see Figures 6 
and 4(b)). The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F (1, 32) = 1.633, MSE = .020, p 
= .210, ηp² = .049. The Emotion x Perspective and Emotion x Perspective x Consistency 
interactions were not significant, F (1, 32) < 1, MSE = .001, p = .658, ηp² = .006, F (1, 32) < 
1, MSE = .001, p = .345, ηp² = .028, respectively, but the Emotion x Consistency interaction 
was marginally significant, F (1, 32) = 3.568, MSE = .013, p = .068, ηp² = .100. 
To inspect whether there was a speed-accuracy trade-off in our results, we explored the 
Consistency x Emotion interaction. In order to compare the Consistency effects between the 
shame and control conditions, a t-test for independent samples was conducted on the 
consistency differences (i.e., mean ER of inconsistent perspectives trials minus mean ER of 
consistent perspectives trials) with the Emotion as a between-subjects variable. There was a 
marginally significant effect of Emotion on the consistency differences, t (32) = 1.750, p = 
.090, d = 0.62, where participants in the shame condition made on average 5.01% more 
errors on inconsistent than consistent perspectives trials whereas participants in the control 
condition made only 2.87% more errors. These results suggest that participants did not 
differ in terms of performances in taking one perspective over another and that the 
difference of consistency effects between the shame and control conditions on RTs was not 
due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
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Figure 6. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the visual perspective-taking task of 
Experiment 2 as a function of the Perspective, Consistency, and Emotion conditions. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
In sum, our results suggest that participants did not differ in terms of their ease of taking 
one perspective over another but were different in terms of their ease in dealing with 
conflicting perspectives: participants in the shame condition were less efficient in handling 
conflicting perspectives than the participants in the control condition (see Figure 4(b)). This 
modulatory effect found in the shame condition was thus different in nature to the one 
observed in the guilt condition in Experiment 1. We can thus conclude that the effect of 
guilt observed in Experiment 1 was not an artefact of the effect of shame or self-
incompetence. 
3.2.4 Raffle task.  
There was no difference between the shame and control conditions regarding the 
number of tickets the participants allocated to their game partner, t (32) < 1, p = .489 d = 
0.25, to themselves, t (32) = 1.008, p = .321, d = 0.36, or to the Red Cross, t (32) < 1, p = 
.858, d = 0.06 (see Figure 5). 
4. General discussion 
Anger and guilt feelings typically emerge from social contexts in which one individual 
breaks with socially shared expectations but they promote strikingly different behaviours to 
adjust with the unpleasant state (Haidt, 2003; Keltner, 1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & 
Barlow, 1996). Anger and guilt promote actions that will restore compliance to the 
expectations by, for example, threatening or punishing a harm doer and making amend to 
the harmed person, respectively (Ausubel, 1955; Haidt, 2003). Those emotional influences 
on our social behaviour are likely to be mediated or accompanied by changes in the way we 
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attend, perceive, judge, or empathize with a person. The study thus aimed at examining 
whether guilt and anger influence our ability to take someone’s perspective and if so, 
whether they affect perspective by making us more or less self-centred or whether they 
affect more generally the cognitive control processes necessary to put aside our own 
perspective when it conflicts with the other person’s perspective. Experiment 1 showed the 
expected effects of guilt and anger on prosocial behaviour but only as far as sharing with 
the person responsible for the emotion was concerned, and not when sharing involved a 
charity. Interestingly, Experiment 1 also showed that guilt made participants more other-
oriented in a visual perspective-taking task while anger tended to make participants more 
self-centred. Guilt and anger had however no effect on the ability to handle conflicting 
perspectives. Experiment 2 aimed at ruling out that the observed effects of guilt were due to 
the feelings of shame and self-incompetence, two feelings concomitantly induced as a result 
of our guilt induction procedure in Experiment 1. Self-incompetence and shame had no 
effect on the sharing of raffle tickets and did not make participants more other-oriented in 
the visual perspective-taking task. Interestingly however, self-incompetence and shame 
affected participants’ ability to handle conflicting perspectives. The implications of these 
findings for understanding the effects of emotional states on perspective taking and 
prosocial behaviour are discussed in turns.  
4.1  The effects of emotional state on perspective 
taking 
Experiment 1 showed that when participants were induced to feel guilt, they were more 
other-centred, showing better abilities in judging their partner’s perspective than their own 
perspective. However, feeling guilt did not affect the ease with which participants dealt 
with conflicting perspectives. Thus, in line with previous findings (Yang et al., 2010), our 
results indicate that guilt affects perspective taking but here, we can conclude in addition 
that guilt affects the orientation of attention to the other person and not the cognitive 
resources required to inhibit one’s own perspective.  
Interestingly, the visual perspective-taking task that we used does not only include 
deliberative perspective-taking processes (explicit perspective attribution) but also low-
level processes (the attraction of visual attention to the other person and attentional 
reorienting to the object that the other person is looking at; Ramsey et al., 2013; Samson et 
al., 2010). Previous effects of guilt on perspective taking were found in a verbal task in 
which visual attentional processes were not recruited (Yang et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
either the other-centred effect occurs only at the stage of deliberative perspective taking or 
it occurs also at the stage of more low-level processes. It would be an interesting avenue to 
explore further this latter possibility. 
It is important to highlight that this other-centred effect on attention does not directly 
speak to the other- and self-centred nature of the motives of the reparative actions that 
people feeling guilt engage in. The other-centred effect on attention concurs with the 
relationship-oriented goals that guilt promote (i.e., willingness to repair a damaged 
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relationship due to a faulty action; Baumeister et al., 1994) but does not exclude that these 
goals are fuelled by selfish motives to reduce the unpleasantness of guilt. 
Although we described the effect of guilt on perspective taking as an other-centred 
advantage, it can also be described as a self-centred disadvantage. However, an increased 
self-centred disadvantage could also originate from increased attention on the partner’s 
perspective because it would increase the difficulty of disengaging from the partner’s 
perspective in self-perspective trials. Alternatively, guilt may not orient attention to the 
partner’s perspective but rather draw attention away from our egocentric perspective; this 
phenomenon has never been described but could be related to the escape of self-awareness 
described in pathological populations such as suicide attempters, in which a strong feeling 
of guilt is often present (e.g., Baumeister, 1990). 
Guilt and shame often co-occur and this was the case in Experiment 1. Indeed, as part of 
our guilt induction procedure, participants were led to believe that they performed very 
badly and they could not reciprocate the wins they received as a result of the good 
performance of their partner. This procedure did not only induce guilt but also a feeling of 
low self-competence and a feeling of shame. It was thus possible that the effects observed 
in Experiment 1 and attributed to guilt were in fact the result of feelings of shame and/or 
self-incompetence. In line with this concern, the replication experiment of the guilt 
condition confirmed that participants felt high feelings of self-incompetence and shame (see 
Appendix 3). In Experiment 2, we thus examined the effects of shame/self-incompetence 
by using an induction procedure that specifically targeted these feelings. Two interesting 
results were found. Firstly, when participants felt shame and self-incompetence, there was 
no other-oriented advantage anymore in the visual perspective-taking task (see Figure 4(a)) 
nor was there any effect on the prosocial behaviour measure (see Figure 5). This indicates 
that the effects observed in Experiment 1 were due to guilt rather than to the feelings of 
shame and self-incompetence. Secondly, although shame and self-incompetence did not 
make participants more other-oriented, these emotions did nevertheless impact on the 
performance on the visual perspective task by making participants less able to handle 
conflicting perspectives (see Figure 4(b)). Our results are in line with those of Yang and 
colleagues (2010), who found that the participants in the shame condition were worse in 
taking the other person’s perspective than those in the control condition. From our study, 
we can conclude in addition that shame (associated with low self-competence) affects the 
cognitive resources required to inhibit one’s own perspective and not the orientation of 
attention to the other person. Shame and self-incompetence seems thus to affect perspective 
taking through a different pathway than guilt.  
The depletion of cognitive control resources found among the participants of the shame 
condition is probably caused by a combination of factors such as the need suppress their 
unpleasant feelings (supported by the action tendencies to avoid and shelter), the disruption 
caused by the emotional arousal (supported by the body sensations reported), or the 
situational appraisals of being incapacitated or powerless usually associated with shame 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 1971; Lynd, 1958; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). 
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Importantly, in this study we induced shame by manipulating perceived self-competence. 
This was done purposely to match the nature of our induction procedure in Experiment 1. 
However, shame is not always associated or caused by feelings of self-incompetence. It can 
also result from moral violations or condemnations from others (Gausel & Leach, 2011) 
and a future avenue for research would be to examine whether these other forms of shame 
affect perspective taking in the same way.  
Since high levels of shame were reported in the guilt condition, one can wonder whether 
there were additive effects of shame and guilt in the guilt condition. If we compare the 
perspective interference cost across the various conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 (see 
Figure 4(b)), it appears that participants in the guilt condition showed the second highest 
cost after those in the shame condition, although there was no statistically significant 
difference when comparing that cost to the cost in the anger and control condition. We 
could speculate that the effects of shame in the guilt conditions were attenuated because, at 
the same time, guilt made participants more other-oriented thereby reducing the demands in 
self-perspective-taking inhibition. Therefore, the effect of guilt may have been partially 
cancelling out the effect of shame.  
As for anger, the results of Experiment 1 showed that when participants were induced to 
feel anger, they tended to be more self-oriented, showing marginally better abilities in 
judging their own perspective than their partner’s perspective. However, this self-
perspective advantage was not significantly different to the one found in the control 
condition. The effect size of the impact of anger on perspective taking (d = 0.35) is small 
and clearly inferior to (1) the effect sizes found in the studies that showed an effect of anger 
on cognition as reviewed by Lerner and Tiedens (2006; Mdn = 0.78, range: 0.47-2.25), (2) 
the effect size of the impact of anger on the raffle ticket sharing in this study (d = 0.79) and 
(3) the effect size of the impact of guilt and shame on perspective taking in this study (guilt 
in Experiment 1: d = 0.71; guilt in Replication experiment: d = 0.71; shame in Experiment 
2: d = 0.87). Moreover, power analysis indicated that in order for an effect of anger of this 
size to be detected (80% chance) as significant at the 5% level, a sample of 260 participants 
(122 in the anger condition) would be required, which is 4 times the average sample size 
found in the studies reviewed by Lerner and Tiedens (2006; Mdn = 30, range: 14-85). 
This small effect of anger may seem surprising given that effects of anger on cognition 
have been repeatedly found (for a review, see Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Hence, one may 
question whether this small effect originates from methodological issues such as the level 
of intensity of anger induced or the number of participants. It is important to note that our 
participants in the anger condition felt on average a level of anger (M = 4, on a scale 
ranging from 0, meaning “Not at all”, to 6, meaning “Strongly”) superior or equal to almost 
all the anger induction experiments that have shown effects on cognition as reviewed by 
Lerner and Tiedens (2006; after conversion to a 0 to 6 scale: Mdn = 3.09, range: 1.68-5.4). 
Moreover, guilt and shame showed effects on perspective taking despite the fact that they 
had comparable levels of intensities (guilt in Experiment 1: M = 4.8; guilt in Replication 
experiment: M = 4.7; shame in Experiment 2: M = 3.35) and a similar number of 
What influences perspective taking? 
83 
 
participants. It seems thus that anger has a much smaller effect on our perspective-taking 
task than on other cognitive tasks and tasks measuring prosocial behaviour and, that anger 
has also a much smaller effect on our perspective-taking task than guilt and shame.  
Behavioural reactions to anger are known to vary across individuals (Ceulemans, 
Kuppens, & Mechelen, 2012; Martin et al., 1999; Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, 1988). 
It may thus be that the smaller effect of anger results from a larger inter-individual 
variability in the effect of anger on perspective taking than what is observed with guilt or 
shame. This is, however, not the case either. For 75% of the participants in the anger 
condition, the difference between the other-perspective and self-perspective trials went in 
the direction of a self-perspective advantage. This percentage is similar to the percentage of 
participants showing an other-perspective advantage in the guilt conditions of Experiment 1 
(70.6%) and the Replication experiment (73%).  
Finally, a remaining possibility is that anger does affect cognition in several opposing 
directions that cancel out each other out in perspective-taking tasks. Since anger and 
happiness are known to promote the use of heuristics rather than elaborate processing (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), anger should increase 
tendencies to use the default egocentric perspective rather than engaging in effortful 
perspective taking, as it was found for happiness (Converse et al., 2008). However, anger 
arises from situational appraisals where an external agent is blamed and judged as 
responsible of an offense (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; C. a Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Wallbot & Scherer, 1986), which is likely to orient attention towards the person who 
caused the anger. As a result, anger may concomitantly increase reliance on the egocentric 
perspective and orient attention towards the person who caused the anger, the two effects 
cancelling one another out. It would thus be interesting to test whether anger may further 
increase this self-perspective advantage when one has to take the perspective of an 
unrelated individual rather than the person who caused the anger.  
4.2  The effects of emotional state on prosocial 
behaviour 
In Experiment 1, we found an effect of the emotional state on participants’ prosocial 
behaviours. When feeling anger, participants were less generous towards their partner than 
in the control condition whereas, when feeling guilt, participants were more generous 
towards their partner. These findings are in line with previous studies showing the 
antisocial and prosocial influences of anger and guilt, respectively (e.g., Ketelaar et al., 
2003; Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009). 
It is striking that in Experiment 1 participants’ prosocial behaviour was influenced only 
when this behaviour was oriented towards the person with whom they socially interacted 
and not towards a charity. This finding suggests that participants’ emotional experience of 
anger and guilt conveyed effects that target specifically context-relevant agents. This 
observation is in line with two other studies (Cryder et al., 2012; De Hooge, Nelissen, 
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Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011) which showed that participants in the guilt induction 
condition showed higher prosocial tendencies than those in the neutral condition, but only 
towards the person(s) towards whom they felt guilty. Interestingly, however, guilt-related 
prosocial behaviours have been reported also towards irrelevant agents, such as charities or 
unrelated individuals, but these studies induced incidental emotions (i.e., de-contextualized 
emotions such as after autobiographical recalls, listening to music, or watching movies), 
that is, when guilt was not oriented to one person specifically (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2007; 
Ketelaar et al., 2003; Regan, 1971). Consequently, it seems that integral emotions (i.e., 
contextualized emotions such as in this study) affect prosocial behaviour in a target-specific 
way whereas incidental emotions affect prosocial behaviour in a target-unspecific way.  
In Experiment 2, participants in the shame/self-incompetence condition did not differ 
from those in the control condition in terms of the number of raffle tickets allocated to 
themselves, to their partner, or to the Red Cross. This finding suggests that the increased 
generosity towards the partner found in the guilt condition was not due to participants’ 
shame or self-incompetence feelings. The absence of effect on prosocial behaviour in the 
shame condition is in line with the absence of effects found in de Hooge and colleagues 
(2007) and with the avoidance action tendencies associated with shame in this study and in 
previous studies (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012; Keltner, 1996; Lindsay-Hartz, 
1984; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996). More recent findings (De Hooge et 
al., 2011; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Gausel et al., 2012; Gausel & 
Leach, 2011; Hooge, Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, & De Hooge, 2008; Zaiser & Giner-
Sorolla, 2013), however, suggest that shame can promote both avoidance and approach 
behaviours, including prosocial behaviours, in order to restore the damaged self-image. 
Following this logic, shame should have not influenced the raffle tickets sharing in our 
study since giving tickets to a partner would not restore the self-image of being 
incompetent at the Card Picking Game. Finally, it has also been proposed that whether 
shame originates from a deviation from moral or personal standards is also a critical factor 
determining the prosocial influence of shame: only “moral shame” would lead to prosocial 
actions (Allpress, 2011). The fact that all the moral expectations were removed from the 
induction procedure of Experiment 2 could thus be another reason why shame had no effect 
on prosocial behaviour in our study. 
5. Conclusion 
Guilt and anger are two negative emotions promoting distinct social behaviours (Haidt, 
2003, Nesse & Ellsworth, 2006). Here we examined whether these emotions also influence 
how we represent and understand others’ point of view. Previous studies found that our 
emotional state can make us more or less egocentric. We examined this further by 
disentangling whether this results from a modulation of our cognitive control abilities 
(helping or hindering the inhibition of our own perspective) or whether it results more 
directly from a change in how much attention we allocate to ourselves and other people. 
While anger tended to make participants more self-oriented, guilt feelings clearly boosted 
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participants’ ability to take someone’s perspective by making them more other-oriented. 
These two emotions had thus an effect on how attention is allocated to oneself and the other 
person rather than on the cognitive control abilities necessary to inhibit one’s own 
perspective. This is however not the only way emotion can affect perspective taking. 
Feelings of shame and self-incompetence diminished participants’ ability to take someone’s 
perspective by reducing their cognitive control abilities. Our results thus highlight two 
different paths by which emotional states can affect perspective taking. Furthermore, our 
results suggest that anger and guilt, but not shame linked to self-incompetence, influence 
prosocial behaviour, specifically when the recipient of the action caused the participants’ 
emotional state.  
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6. Appendix 1 
6.1  Guilt replication experiment 
6.1.1 Method. 
Participants.  
Eighteen individuals participated in the replication experiment, two participants did not 
feel guilt following the induction procedure and were thus replaced by an additional set of 2 
participants who reported guilt feelings (9 females, mean age: 21.175, age range: 18-25). 
Participants participated in return of a 1/60 chance to win 150 euros and were also told that 
they would receive an additional monetary compensation which depended upon their 
partner’s performance in a card game. The study was approved by the ethics committee of 
the Psychological Sciences Research Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain.  
Material and procedure.  
The participants followed exactly the same procedure as described in Experiment 1 for 
the guilt condition except that the confederate female was a different person. 
6.1.2 Results.  
Induction efficacy.  
Two participants felt guilt below an intensity of 2 (on a scale ranging from 0, meaning 
“Not at all”, to 6, meaning “Strongly”) and were thus replaced with an additional set of 2 
participants who felt guilt with an intensity of 2 or more. 
Participants felt significantly more guilt, M = 4.722, SD = 1.320, than any other emotion 
(all ps < .05), except for attention, t (17) = 1.158, p = .263. Participants in the guilt 
condition of this experiment felt significantly more guilt and shame, M = 3.611, SD = 
2.033, than the participants in the anger condition, respectively, t (32) = 11.849, p < .001, t 
(32) = 3.273, p = .003, and the control condition, t (34) = 14.768, p < .001, t (32) = 7.370, p 
< .001, but no more than those in the guilt condition of Experiment 1, t (33) < 1, p = .803, t 
(32) < 1, p = .803, respectively. Moreover, they perceived themselves as less competent 
than their partner, t (17) = 18.647, p < .001. 
Participants felt significantly more body sensations (heart beating faster; tightness in the 
chest; lump in the throat; breath changes; burning cheeks; hot flush; perspiring; less 
relaxation) and action tendencies (yell, scream, or swear; disappear or dissolve; being 
paralyzed; shelter or protect oneself; less willing to sing, dance, jump, or laugh) than 
participants in the control condition of Experiment 1, indicating that the manipulation 
succeeded in inducing emotional “responses”. 
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As for the credibility of the experiment, the ratings could go from 0, meaning ‘Not at all 
convincing’, to 6, meaning ‘Strongly convincing’, and averaged above 5.10 across all 
deceptive components.  
In summary, the induction of guilt was overall successful and was rated as highly 
credible.  
Visual perspective-taking task.  
For the purpose of between-subjects comparison and because the mean ER was below 
.10, the ANOVA 2 (Perspective) x 2 (Consistency) was conducted on the IES. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 17) = 41.362, MSE = 393,913, p < 
.001, ηp² = .709, a main effect of Perspective, F (1, 17) = 9.531, MSE = 59,493, p = .007, 
ηp² = .359, with participants being better in judging from their partner’s perspective than 
their own perspective, but a non-significant Consistency x Perspective interaction effect, F 
(1, 17) < 1, MSE = 190, p = .858, ηp² = .002. This unusual main effect of Perspective is in 
line with the effect of guilt found in the guilt condition of Experiment 1 (see Supplementary 
Figure 1). Planned contrasts comparing the other-perspective advantage (i.e., mean IES on 
self-perspective trials minus mean IES on other perspective trials) of the replication 
experiment with the other-perspective advantage in the three conditions of Experiment 1 
revealed no difference with the guilt condition, t (65) < 1, p = .930, d = 0.03, but a higher 
other-perspective advantage compared to the control condition, t (65) = 2.066, p = .043, d = 
0.71, and anger condition, t (65) = 3.051, p = .003, d = 1.08. In sum, the other-perspective 
advantage found in the guilt condition of Experiment 1 was replicated. 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Mean IESs in the visual perspective-taking task as a function of 
Experiment, including the Guilt replication Experiment, Perspective, Consistency, and Emotion 
conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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7. Supplementary information 
7.1  Implementation of the Card Picking Game 
Matlab 7.5 (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA) with Psychtoolbox 
(Brainard, 1997) and Cogent (John Romaya, The Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK; 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html) were used to present the Card Picking 
Game. The game interface comprised the monetary reserves of each player on the left side. 
A red superior panel and a blue inferior panel displayed the accumulated money of the 
fictive partner and the participant, respectively. A nickname chosen by the participant plus 
a portrait picture of each player were included in their respective panel to insure correct 
identification of each monetary reserve. Written statements displayed adjacently to each 
player’s portrait described each player’s current action (i.e. “[nickname] is watching” or 
“[nickname] is playing”).  
The game was divided in 16 rounds where each player played 8 rounds successively. 
The sequence of events of each trial was as follows. First a fixation cross appeared for 5-10 
s followed by a reminder of each player’s role and the current round count displayed for 3 
s. Then, alongside a 5 s countdown, the two cards appeared in the centre of the screen side 
by side and showed their value for 3 s. Then the two cards turned over and remained face 
down for 2 s. Then, the two cards started to move and crossed each other’s path for 8 to 10 
s before returning side by side to the centre of the screen, face down. Then the picture of a 
hand appeared on the screen, pointing in the direction of the middle of the screen and 
symbolizing the active player’s hand. Participant were asked to press the left or right arrow 
on the keyboard to indicate whether they choose the left or the right card respectively, and 
the pointing hand moved towards the chosen card. Finally, when the pointing hand arrived 
in front of the chosen card, the two cards turned over and showed their value. Before 
starting the game, participants played a 2 round warm-up session to become familiar with 
the interface and the card shuffling.  
7.2  Induction efficacy in Experiments 1 and 2 
Table S1. List of items rated in the exit questionnaire 
Feelings Body sensations Action tendencies Person appraisals 
To what extent did 
you feel …? 
To what extent did 
you feel …? 
To what extent did 
you feel the 
willingness to…? 
To what extent…? 
Happy, thrilled, 
blooming 
Lump in throat Go towards 
someone/thing 
Your partner was 
fair 
Sad, depressed, blue Heart beating faster Leave, avoid Your partner was 
nice 
Angry, annoyed, Change in Kick, beat, destroy, Your partner was 
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outraged breathing bite nice competent 
during the Card 
Picking Game* 
Scared, afraid, 
frightened 
Chest tightness Yell, scream, swear Were you 
competent during 
the Card Picking 
Game* 
Disdainful, scornful Stomach troubles Badmouth  
Anxious, tensed, 
nervous 
Perspiring Sing, dance, laugh, 
jump 
 
Disgusted, repulsed Hot flush Move, twist and turn,  
Amused, joyful, 
cheerful 
Feeling cold, 
shivering 
Disappear, dissolve  
Surprised, stunned, 
astonished 
Muscles tensing Cry, sob  
Attentive, 
concentrating, alert 
Trembling Protect, shelter  
Ashamed, disgraced, 
humiliated 
Relaxed Bing paralysed, 
unable to react 
 
Guilty, blameworthy, 
responsible 
Boiling   
 Feeling hot, cheeks 
burning 
  
Note: * Present in the replication experiment and Experiment 2 only. 
7.2.1 Experiment 1.  
In terms of body sensations, the participants in the anger condition felt significantly less 
relaxation, t (32) = -3.976, p < .001, and more tension in the muscles, t (32) = 2.569, p = 
.015, a lump in the throat, t (32) = 2.557, p = .016, a tightness in the chest, t (32) = 2.376, p 
= .024, and their heart beating faster, t (32) = 2.101, p = .044, than those in the control 
condition. The participants in the guilt condition felt significantly less relaxation, t (33) = -
4.823, p < .001, and more a lump in the throat, t (33) = 3.331, p = .002, a tightness in the 
chest, t (33) = 3.174, p = .003, tension in the muscles, t (33) = 3.047, p = .005, their heart 
beating faster, t (33) = 2.448, p = .020, sensations of boiling, t (33) = 2.315, p = .027, and 
breath changes, t (33) = 2.197, p = .035, than those in the control condition. 
In terms of action tendencies, the participants in the anger condition were significantly 
less willing to sing, dance, jump, or laugh, t (32) = -3.221, p = .003, and to move, t (32) = -
2.137, p = .040, but more willing to badmouth, t (32) = 2.996, p = .005, to go towards 
someone or something, t (32) = 2.806, p = .008, to kick, hit, or destroy, t (32) = 2.700, p = 
.011, to yell, scream, or swear, t (32) = 2.273, p = .030, and to feel paralyzed, t (32) = 
2.218, p = .034, than those in the control condition. The participants in the guilt condition 
were significantly more willing to go towards someone or something, t (33) = 3.692, p = 
.001, and to disappear or dissolve, t (33) = 3.332, p = .002, than those in the control 
condition. Altogether, these results suggest that the participants in the guilt and anger 
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conditions felt a series of body sensations and actions tendencies to a greater extent than 
those in the control condition, which indicates that the emotional induction succeeded in 
inducing emotional “responses” 
7.2.2 Experiment 2. 
In terms of body sensations, the participants in the shame condition felt significantly 
more burning cheeks, t (32) = 2.209, p = .034, and heat, t (32) = 2.607, p = .014, than those 
in the control condition.  
In terms of action tendencies, the participants in the shame condition were significantly 
more willing to avoid or leave, t (32) = 3.892, p < .001, to shelter or protect oneself, t (32) = 
2.447, p = .020, to yell, scream, or swear, t (32) = 2.235, p = .033, than those in the control 
condition.  
Altogether, these results suggest that the participants in shame condition felt a series of 
body sensations and actions tendencies to a greater extent than those in the control 
condition, which indicates that the emotional induction succeeded in inducing emotional 
“responses”. 
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Narcissists do not lack perspective-taking abilities 
Chapter 4 
 
Narcissists do not lack perspective-
taking abilities 
 
 
Is narcissism an irremediable curse to interpersonal cognition and behaviour? It has been 
long supported that reduced empathic and perspective-taking abilities in narcissists lie at 
the heart of their interpersonal difficulties but so far only the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980), a self-report questionnaire, has been used to support this association. This 
study examined narcissists’ actual performance on a behavioural measure of perspective 
taking. One-hundred healthy adults completed a visual perspective-taking task along with 
self-report questionnaires measuring narcissism, perspective taking, empathy, depression, 
anxiety, mood, and machiavellism. We found that individuals scoring high on narcissism 
did not have poorer perspective taking performance than individuals scoring low on 
narcissism; they actually prioritized less their egocentric perspective. These results suggest 
that narcissists are either genuinely paying more attention to others’ views than non-
narcissists or have the ability to be good perspective-takers if they are given the appropriate 
motives to be so. This reduced egocentrism was not explained by any measured factors 
other than narcissism. Based on these findings, we argue that narcissism has been 
negatively associated with self-reported perspective-taking habits because this latter 
measure actually captured narcissists’ lack of communal motives in their interpersonal 
behaviour but not their actual perspective-taking abilities. 
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1. Introduction 
A narcissistic person is characterized by inflated self-views, disregard for others’ 
concerns, self-focus, and a strong need for external self-affirmation (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000; Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). These features can be 
expressed to various extents, ranging from mildly expressed features in the normal 
population to excessively expressed features in some clinical populations. However, even at 
the sub-clinical level narcissism is associated with a wide range of interpersonal difficulties. 
For example, narcissists are less faithful and committed in their relationships (Campbell, 
Foster, & Finkel, 2002; Finkel, Campbell, Buffardi, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2009), react 
more aggressively to rejection or criticism (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998), are disliked by 
their peers (Back et al., 2013), and are more likely to commit crimes (Barry, Frick, Adler, 
& Grafeman, 2007; Hepper, Hart, Meek, Cisek, & Sedikides, 2014).  
Reduced empathic (i.e., failing to share other people’s feelings) and reduced perspective 
taking (i.e., failing to consider and understand other people’s mental states) abilities have 
been proposed to lie at the heart of narcissists’ interpersonal difficulties (Hepper, Hart, 
Meek, et al., 2014; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; P J Watson, Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 
1984; P J Watson & Morris, 1991). This view is strongly supported by the consistent 
finding of a negative association between narcissism and perspective taking and empathy 
(Delič et al., 2011; Given-Wilson, McIlwain, & Warburton, 2011; Hepper, Hart, Meek, et 
al., 2014; Jonason & Krause, 2013; Munro, Bore, & Powis, 2005; Ritter et al., 2011; Vonk, 
Zeigler-hill, Mayhew, & Mercer, 2013; P J Watson et al., 1984; P J Watson, Little, Sawrie, 
& Biderman, 1992; P J Watson, Biderman, & Sawrie, 1994; P J Watson & Biderman, 1994; 
P J Watson & Morris, 1991). However, all these studies used the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1980), a self-report questionnaire of perspective taking and empathic habits 
and tendencies rather than actual behavioural performance. It is therefore likely that these 
studies highlighted narcissists’ lack of motivation in taking other people’s point of view but 
it is unclear whether narcissists have reduced abilities to accurately take other people’s 
point of view. Following this logic, it is possible that narcissists are equally good at 
perspective taking than non-narcissists or that they can be equally good if they are given the 
right motives. This latter possibility received support from three recent studies that showed 
that narcissists’ interpersonal performances can be improved if they are given the 
appropriate motives to perform better. More specifically, increased empathy was found 
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following explicit instruction to imagine what another person is feeling (Hepper, Hart, & 
Sedikides, 2014), increased mimicry was found when interacting with a high status person 
relatively to low-status person (Ashton-James & Levordashka, 2013), and increased 
relationship commitment was found following the priming of communal values (e.g., 
caring, helpfulness; Finkel et al., 2009). These findings suggest therefore that narcissists’ 
interpersonal abilities are less impaired than previously thought. However, no study has yet 
tested whether narcissists have poorer, identical, or better perspective-taking performance 
than non-narcissists.  
This study aims to investigate the role of narcissism on behavioural performance in a 
perspective-taking task and to examine which underpinning mechanism of perspective 
taking might be related to narcissism: Do narcissists have different abilities to inhibit their 
interfering egocentric perspective or do they give a different attentional priority to their 
egocentric perspective relative to other people’s perspectives? 
Concerning the extent narcissists prioritize the processing of their egocentric 
perspective, several researchers described narcissists as egocentric individuals (Akhtar & 
Thomson, 1982; Dimaggio et al., 2002; Westen, 1990) because virtually all studies 
converge in pointing that narcissists are particularly self-interested and behave as if only 
their own person or image matters (e.g., Buss & Chiodo, 1991; for a review, see Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001). Alternatively, narcissists could put a high priority to others’ views 
because of their chronic need to seek others’ attention (Buss & Chiodo, 1991; Nathan 
DeWall, Buffardi, Bonser, & Keith Campbell, 2011), to validate their inflated self-views in 
the eyes of others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), or to compare themselves with others 
(Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000). No study has yet objectively measured this 
dimension underpinning perspective taking. 
As for the ability to inhibit a conflicting perspective, to this date, only one study has 
looked at the role of narcissism in individuals’ abilities to inhibit interfering stimuli and 
reported no relation between narcissism and response inhibition (Unsworth et al., 2009). 
However, given that narcissism is often associated with proneness to shame and shame 
feelings (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; P.J. Watson, Hickman, & Morris, 1996; Wright, 
O’Leary, & Balkin, 1989) and that previous studies have showed a negative impact of 
shame on perspective taking (Yang et al., 2010), and more specifically a negative impact on 
handling conflicting perspectives (cf. Chapter 3), it is possible that narcissists have reduced 
abilities to handle their conflicting egocentric perspectives.  
In order to test whether narcissists have reduced perspective-taking abilities and to 
explore which specific mechanisms underpinning perspective taking may be affected, one-
hundred participants were enrolled to complete a visual perspective-taking task (Samson et 
al., 2010). The task chosen was specifically designed to separately assess behavioural 
performance in terms of handling conflicting perspectives and in terms of the relative 
priority given to the egocentric perspective over another person’s perspective. In addition, 
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participants completed questionnaires measures of narcissism, empathy, perspective taking, 
mood, machiavellism, anxiety, and depression.  
2. Method 
2.1  Participants 
One-hundred healthy adults (31 females, mean age: 22.52, age range: 19-26) 
participated in the study in return of 10 euros. Demographic information of 4 participants 
was not recorded due to a technical failure. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Psychological Sciences Research Institute of the Université catholique de 
Louvain. 
2.2  Stimuli and Procedure 
After completing the consent forms, participants completed the Positive and Negative 
Affects Scale (PANAS; D. Watson & Clark, 1988) to assess their initial mood state. Then, 
they read the instructions related to a visual perspective-taking (VPT) task designed by 
Samson et al. (2010) and completed the task. Before being debriefed, participants 
completed four questionnaires: the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & 
Terry, 1988), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), the Mach-IV inventory 
(Christie & Geis, 1970), the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983), 
and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1961), which assess narcissism, empathic 
and perspective-taking habits, machiavellism, anxiety, and depression, respectively. 
The PANAS is a self-report questionnaire using a 5-point intensity scale ranging from 
“Not at all or very slightly” to “Strongly” on 10 positively and 10 negatively valenced 
emotional states (D. Watson & Clark, 1988). The initial emotional state of participants was 
assessed because it has been shown to influence both empathy and perspective taking 
(Converse et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2010).  
Narcissism was assessed with the NPI questionnaire in its classic form with 40 items 
(Raskin & Terry, 1988) on which participants had to rate their extent of agreement on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Scores on the NPI 
have consistently been negatively associated with empathy and perspective taking (e.g., 
Delič et al., 2011; Hepper, Hart, Meek, et al., 2014; Jonason & Krause, 2013; P J Watson et 
al., 1984). 
Empathy and perspective taking were assessed with the IRI (Davis, 1983), a self-report 
questionnaire composed of 28 statements about their personal experiences and habits in 
social and emotional situations on which participants had to rate their extent of agreement 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The IRI is 
divided in 4 subscales: perspective taking, fantasy (i.e. self-absorption in fictions), empathic 
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concern, and personal distress. The perspective-taking and empathic concerns subscales 
reflect respectively cognitive and affective empathy habits. 
The MACH-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970) is a self-report questionnaire using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from “Totally disagree” to “Fully agree” on 20 different beliefs and 
habits statements. Machiavellism as a personality trait was assessed because it has been 
negatively associated with the Empathy Quotient (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010), a self-
report questionnaire measure of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and because 
machiavellism has been linked to narcissism (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012) . 
The STAI (Spielberger, 1983) is a self-report questionnaire using a 4-point frequency 
scale ranging from “Almost never” to “Almost always” on 20 trait-related and 20 state-
related statements. Anxiety as personality trait and a state was assessed because it has been 
previously negatively associated with empathy (Davis & Oathout, 1992; Deardorff, 
Kendall, Finch Jr, & Sitarz, 1977; Negd, Mallan, & Lipp, 2011).  
The BDI (Beck, 1961) is a self-report questionnaire containing 21 series of 4 statements 
among which participants must choose the one corresponding to their state in the past few 
weeks. Depression was assessed because a few studies have reported impaired empathy and 
perspective taking among clinically depressed individuals (Kerr, 2003; Lee, Harkness, 
Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005; Y. Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008; Wolkenstein, 
Schönenberg, Schirm, & Hautzinger, 2011).  
The VPT task (Samson et al., 2010) is a behavioural measure of perspective-taking 
performance measured through mental chronometry. Participants were instructed to make 
judgments from either their own or someone else’s visual perspective in situations where 
both perspectives are either conflicting or consistent. More specifically, they were asked to 
judge whether a number prompt (ranging from 0 to 3) matches the number of discs visible 
from the prompted perspective, which could be either their own perspective (self-
perspective condition) or the perspective of the person in the room (other-perspective 
condition). The other person and the participants could see either the same number of discs 
(consistent condition) or a different number of discs (inconsistent condition). Each trial was 
a sequence of a fixation cross, a 500 ms blank screen, a perspective prompt (‘SHE’/’HIM’ 
or ‘YOU’), a 500 ms blank screen, a number prompt (0/1/2/3), and a picture of a lateral 
view of a room in which a person was posited in the centre facing the left or the right wall 
with 0 to 3 red discs on it. The person in the centre of the room was an avatar of the same 
gender as the participant. The number prompt could match or mismatch the number of red 
discs visible from the prompted perspective. Participants had to press the upward arrow 
when the number prompt matched or the downward arrow when the number prompt 
mismatched. A feedback was presented after each response indicating whether the response 
was correct (‘CORRECT’ or ‘INCORRECT’) or when 2000 ms has elapsed (‘NO 
RESPONSE’). The perspective to adopt was manipulated so that the participant had to 
adopt equally often their own perspective or the avatar’s perspective (self-perspective vs. 
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other-perspective conditions). The consistency between perspectives was manipulated so 
that the participant and the avatar were seeing equally often either the same visual content 
or a different visual content (consistent vs. inconsistent perspectives conditions). 
Perspective and Consistency were orthogonally manipulated, forming 4 experimental 
conditions for statistical analyses. The task included a total of 128 trials, evenly spread 
across experimental conditions and divided into 2 blocks of 52 trials plus a set of 26 
practice trials. Trials within each block were presented in a randomized order. To avoid 
anticipatory responses, 18 filler trials were included. Reaction times and errors were 
collected but only matching trials were taken into account for the analyses because the task 
difficulty between conditions was unbalanced in mismatching trials (for details, see the 
original study by Samson and colleagues, 2010).  
The experiment was run on a Pentium 4 computer with a 17-inch monitor. The visual 
perspective-taking (VPT) task was programmed on E-Prime software (version 2.0, 
Psychology Software Tools) and all the questionnaires were presented via online forms 
implemented with Google Drive. 
2.3  Data analyses 
In order to insure that statistical conditions were met to investigate inter-individual 
differences in terms of narcissism, we inspected the distribution of participants’ score on 
the NPI-40 questionnaire (see Figure 1) and noted that scores were normally distributed 
(Shapiro-Wilk: p = 0.988). In addition, the scale was highly reliable (40 items; α = .91). To 
test the effect of narcissism on perspective-taking performance, we split our sample of 
participants into high and low narcissism groups (N = 49 vs. 50) based on the median NPI 
score (Mdn = 146). The NPI data of one participant was lost due a technical failure and was 
thus not included in analyses.  
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Figure 1. Histogram of participants’ scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & 
Terry, 1988) split into low and high narcissism participants. 
3. Results 
3.1  Narcissism and perspective-taking performance 
Trials on which participants responded beyond 2.5 standard deviations above or below 
the mean for each condition (1.08 % of all data) were excluded from statistical analyses. 
The results are presented separately for reaction times (RT) and error rates (ER). The RT 
data of one participant was lost due to a technical failure. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on the RT and ER with the Consistency between 
the two perspectives (consistent vs. inconsistent perspectives) and the Perspective to judge 
(self- vs. other-perspective) as within-subject variables, and NPI (low NPI vs. high NPI) as 
a between-subjects variable.  
3.1.1 Reaction times.  
The ANOVA on RT revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 96) = 
136.199, MSE = 604,284, p < .001, ηp² = .587, a significant main effect of Perspective, F 
(1, 96) = 10.409, MSE = 50,833, p = .002, ηp² = .098, and a significant Consistency x 
Perspective interaction effect, F (1, 96) = 33.172, MSE = 165,042, p < .001, ηp² = .257. 
These results replicate all the effects found in the original study (Samson et al., 2010) and 
show that the task was properly completed. 
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Of particular interest to the current study were any effects of narcissism (see Figures 2 
and 3). There was no main effect of NPI, F (1, 96) < 1, MSE = 5,686, p = .787, ηp² = .001, 
nor any significant interaction with NPI (NPI x Consistency: F (1, 96) < 1, MSE = 1, p = 
.990, ηp² = .001; NPI x Perspective, F (1, 96) < 1, MSE = 4,714, p = .328, ηp² = .010, see 
Figure 2; NPI x Consistency x Perspective: F (1, 96) < 1, MSE = 4,434, p = .348, ηp² = 
.009). 
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) in the visual perspective-taking task as a 
function of the Perspective, Consistency, and Narcissism (NPI) conditions. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
3.1.2 Error rates.  
Response omissions due to the timeout procedure (> 2000 ms) were counted as errors. 
The ANOVA on ER revealed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 97) = 60.677, 
MSE = .432, p < .001, ηp² = .385, a significant main effect of Perspective, F (1, 97) = 
13.063, MSE = .078, p < .001, ηp² = .119, and a significant Consistency x Perspective 
interaction effect, F (1, 97) = 7.136, MSE = .045, p = .009, ηp² = .069. These results 
replicated all the effects found in the original study by Samson et al. (2010) and show that 
the task was properly completed. 
Regarding the effects of narcissism (see Figure 2), there was no main effect of NPI, F 
(1, 97) < 1, MSE = .008, p = .476, ηp² = .005, but the NPI x Perspective interaction was 
significant, F (1, 97) = 6.334, MSE = .038, p = .013, ηp² = .061. The NPI x Consistency and 
NPI x Consistency x Perspective interactions were not significant, F (1, 97) < 1, MSE = 
.001, p = .977, ηp² = .001, F (1, 97) < 1, MSE = .002, p = .583, ηp² = .003, respectively. 
To explore the Perspective x NPI interaction effect, we conducted separate paired-t tests 
for each NPI group to test the effect of Perspective. There was a significant effect of 
Perspective in the Low NPI group, t (49) = 3.389, p < .001, d = 0.54, with 5% less errors 
when Low NPI individuals made judgments about their egocentric relative to the other 
person’s perspective, but no significant Perspective effect in the High NPI group, t (48) < 1, 
p = .363, d = 0.13. In order to compare the Perspective effects across the two NPI groups, a 
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t-test for independent samples was conducted on the perspective differences (i.e., mean ER 
of self-perspective trials minus mean ER of other-perspective trials) with the NPI as a 
between-subjects variable (see Figure 3). A positive perspective difference indicated an 
advantage in judging the avatar’s perspective whereas a negative difference indicated an 
advantage in judging one’s own perspective. Participants of the Low NPI group had a 
significantly lower mean perspective difference, M = -4.75%, SD = 8.75, than those in the 
High NPI condition, M = -0.85%, SD = 6.48, t (97) = 2.517, p = .013, d = 0.51. These 
results indicate therefore that the participants who scored highly in narcissism were less 
egocentric than those who had a low score of narcissism (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3. Performance advantage on self-perspective trials over other-perspective trials in the visual 
perspective-taking task on RTs (left panel) and ERs (right panel) as a function of the Narcissism 
group. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
3.2  Correlations 
As we were also interested in inspecting (1) whether the association between narcissism 
and perspective-taking performance was explained by other measured variables and (2) 
whether we would find again a negative association between narcissism and self-reported 
cognitive and affective empathy, we ran correlational analyses between participants scores 
of empathy and perspective taking (as measured by the perspective-taking and empathic 
concern subscales of the IRI and the VPT task) and their scores of narcissism (NPI), 
machiavellism (Mach-IV), depression (BDI), anxiety (STAI), positive affects (PA), and 
negative affects (NA). 
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Table 1. Correlations between the visual perspective-taking scores and the NPI as 
well as other trait and state measures. 
N = 99 NPI IRI-PT IRI-EC Mach-IV BDI STAI PA NA 
Egocentric advantage (ER) -,214* -,159 ,101 -,050 ,041 ,060 ,001 ,117 
Egocentric advantage (RT) -,066 ,100 ,126 -,058 ,030 -,054 ,094 ,042 
IRI-PT -,125 1 ,491** -,282** -,260** -,310** -,04 -,089 
IRI-EC -,246* ,491** 1 -,420** -,062 ,051 ,077 ,028 
Note: NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory, IRI-PT and IRI-EC = Perspective-Taking and Empathic 
Concern subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, STAI = State 
and Trait Anxiety Inventory, PA = Positive Affects, NA = Negative Affects, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
The participants’ performance advantage in taking their egocentric perspective over 
another person’s perspective was significantly negatively associated with the NPI score but 
was not significantly associated with any other questionnaire measures, which suggests that 
there is a linear relationship between narcissism and perspective-taking performance that 
could not be accounted for by other factors (see Figure 4). 
The participants’ scores on the perspective-taking and empathic concern subscales of 
the IRI were negatively associated with NPI scores, but this association was significant 
only for empathic concern, which replicates previous studies that consistently reported this 
negative relationship when using self-reports of everyday life habits. 
 
Figure 4. Performance advantage in self-perspective trials over other-perspective trials in the visual 
perspective-taking task on ERs as a function of the scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
questionnaire (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988).  
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4. Discussion 
Even in the normal population, narcissism has been associated with interpersonal 
difficulties. Because self-reported empathic and perspective-taking habits were consistently 
negatively associated with narcissism, narcissists’ difficulties in understanding and 
predicting other people’s mental states may lie at the heart of their interpersonal difficulties. 
However, a recent study (Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014) provided evidence that 
narcissists have the ability to be as empathic as non-narcissists if explicitly instructed to be 
so. The current study aimed to test whether narcissists have lower perspective-taking 
abilities than non-narcissists while measuring empathic and perspective-taking habits. We 
found that participants scoring high on narcissism had not lower perspective-taking abilities 
than non-narcissistic participants and were actually less egocentric in their performance 
when judging what another person sees. This reduced egocentrism was not explained by 
any other measured factor than narcissism. Self-reported empathic habits and, to a lesser 
extent, perspective-taking habits, were nevertheless negatively associated with narcissism. 
The implications of these findings for understanding the effects of narcissism on 
perspective taking are discussed in turns. 
We found that individuals scoring high on narcissism had not poorer perspective-taking 
performances than individuals scoring low on narcissism. This finding strongly supports the 
idea that narcissists have the ability to be as good perspective-takers as other individuals 
and is in line with recent findings that narcissists have the ability to express as much 
empathy (Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014), commitment in their relationship (Ashton-
James & Levordashka, 2013) and mimicry behaviour (Finkel et al., 2009) as non-
narcissists. However, our finding seems to contradict the behavioural results of Vonk and 
colleagues (2013) who reported a negative association between narcissism and social causal 
reasoning and theory of mind (i.e., the ability to impute mental states to others; Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). This inconsistency is however probably explained by the fact that their 
measures did not entirely overlap with perspective-taking performance. Their scoring 
method of social causal reasoning included criteria irrelevant to perspective taking (i.e., 
descriptiveness of reasoning and immediacy of causal factors) and they used the Read the 
Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) which taps 
more onto facial expression recognition and does not entail discrepant self-other 
perspectives. 
Individuals scoring high on narcissism were not only unimpaired in perspective taking 
but they were actually less egocentric than individuals scoring low on narcissism in the 
sense that they gave less priority to the processing of what they saw over what other person 
saw. Individuals from the general population are reported as egocentrically biased in all 
perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Epley et al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2000; A. D. R. Surtees & 
Apperly, 2012), including in the VPT task (cf. Chapter 5). Hence, observing an absence of 
egocentric bias in a substantial sample of participants (N = 49) is an unusual finding. We 
interpret this finding as resulting from either situational or dispositional motivational 
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factors specifically relevant to the narcissistic personality. The situational interpretation is 
that situational factors increased narcissists’ motivations to perform well on the 
perspective-taking task. This interpretation is especially in line with three studies that 
showed superior performance among narcissists but only under conditions where motives 
for performing better were provided. More specifically, increased empathy was found 
following explicit instruction to imagine what another person is feeling (Hepper, Hart, & 
Sedikides, 2014), increased mimicry was found when interacting with a high status person 
(Ashton-James & Levordashka, 2013), and increased relationship commitment was found 
following the presence of communal goals (e.g., caring, helpfulness) in the partner or the 
priming of communal values (Finkel et al., 2009). Thus, it seems that narcissists can have 
good interpersonal performances if they are given the right motives. Following this 
interpretation, narcissists may be particularly motivated to self-enhance by succeeding the 
task at hand or to self-present positively to the experimenter. In line with this interpretation, 
narcissists outperformed non-narcissists in the VPT task only in terms of accuracy possibly 
because feedbacks on the accuracy of the participants’ response were given after each trial. 
The dispositional interpretation is that narcissists performed less egocentrically because 
they are genuinely motivated to pay attention to others. Congruently, narcissists are 
characterised for their chronic need to seek the attention of others (Buss & Chiodo, 1991; 
Nathan DeWall et al., 2011), for externally validating their inflated self-views (Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001), and for comparing themselves with others (Campbell et al., 2000). To 
fulfil these goals narcissists may therefore pay more attention to others than non-narcissists 
despite these goals are self-interested. This latter possibility would be in line with our 
finding that individuals induced in a state of guilt prior to completing the VPT task also 
gave a higher priority to another person’s perspective than to their own perspective (cf. 
Chapter 3) despite the fact that guilt is considered as a self-interested and self-centred 
emotion (Iyer et al., 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2003).  
Although we found a positive association between narcissism and perspective-taking 
performance, empathy and perspective taking have both been negatively associated with 
narcissism. These negative associations have been consistently reported with self-report 
questionnaire measures (Delič et al., 2011; Given-Wilson et al., 2011; Hepper, Hart, Meek, 
et al., 2014; Jonason & Krause, 2013; Munro et al., 2005; Ritter et al., 2011; Vonk et al., 
2013; P J Watson et al., 1994, 1984, 1992; P J Watson & Biderman, 1994; P J Watson & 
Morris, 1991) but less so with behavioural measures (Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014; 
Vonk et al., 2013). One explanation reconciling these conflicting findings is that the IRI, 
the self-report questionnaire used so far, and the behavioural measures do not assess the 
same facet of perspective taking. The IRI assesses perspective taking by scoring agreements 
on statements such as “If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time 
listening to other people's arguments.”, “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement 
before I make a decision”, and “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective”. It is thus implicitly assumed that people 
take other people’s perspective because they care about others rather than for self-interested 
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motives such as to manipulate others or to self-present positively. Consequently, the IRI 
assess to what extent narcissists adhere to communal values (e.g., caring, nurturance, 
warmth) whereas behavioural measures are more likely to assess actual abilities. Because it 
is well evidenced that narcissists adhere to agentic values (e.g., independence, ambition, 
assertiveness) rather than communal values (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 
2007; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011), it is not 
surprising that narcissists reported fewer perspective-taking habits if these habits are framed 
with communal values such as caring, equity, openness or friendliness. Interestingly, the 
sole study (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) that reported a positive association between 
narcissism and perspective taking as measured through as self-report questionnaire is the 
only study that did not use the IRI but a perspective-taking subscale of the Empathy 
Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & 
David, 2004). The items on this subscale are framed in terms of abilities rather than habits 
and are not framed with communal values (e.g., “I am good at predicting what someone 
will do.” or “I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.”). 
5. Conclusion 
Is narcissism an irremediable curse to interpersonal cognition and behaviour? While it 
has been long supported that reduced empathic and perspective-taking abilities in 
narcissists lie at the heard of their interpersonal difficulties, this study showed that 
narcissists do not have poorer perspective-taking performances than non-narcissists. 
Moreover, we found that narcissists prioritized their egocentric perspective over another 
person’s perspective to a lesser extent than non-narcissists, which suggests that narcissists 
are either genuinely paying more attention to others’ views than non-narcissists or have the 
ability to be good perspective-takers if they are given the appropriate motives to be so. 
Finally, we argued that the repeatedly reported negative association between narcissism and 
perspective taking measured by a self-report questionnaire reflects narcissists’ lack of 
prosocial and communal motives in their interpersonal behaviour rather than a lack of 
interpersonal abilities. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Beyond good versus poor perspective-
takers: A two-dimensional approach to 
characterize perspective-taking 
performance 
 
 
An individual’s ability to take other people’s perspective is usually graded along a one-
dimensional continuum that allows characterizing individuals either as good or poor 
perspective-takers. This study tested whether inter-individual differences in perspective 
taking could be explained with two underpinning dimensions: The ability to handle the 
conflict between our egocentric perspective and another person’s perspective and the 
relative priority given during processing to the egocentric perspective versus another 
person’s perspective. We conducted cluster analyses on 346 participants who completed a 
visual perspective-taking task assessing performance on these two dimensions. Inter-
individual differences were best reduced by forming 4 clusters, or profiles, of perspective-
takers. This partition reflected a high heterogeneity along both dimensions. In addition, 
deconstructing the traditional one-dimensional measure of perspective-taking performance 
in two independent dimensions allowed to almost triple the explanatory power of 
perspective-taking performance in predicting participants’ self-reported everyday life 
perspective-taking tendencies. Altogether, considering the priority given to the egocentric 
perspective versus another person’s perspective as a potential source of variability allows 
forming, in combination with the ability to handle conflicting perspectives, a two-
dimensional space that enriches our understanding of the inter-individual differences in 
perspective taking. 
 
  
What influences perspective taking? 
107 
 
Beyond good versus poor perspective-
takers: A two-dimensional approach to 
characterize perspective-taking 
performance 
 
 
Henryk Bukowski, Dana Samson 
Institut de recherche en sciences psychologiques, Université catholique de Louvain, 
Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium 
1. Introduction 
Adults are not all equally good at taking someone else’s perspective, that is to say, at 
inferring what another person is thinking, wanting or feeling. This ability is also referred to 
as Theory of Mind or cognitive empathy (to distinguish from affective empathy which 
consists in sharing another person’s emotional experience (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002). Differences in perspective-taking skills among healthy adults 
have often been measured in relation to enduring, or trait-like, characteristics and have 
always been captured through a single score of perspective taking. For example, higher 
perspective-taking scores have been associated with higher self-esteem (Davis, 1983), 
better executive control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Wardlow, 2013), higher proneness to guilt 
(Joireman, 2004; Leith & Baumeister, 1998), better negotiation performance (Galinsky, 
Maddux, et al., 2008), and higher propensity to forgive (Rizkalla et al., 2008), whereas 
lower perspective-taking scores have been associated with higher proneness to anger (Mohr 
et al., 2007), higher dispositional hostility (Loudin et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 1994), 
narcissism (Delič et al., 2011; Hepper, Hart, & Sedikides, 2014), social dominance 
orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), alexithymia (Grynberg et al., 2010; Wastell & Taylor, 
2002), or schizotypy (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999, 2001). In all these studies and in the 
study of perspective taking among healthy adults in general, it is implicitly assumed that 
individuals differ along a one-dimensional scale ranging from poor to good perspective-
taking skills. 
It is increasingly recognised, however, that perspective taking is not a unitary construct. 
Individuals’ perspective-taking skills may thus vary along more than one dimension. We 
focus here on two dimensions directly linked to current views of the cognitive processes 
underlying perspective taking. The first dimension is probably the one that has been most 
studied so far and refers to the ability to handle conflicting perspectives. During our social 
interactions, we often hold a different view to that of others. Considering other people’s 
point of view therefore often requires to suppress interferences from our own point of view 
(Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley et al., 2004; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; Perner & Lang, 
1999; Royzman et al., 2003), a computation that is thought to be achieved by domain 
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general executive processes (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Leslie et al., 2005; Qureshi et al., 2010; 
Wardlow, 2013). Accordingly, it has been shown that perspective-taking performance 
decreases when individuals perform concurrently a task tapping onto executive processes 
(T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; Lin et al., 2010; Newton & de Villiers, 2007; Qureshi et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, it has been shown, both in children and adults, that perspective 
taking performance varies from one individual to another depending on the individual’s 
performance in working memory and inhibitory control tasks (Bernstein, Atance, Meltzoff, 
& Loftus, 2013; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Devine & Hughes, 2014; Fizke et al., 2014; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; 
Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Lin et al., 2010; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Sabbagh et al., 2006; 
Wardlow, 2013). The ability to handle conflicting perspectives is thus one dimension along 
which individuals differ and which may determine individuals’ overall perspective taking 
abilities. However, this may not be the sole dimension. 
Another dimension along which individuals’ perspective taking skills may vary relates 
to the relative priority that is given to our own point of view compared to other people’s 
point of view during social interactions or when we think about others. It is often 
considered that our own perspective is more salient. For example, it is well known that 
objects associated with the self are preferred (Beggan, 1992), better attended to (Bargh, 
1982; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012) and better remembered (Cunningham, Turk, 
Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). Several models also posit 
that we use our own point of view as anchoring point and then adjusted it when we think 
about other people’s point of view (Epley et al., 2004; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). This 
explains why it can be so difficult to inhibit one’s own conflicting perspective to consider 
other people’s point of view and why, both in children and adult, egocentric biases are so 
prevalent in perspective taking tasks (Birch & Bloom, 2004; A. D. R. Surtees & Apperly, 
2012).  
Recent findings show, however, that the self-perspective is not necessarily more salient 
or getting in the way when children or adults watch or interact with other people. For 
example, there is accumulating evidence showing that, at least in some circumstances, we 
spontaneously track other people’s mental states such as their beliefs (Kovács et al., 2010; 
Schneider, Nott, et al., 2014; van der Wel et al., 2014) or their visual experiences (Samson 
et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013) even when these mental states conflict with our own 
mental states. Such spontaneous tracking has been found to be maintained when individuals 
perform a concurrent effortful task (Qureshi et al., 2010), suggesting that attention can be 
drawn effortlessly to other people’s mental states. The relative salience of one’s own and 
someone else’s perspective can thus be variable from one context to another but maybe 
also, in the same context, vary from one individual to another. Individual differences in 
perspective taking may therefore also be explained in terms of the priority that is given to 
the self-perspective relative to the other-perspective.  
In order to test the hypothesis that inter-individual variability in perspective-taking 
performance can be better explained along two dimensions, namely the ability to handle 
What influences perspective taking? 
109 
 
conflicting perspectives and the relative priority given to the self- and the other-perspective, 
rather than one dimension, we used a visual perspective-taking (VPT) task developed by 
Samson and colleagues (2010). The task measures level 1 VPT, which is the ability to infer 
which objects someone else can or cannot see (in contrast to level 2 VPT that allows to 
infer that an object may have a different appearance to someone else; Flavell et al., 1981). 
In daily life, this basic form of VPT often serves as basis for more sophisticated inferences 
since what someone else is looking at gives us useful information about what that person 
wants, knows, thinks or talks about. Variability in performance on this VPT task is thus 
relevant for everyday life perspective taking.  
More concretely, in the VPT task (see Figure 1), participants are shown a person in a 
room who is facing one of the lateral walls. Red dots are pinned on one or the two lateral 
walls. On some trials, some of the dots are not visible to the person in the room, which 
means that the person in the room does not see the same amount of dots as participants 
(inconsistent perspectives condition). On other trials, all dots are visible to the person in the 
room, which means that participants and the other person see the same amount of dots 
(consistent perspectives condition). Participants are asked either to judge the number of 
dots that they can see (self-perspective judgment) or they are asked to judge the number of 
dots the person in the room can see (other-perspective judgment). This task allows us to 
extract a classic measure of perspective taking, namely the performance in taking another 
person’s perspective that is inconsistent with our egocentric perspective. This first measure 
corresponds to participants’ performance in the other-perspective/inconsistent perspectives 
condition (see the dotted rectangle in Figure 1). Moreover, given the orthogonal 
manipulation of, on the one hand, the consistency of participants’ perspective with the 
perspective of the person in the room and, on the other hand, the perspective to judge, we 
can separately measure (1) the ability to handle conflicting perspectives by comparing the 
performance on trials where the perspectives are inconsistent with the performance on trials 
where the perspectives are consistent, irrespective of the perspective that participants have 
to judge (Consistency index) and (2) the relative salience of the self- and the other-
perspective during judgments by comparing the performance on trials where participants 
have to judge the other-perspective with the performance where participants have to judge 
the self-perspective irrespective of the level of conflict between the perspectives 
(Perspective index).  
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Figure 1. Examples of trials used in the VPT task in the different experimental conditions. 
Participants were asked to judge whether the number prompt (ranging from 0 to 3) matched the 
number of discs visible from the prompted perspective, which could be either their own perspective 
(self-perspective condition) or the perspective of the person in the room (other-perspective condition). 
The other person and the participants could see either the same number of discs (consistent condition) 
or a different number of discs (inconsistent condition). The classic one-dimensional measure of 
perspective taking is the ability to inhibit our egocentric perspective to correctly consider the other 
person’s differing perspective, which was captured here by the performance in the other-perspective / 
inconsistent-perspectives condition (dotted rectangle). The two hypothesized dimensions, the 
handling of conflicting perspectives and the relative priority given to the self- versus other-
perspective were measured by comparing performance on inconsistent and consistent perspectives 
trials (Consistency index) and on other- and self-perspective trials (Perspective index), respectively.  
Based on these measures, we ran two separate cluster analyses that determine whether 
individuals can be partitioned in statistically distinct groups of perspective-takers. The first 
analysis was based on the one-dimensional measure while the second analysis was based on 
the two-dimensional measures. Depending on the number of subgroups obtained and how 
they differ from each other, we can determine how many dimensions are needed to 
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distinguish the different groups of perspective-takers and whether considering the 
Consistency and Perspective measures separately gives us more information about the 
origin of the inter-individual variability than relying on a single and classic perspective 
taking measure. Participants also filled a self-reported questionnaire assessing perspective-
taking skills so that we could also assess the extent to which the different clusters were 
useful in predicting everyday life perspective taking skills. 
For the single dimension cluster analysis, two outcomes were possible: the cluster 
analysis could result either in one group, meaning that there were not enough individual 
differences to distinguish individuals in distinct groups (see Figure 2(a)), or several groups. 
This latter result would indicate that significant individual differences exist in our sample. 
However, these subgroups would be only distinguishable along a one-dimensional 
continuum, where some individuals could be classified as good perspective-takers and 
some others as poor perspective-takers (Figure 2 (b)).  
If there is enough individual variability with the one-dimensional measure in our 
sample, we can then test whether these individual differences can be decomposed in distinct 
sources of variability, that is to say, in distinct dimensions along which individuals vary. 
For the two-dimensional cluster analysis, three outcomes were possible. 
One possible outcome is that the different groups of perspective-takers can be fully 
distinguished along only one of the two measures introduced in the analyses, which would 
indicate that one of our measures does not reflect a dimension on which individuals vary. If 
this result is found, we would not be in a position to demonstrate that a two-dimensional 
assessment is more informative than a one-dimensional assessment. Given the evidence 
reviewed earlier, if only one of the two measures captures individual variability, it would 
most likely be the measure of Consistency which taps on individuals’ ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives (see Figure 2(c)).  
A second possibility is that the different groups of perspective-takers can be 
distinguished along both measures but in a highly similar fashion. For example, individuals 
with a high or low Consistency index would have, respectively, a high or low Perspective 
index. This high interdependence between the two indexes would indicate that the different 
groups can actually be fully distinguished with only one of the indexes or another 
dimension that summarizes the two indexes (see Figure 2(d)). Following such outcome, we 
would again be unable to demonstrate that a two-dimensional assessment is more 
informative than a one-dimensional assessment.  
Finally, the third possibility is that the different groups of perspective-takers can be best 
distinguished when the two indexes are used (see Figure 2(e)). This would indicate that 
each index captures a unique extent of individual variability and that their combination can 
form a meaningful two-dimensional space which provides a better and richer assessment of 
inter-individual variability in perspective-taking performance. 
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Figure 2. Five hypothetical outcomes regarding individuals’ partition in distinct groups of 
perspective-takers and the minimum number of dimensions needed to distinguish them. Individuals 
could form (a) a homogeneous group or several groups that are distinguishable according to (b) the 
only one dimension considered, (c) only one of the two dimensions considered, (d) a single dimension 
unspecific to any of the two dimensions, (e) two dimensions. Black and grey arrows represent the 
hypothetical dimensions necessary and unnecessary, respectively, to distinguish the different groups 
of perspective-takers. C = Consistency index, P = Perspective index. 
In order to run reliable cluster analyses, we needed a large sample of participants who 
had completed the VPT task. To this end, we merged the data sets from 6 different 
experiments to form a sample of 346 participants who all completed the VPT task (see 
Table 1). These experiments were presented in the two last chapters (except the 
experiments 4 and 5 that are briefly presented in the Appendix B) and thus included 
conditions in which emotional states (guilt, anger, shame, sadness and happiness) were 
induced. A few studies have started to highlight the impact of emotions on perspective-
taking performance (Converse et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2010). The inclusion of these 
conditions thus reflects a natural source of variability in perspective taking that individuals 
can encounter over the course of a single day.  
2. Method 
2.1  Participants 
We merged the data from 3 studies conducted in our research group totalising 6 
experiments with a sample size of 346 healthy individuals (59% females, mean age: 21.5, 
age range: 18-33). The characteristics of the experiments are summarized in Table 1. All 
volunteers participated in return of course credits or 8 to 16 euros. Approximately half of 
the participants (N = 164) were in an emotion induction condition. All experiments were 
conducted at the Université catholique de Louvain and were approved by the ethics 
committee of the Psychological Sciences Research Institute.  
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Table 1. Description of the merged data set 
Exp Conditions (N) %F M Age Reference 
1 Guilt (17), Anger (16), Control (17) 52,9 21,5 Chapter 3 
2 Guilt (18) 50,0 21,2 Chapter 3 
3 Shame (17), Control (17) 55,9 21,0 Chapter 3 
4 Sadness (19), Happiness (22), Control (21) 67,7 20,4 Appendix B 
5 Sadness (30), Happiness (29), Control (29) 87,5 21,5 Appendix B 
6 Control (93) 32,3 22,5 Chapter 4 
2.2  Instruments 
2.2.1 Visual perspective-taking task.  
Perspective-taking performance was measured by the VPT task (Samson et al., 2010). 
Participants saw the picture of a room with a human model positioned in the centre and 
with red discs pinned one or both side walls (see Figure 1).The human model was shown 
sideways facing either the right or the left wall. Prior to the presentation of the visual scene, 
a perspective prompt indicating which perspective to take (“YOU” or “SHE”/“HE”) and a 
number prompt (ranging from 0 to 3) indicating a number of discs to verify were presented. 
Participants were asked to judge whether the number prompt matched the number of discs 
visible from either the participant’s perspective (self-perspective condition) or from the 
human model’s perspective (other-perspective condition) by pressing the upward arrow 
(yes) or downward arrow key (no). For example, after the prompts “HE” and “2”, 
participants had to judge whether the model could see two discs in front of him. The 
number of discs visible could be different between the two perspectives (inconsistent 
perspectives condition) or identical for both perspectives (consistent perspectives 
condition). Directly after the participant’s response, a feedback “Correct”, “Incorrect”, or 
“No response” was presented. A “No response” feedback was presented after 2 s had 
elapsed without a response from the participant. Errors and reaction times were collected. 
The task was run with the same timing of events as in the original study (see Samson et al., 
2010, for a detailed description of the task) but with E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA, USA). 
In Experiments 1, 2 and 3, like in the original paradigm, there were 24 matching trials 
and 24 mismatching trials in each of the 4 experimental conditions (2 (Perspective: self vs. 
other) x 2 (Consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent)). In addition, 16 filler trials were 
included to avoid anticipatory responses (see the original study for details). Furthermore, 
because mismatching trials in the consistent condition displayed number prompts irrelevant 
for any perspective and therefore were particularly easy to process, mismatching trials were 
unbalanced in terms of performance difficulty compared to matching trials and were thus 
not analysed. The task included a total of 234 trials divided into 4 blocks of 52 trials plus a 
set of 26 practice trials. Trials within each block were presented in a randomized order. In 
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the Experiments 4, 5, and 6, we used a shortened version of the VPT task, with 2 blocks 
instead of 4, with which the findings of the original paradigm were replicated, suggesting 
that the shorter version was suited as well to measure VPT performance. The human model 
was a female confederate student in Experiment 1, 2, and 3, and a gender congruent human 
avatar in Experiments 4, 5, and 6. 
2.2.2 Dispositional perspective taking.  
We measured self-reported perspective-taking abilities with the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), a questionnaire measuring participants’ agreement on a 5-point 
Likert scale with 28 statements about their habits, beliefs, and experiences in various social 
and emotional situations. The IRI is divided in 4 subscales: perspective taking, fantasy (i.e. 
self-absorption in fictions), empathic concern, and personal distress. For example, one of 
the seven items of the perspective-taking subscale states “I sometimes try to understand my 
friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.”. As we were 
specifically interested in measuring perspective taking, we only analysed the score on the 
perspective-taking subscale, labelled PT-IRI score, which could go from 0 to 28. The IRI 
was completed prior the emotion induction (when there was one) by all participants, except 
the participants of Experiment 4 who did not complete the IRI and one participant of 
Experiment 6 whose data was lost due to a technical failure. Overall, 283 participants 
completed the IRI. 
2.3  Data analyses 
2.3.1 Indexes computation.  
In order to obtain normalized measures of one-dimensional and two-dimensional 
measures of perspective taking, we calculated 3 indexes: the Inc-Other index, the 
Perspective index, and the Consistency index. The Inc-Other index is a one-dimensional 
measure of, literally, the ability to consider another person’s differing perspective, while the 
Consistency and the Perspective indexes measure the ability to handle conflicting 
perspectives and the relative salience of the self- versus the other person’s perspective, 
respectively. To calculate these indexes, we first computed participants’ reaction times 
(RT) for correct responses and error rates (ER) in the VPT task. To obtain a unique measure 
of performance (that cancels any potential speed-accuracy trade-off; Townsend & Ashby, 
1978) for each index, we transformed RTs and ER in inverse efficiency scores (IES; mean 
RT divided by the proportion of correct responses).  
The Inc-Other index was calculated from participants’ IES in the other-perspective / 
inconsistent perspectives condition of the VPT task (see the dotted rectangle in Figure 1), 
with a higher value indicating lower (one-dimensional) perspective-taking performance. 
The Consistency index calculated from the subtraction of participants’ IES in the consistent 
perspectives condition from their IES in the inconsistent perspectives condition, with a 
higher value indicating more difficulties in handling conflicting perspective. The 
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Perspective index calculated from the subtraction of participants’ IES in the other-
perspective condition from their IES in the self-perspective condition, with a positive value 
indicating better performance in taking the other person’s perspective than the self-
perspective. Finally, to normalize the 3 indexes in terms of unspecific global response 
speed, each index was divided by the participant’s global IES (i.e., with all 4 conditions 
merged). 
2.3.2 Cluster analyses.  
In order to examine individual differences in perspective taking, we ran two two-steps 
cluster analyses: the first with the single index of perspective taking (the Inc-Other index) 
and the second with the Consistency and the Perspective indexes. Clustering consists in 
partitioning objects (here individuals) into groups that minimize within-group variability 
and maximize between-groups variability. Since this multivariate technique clusters 
individuals according to the source variables for which the highest variability is observed, 
we can then examine the dimensions that are necessary to explain performance variability. 
In other words, this technique combines the advantages of other structural techniques (e.g., 
principal component analysis, factor analysis) best suited for dimension reduction and those 
of functional techniques (e.g., multivariate regression, discriminant analysis) best suited to 
describe how these dimensions relate to the source variables (or predictors). The two-step 
technique consists in first forming small sub-clusters of individuals to reduce the size of the 
matrix and then progressively merging them following a hierarchical clustering algorithm. 
We chose this two-step technique because it offers the advantage that no arbitrary 
prescribed number of clusters is needed. The selected partition is the one that minimizes the 
Bayesian information criterion, a widely used statistical index for model selection that 
measures the efficiency of a model in predicting the data while penalizing the complexity 
of the model (Fraley & Raftery, 1998; Schwarz, 1978).  
2.3.3 Regression analyses.  
In order to examine whether self-reported abilities in everyday life activities can be 
better explained by a one-dimensional measure or two-dimensional measures, we compared 
two regressions analyses on the PT-IRI scores: One with Inc-Other index and gender for 
predictors, and the other with gender and the Consistency and the Perspective indexes as 
predictors.  
2.3.4 Tests of independence.  
We investigated whether the different profiles of perspective-takers obtained through 
the two-dimensional cluster analysis were equally distributed across (1) the different 
profiles obtained through the one-dimensional cluster analysis and (2) the different emotion 
induction conditions (control, guilt, sadness, shame, happiness, and anger). To do so, we 
ran two chi-square tests of independence between the two-dimensional cluster membership 
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and either the one-dimensional membership or the emotion induction condition 
membership.  
3. Results 
3.1  One-dimensional cluster analysis.  
The cluster analysis showed a 4-group partition based on 346 participants (see Table 2 
for group centroid characteristics). This partition allows to distinguish individuals only 
along a one-dimensional continuum on which the 4 groups are characterized by either good 
(N = 92), average (N = 177), poor (N = 70), and very poor (N = 7) perspective-taking 
performance (see Figure 3(b)).  
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 Figure 3. Upper panel: One-dimensional clustering of participants’ difficulty in considering another 
person’s differing perspective (Inc-Other index). Lower panel: Two-dimensional clustering of 
participants’ perspective-taking performance based on their difficulty in handling conflicting 
perspectives (Consistency index) and the priority given to the other person’s perspective versus the 
self-perspective (Perspective index). 
3.2  Two-dimensional cluster analysis.  
The cluster analysis showed a 4-group partition based on 346 participants (see Table 2 
for group centroid characteristics and Figure 3 for the distribution of individuals according 
to the two dimensions). We can note that if we consider only the Consistency index, only 
two of the 4 groups can be distinguished. These two groups are characterized by having 
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either high or low values on the Consistency index, which indicates that the two groups had 
particularly high or low difficulties in handling conflicting perspectives. We labelled these 
two groups as “non-flexible” and “flexible” perspective-takers, respectively. Critically, the 
two remaining groups are distinguished only along the Perspective index. They are 
characterized by having either highly negative or highly positive values on the Perspective 
index, which indicates that the two groups gave priority to either the self- or the other-
perspective, respectively. We labelled these two groups as “egocentric” and “altercentric” 
perspective-takers, respectively. This result shows for the first time that there is a large 
amount of individual variability regarding the relative priority given to the egocentric 
versus the other people’s perspective3 and that the priority is not given to the self-
perspective in all individuals (20% show even the reverse). It is important to note however 
that, overall, individuals have a negative Perspective index (M = -.0161, SD = .067), which 
means that, in line with most perspective-taking studies, they are significantly better at 
taking their egocentric perspective over another person’s perspective, t (345) = 4.443, p < 
.001.4 
Table 2. Description of the two cluster partitions based first on participants’ difficulty 
in considering another person’s differing perspective (Inc-Other) and, secondly, on 
both the difficulty in handling conflicting perspectives (Consistency) and the priority 
given to the other person’s perspective relative to the self-perspective (Perspective). 
Source variables Inc-Other    
Cluster # 1 2 3 4 
Label Average Good Poor Very poor 
N (% total) 177 (51.2%) 92 (26.6%) 70 (20.2%) 7 (2.0%) 
Female % 71.4% 62.9% 56.5% 58.2% 
Inc-Other M (SD) 1.153 (.055) 0.999 (.057) 1.367 (.885) 1.965 (.286) 
Source variables Consistency Perspective   
Cluster # 1 2 3 4 
Label Flexible Non-flexible Altercentric Egocentric 
N (% total) 139 (40.2%) 75 (21.7%) 69 (19.9%) 63 (18.2%) 
Female % 55.4% 62.7% 59.4% 61.9% 
Consistency M (SD) .046 (.034) .164 (.045) .069 (.034) .122 (.032) 
Perspective M (SD) -.026 (.032) -.005 (.042) .073 (.036) -.105 (.048) 
Inc-Other M (SD) 1.12 (.076) 1.228 (.164) 1.006 (.078) 1.399 (.212) 
                                                 
 
3
 We found the same 4-group partition varying on both Consistency and Perspective indexes when we ran 
the two-step cluster analysis on the participants who were not in an emotion induction condition (see 
Appendix 1) or when we entered participants’ indexes of performance on the 4 experimental conditions 
(other/inconsistent, other/consistent, self/inconsistent, self/consistent) of the VPT task as source variables. 
4
 We found the same egocentric advantage when taking into account only the participants who were not in 
an emotion induction condition, M = -.025, SD = .065, t (176) = 5.069, p < .001. 
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3.3  Predicting self-reported everyday life perspective-
taking habits with a one-dimensional versus two-
dimensional measures. 
The regression analysis showed that the gender of participants did not significantly 
predict their PT-IRI scores, β = .020, t (282) < 1, p = .736, whereas their Inc-Other index 
marginally predicted their PT-IRI scores, β = -.107, t (282) = 1.803, p = .073. Together, 
these variables explained a non-significant proportion of the variance, R2 = .012, F (2, 283) 
= 1.718, p = .181. In contrast, the combination of the Consistency and the Perspective 
indexes while controlling for gender explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = 
.034, F (2, 283) = 3.286, p = .021. Participants’ PT-IRI scores were not significantly 
predicted by participants’ gender, β = .035, t (282) < 1, p = .560, nor their Consistency 
index, β = .026, t (282) < 1, p = .672. Participants’ Perspective index, however, 
significantly predicted participants’ PT-IRI scores, β = .186, t (282) = 3.107, p = .002.5 In 
other words, the higher priority that individuals gave to the other person’s perspective 
compared to their own perspective in the VPT task significantly predicted higher 
perspective-taking scores on the IRI questionnaire (see also Figure 4 for a comparison of 
perspective-taking scores across the 4 profiles of perspective-takers). Thus, deconstructing 
the one-dimensional measure into two independent dimensions allowed isolating a 
dimension that is more predictive of real-life perspective-taking habits than the traditional 
measure. Furthermore, entering the two dimensions as separate predictors had almost thrice 
the explanatory power of the one-dimensional model to predict self-reported perspective-
taking habits. 
                                                 
 
5
 Entering the Perspective index x Consistency index interaction did not change the results (Model: R2 = 
.035, F (2, 283) = 2.549, p = .040; Gender: β = .035, t (282) < 1, p = .562; Consistency index: β = .043, t 
(282) < 1, p = .521; Perspective index: β = .178, t (282) = 2.904, p = .004; Consistency index x Perspective 
index: β = .041, t (282) < 1, p = .548). 
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Figure 4. Perspective-taking scores measured by the IRI questionnaire in function of the groups of 
perspective takers. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
3.4  Comparison of the one-dimensional profiles and 
the two-dimensional profiles.  
The Pearson’s chi-square analysis revealed a highly significant rejection of the null 
hypothesis of independence between the one-dimensional (‘good’ to ‘very poor’ 
perspective-takers) and two-dimensional partitions of participants, χ²(9, N = 346) = 
260.680, p < 0.001. When plotting how each profile of perspective-takers of the one-
dimensional partition is distributed across each profile of perspective-takers of the two-
dimensional partition (see Figure 5) we can note that the 2 partitions do not overlap. 
Instead, we can see that the ‘good’ perspective-takers profile can be broken down into 
individuals who either have low difficulties in handling conflicting perspectives or 
prioritize the other person’s perspective over the self-perspective. As for the ‘poor’ 
perspective-takers, they can be broken down into individuals who either have high 
difficulties in handling conflicting perspectives or prioritize their egocentric perspective 
over the other person’s perspective. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the each profile of perspective-takers between the two-dimensional and one-
dimensional partition.  
3.5  Distribution of profiles across emotion induction 
conditions.  
The Pearson’s chi-square analysis revealed a highly significant rejection of the null 
hypothesis of independence in the distribution of each profile of perspective-takers across 
the different emotion induction conditions, χ²(15, N = 345) = 47.066, p < 0.001, which 
suggests that participants’ perspective-taking performance can be highly influenced by 
transient factors such as their emotional state (see Figure 6). For example, while a sixth of 
the 177 participants included in a control condition was classified as non-flexible or 
altercentric perspective-takers, twice this proportion was found in the guilt and shame 
conditions, respectively (cf. Chapter 3).  
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Figure 6. Distribution of the two-dimensional profiles of perspective-takers within the emotion 
induction conditions.  
4. Discussion 
An individual’s performance on a perspective-taking task is usually graded along a one-
dimensional continuum spanning from poor to good perspective-taking ability. This study 
showed, however, that inter-individual variability taken from a sample of 346 individuals 
could be better captured by taking into account two dimensions: the ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives and the relative priority that is given to the egocentric perspective 
versus other people’s perspectives. These two dimensions were not redundant in explaining 
inter-individual variability because individuals could score high or low on one dimension 
but not the other and, because the cluster division obtained by taking into account two 
dimensions did not overlap with the cluster division obtained with a classic one-
dimensional perspective taking measure. Furthermore, we found that deconstructing the 
perspective-taking performance into two independent dimensions allowed to better predict 
individuals’ self-reported perspective-taking habits in daily life (as assessed with IRI 
questionnaire). This increased (almost tripled) predictive power came from the fact that, 
amongst the two dimensions, the relative priority that is given to the self- versus the other-
perspective had a strong predictive power. This finding supports therefore that assessing the 
two dimensions separately allows testing and capturing effects that may have been not 
captured with a one-dimensional measure of PT performance. 
Participants’ partition in two opposite groups regarding their ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives clearly indicates that there exists a large amount of individual 
variability on this dimension. Many studies have highlighted the role of domain general 
executive abilities in the ability to overcome the conflict between the egocentric perspective 
and another person’s perspective (Carlson et al., 2004; Qureshi et al., 2010). For example, 
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young children or adults with frontal brain damage have poor performance on classic 
perspective-taking tasks but reducing the level of conflict between perspectives 
significantly increases their level of performance (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, Bickerton, 
& Humphreys, 2007; Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005; Carlson et al., 2002, 1998; 
Samson et al., 2005). Thus, given the known inter-individual variability observed on 
measures of domain general executive abilities it is not surprising to have found that the 
ability to handle conflicting perspectives is one dimension that explains individual 
differences in perspective-taking performance.  
However, individuals’ performance on executive tasks cannot entirely predict their 
performance on perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner & Lang, 
1999) and several studies in infants suggest that it is possible to correctly infer another 
person’s conflicting perspective despite a reduced ability to handle conflicting perspectives 
(Kovács et al., 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007). 
This is why we expected that at least an additional dimension must underpin perspective-
taking performance. 
Among the four groups of perspective-takers we obtained, only two could be 
distinguished in terms of difficulty in handling conflicting perspectives. The two other 
groups could be distinguished when another dimension was considered: the priority given 
to the egocentric perspective relatively to other people’s perspective during processing. 
This means that there was enough variability along this dimension to form two opposite 
groups of perspective-takers. A fifth of our participants were characterized by a higher 
priority given to the other person’s perspective than their egocentric perspective. This 
finding qualifies the widespread view that the egocentric perspective is always prioritized, 
accessed first, and used as an anchoring point during perspective taking (Birch & Bloom, 
2004; Epley et al., 2004; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Piaget & Inhelder, 1948; Ross et al., 
1977), as for some individuals this was not the case. This finding is however consistent 
with recent studies showing that, in some situations, another person’s perspective receives 
at least as much attention as the egocentric perspective. For example, holding a conflicting 
egocentric perspective did not prevent adults from spontaneously tracking other people’s 
mental states (Kovács et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013; 
Schneider, Nott, et al., 2014; van der Wel et al., 2014), even when they concurrently 
performed an effortful executive task (Qureshi et al., 2010). Furthermore, some studies 
have shown that in the absence of conflict between perspectives adults judged faster what 
another person saw than what they saw from their egocentric perspective (Qureshi et al., 
2010; Ramsey et al., 2013; Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013; A. D. R. Surtees 
& Apperly, 2012). Together, these studies suggest that the egocentric perspective is not 
always as prioritized as usually assumed. In this study, we show for the first time that the 
extent of this prioritization differs across individuals and therefore that prioritizing our 
egocentric perspective should not be considered as a universal characteristic. 
Together, the 4 groups, or profiles, of perspective-takers seem to reflect a high 
heterogeneity in the adult population where individuals with poor conflict handling skills 
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and high egocentrism would have been otherwise merged into a single group of “poor” 
perspective-takers, and individuals with a high altercentrism and good conflict handling 
skills would have been merged into the “good” perspective-takers group (see Figure 4). 
Therefore, considering the priority given to the egocentric perspective versus the other 
person’s perspective as a potential source of variability allows to form, in combination with 
the ability to handle conflicting perspectives, a two-dimensional space that leads to a richer 
understanding of the underpinning causes of individual differences in perspective taking. 
We found that self-reported perspective-taking tendencies in daily life were better 
predicted when using the two dimensions than using the one-dimensional measure of 
perspective-taking performance. Interestingly, perspective-taking tendencies were 
significantly predicted by participants’ priority given to the egocentric perspective relative 
to the other person’s perspective but not by their performances in handling conflicting 
perspectives. In addition, the participants characterized for highly prioritizing the self (i.e., 
egocentric group) were those who reported significantly less perspective-taking tendencies 
in their everyday life than all other groups of perspective-takers (see Figure 4). This finding 
is consistent with the fact that the IRI questionnaire measures only participants’ willingness 
to take other people’s perspective and thus captures motivational factors that are likely to 
determine their level of egocentrism but not their more domain-general conflict handling 
performance (cf. Chapter 4). Importantly, the fact that only one dimension predicted 
perspective-taking tendencies does not indicate that one dimension is enough to predict 
individual differences in perspective taking; the predictive value of the ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives has been largely documented when the ability rather than the 
motivation to take someone else’s perspective was measured (e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Lin 
et al., 2010; Wardlow, 2013). Because the perspective taking subscale of the IRI (Davis, 
1980) is geared towards the motivational aspects, it is possible that the Consistency index 
would be associated with scores on a real-life self-report measure of perspective taking if 
we had used another questionnaire, more geared toward actual abilities, such as the 
cognitive empathy subscale of the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Lawrence et al., 2004). In other words, there is no doubt that successful perspective taking 
in real life also depends on the ability to handle conflicting perspectives and so that the two 
dimensions are necessary. People have different knowledge and experiences of the world 
and therefore we must very often decentre from our prepotent vision of the world to 
correctly understand how others see the world. 
Across the variety of emotion induction conditions participants were allocated to, we 
found very different proportions of egocentric, altercentric, non-flexible, and flexible 
perspective-takers. For example, we found a twice higher proportion of altercentric and 
non-flexible perspective-takers in the guilt and shame induction conditions, respectively, 
than in the control conditions. This finding suggests that our emotional state may affect our 
perspective-taking performance, which goes in line with the findings of Converse et al. 
(2008) and Yang et al. (2010) who reported a beneficial influence of sadness and guilt and a 
detrimental influence of shame and happiness. Because our emotions change over the 
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course of a single day, this finding highlights the importance of considering perspective 
taking as a dynamic ability rather than a trait-like, or static, characteristic.  
All our findings are based on a single task that measures level 1 VPT. This basic form 
of VPT has been proposed to be achieved via the computation of the other person’s line of 
sight and is considered as a building block of Theory of Mind development (Kessler & 
Rutherford, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; A. D. R. Surtees et al., 2013). However, one 
can wonder whether our findings generalize to the other forms of perspective taking (e.g., 
when beliefs or desires must be inferred) present in real life and in other perspective-taking 
tasks.  
 A first argument in favour of generalizability is that the same egocentric bias and the 
same relation to executive processes are found across verbal (auditory and visual) and non-
verbal (visual and tactile) perspective-taking tasks that require to infer other people’s 
intentions (Keysar, 1994), knowledge (Camerer et al., 1989), beliefs (Carlson et al., 1998; 
T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; Newton & de Villiers, 2007), visual experiences (Keysar et 
al., 2000; Lin et al., 2010; Qureshi et al., 2010), and emotions (Gilovich et al., 1998; Silani, 
Lamm, Ruff, & Singer, 2013). This suggests that the same cognitive processes are involved 
irrespectively of the type of perspective-taking task used, including in level 1 VPT tasks.  
Secondly, we found that participants’ relative priority given to the self- versus other-
perspective significantly predicted participants’ self-reports of perspective-taking 
tendencies in their everyday life; which suggests that this new dimension we have 
highlighted reflects to some extent a real-life facet of perspective taking. It seems therefore 
reasonable to think that, although based on a measure of a simple form of perspective-
taking, our findings generalize to perspective taking in real life and as studied on other 
tasks. 
This study aimed to show the extent of potential individual variability within a 
relatively homogeneous population (i.e., university students) across diverse emotion 
conditions (see Figure 3) and control conditions (see Supplementary Figure 1). For this 
reason, our sample of participants is not, and was never meant to be, representative of the 
general population. Nevertheless, because the general population is much more 
heterogeneous, more inter-individual differences in perspective taking are expected in this 
population. We are therefore confident that the two-dimensional variability we reported 
here generalizes to the general population. 
5. Conclusion 
It is widely assumed that relying on our egocentric perspective is a universal prepotent 
tendency when inferring other people’s mental states, which led researchers to view 
perspective taking as resulting from the single ability to suppress or correct this egocentric 
tendency (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Epley et al., 2004; Leslie et al., 2005; Perner & Lang, 
Beyond good versus poor perspective-takers 
1999). This assumption is in line with the current assessment of perspective taking along a 
one-dimensional continuum spanning from poor to good perspective-taking performance. 
We analysed the perspective-taking performance of 346 healthy adults on a task that 
separately assessed the relative priority given to the processing of the egocentric 
perspective versus the other person’s perspective and the ability to handle conflicts between 
perspectives. We found a high heterogeneity along both factors that gave a richer account 
of the source of inter-individual differences than using a one-dimensional continuum. 
Perspective-takers that would classically be characterized as “good” perspective-takers 
were either individuals who efficiently handled conflicts or those who strongly prioritized 
the other person’s perspective over their own perspective. On the other hand, perspective-
takers that would classically be characterized as “poor” perspective-takers were individuals 
who had more difficulties in handling conflicting perspectives or those who strongly 
prioritized their egocentric perspective. Furthermore, while both the ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives and the priority given to the self versus others explained the 
variability on the perspective taking task, only the latter significantly predicted self-
reported everyday life perspective taking ability. This study paves the way for a 
multidimensional approach in the study of inter-individual differences in perspective 
taking.  
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6. Appendix 1 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Two-dimensional clustering of participants allocated to the control 
conditions only based on their difficulty in handling conflicting perspectives (Consistency index) and 
their attentional priority given to the other person’s perspective versus the self-perspective 
(Perspective index). 
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1. Summary 
This thesis aimed to challenge two traditional approaches in the study of perspective 
taking (PT) in healthy adults. The first traditional approach consists in considering PT as a 
static, or trait-like, ability and assessing it as such, that is, as if transient factors do not 
significantly affect PT performance. The second traditional approach consists in 
considering PT as a one-dimensional construct and assessing it as such, that is, on a one-
dimensional scale on which individual variability is reduced to a poor-to-good performance 
continuum.  
 The empirical evidence reported in this thesis allowed us to make the following 
observations:  
 PT is a dynamic ability in the sense that PT performance is not stable over time; 
Transient factors can significantly influence performance.  
 PT is a multidimensional construct that is underpinned by at least two dimensions: the 
ability to handle conflicting perspectives and the relative attentional priority given to 
the processing of the egocentric perspective over the altercentric perspective. 
These two observations are now discussed in turn. 
1.1  Perspective taking is a dynamic ability 
In Chapter 1 we have seen that because adulthood is considered as the end point of 
Theory of Mind (ToM) and PT development, it was implicitly assumed that adults should 
be flawless perspective-takers. Although adult PT performance was early on considered to 
reflect the adults’ tendency to engage in PT rather than their actual abilities, PT tendencies 
were nevertheless studied almost exclusively in the context of inter-individual differences 
studies or as an independent variable manipulated through explicit instructions to engage in 
PT. Hence, PT was studied as a stable characteristic of adult personality.  
A few recent studies from psycholinguistics have shown however that situational 
manipulations such as increasing the salience of information pertaining to the egocentric 
perspective can significantly influence PT performance (Kaland et al., 2011; Lane et al., 
2006; Lane & Liersch, 2012). In Chapter 2, as we aimed to explain why what another 
person is looking at interferes more strongly with our judgement of what we see in the VPT 
task than in the gaze cueing paradigm, we investigated the role of three situational factors 
that could account for this difference of interference. In Experiment 1 we tested whether the 
visual stimuli of the VPT task, through their potentially different visual salience, may have 
boosted the interference but this was not the case. In Experiment 2 we tested whether the 
higher task complexity of the VPT task, by slowing down the processing of what we see, 
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may have boosted the interference but this was not the case either. In Experiment 3 we 
hypothesized that the PT instructions made the other person’s gaze more task-relevant and 
thus more salient, which may have boosted the interference. To test this hypothesis without 
introducing PT instructions, we forced participants to pay attention at the location of the 
other person. Manipulating the attentional deployment strongly boosted the interference 
both in the VPT and gaze cueing tasks. These findings suggest that situational factors, such 
as when the salience is increased or when attention is deployed at the location of another 
person, can strongly influence our sensitivity to the visual perspective of other people. 
Besides long lasting factors that are present only in particular situations, two recent 
studies have shown that PT performance was significantly and differently affected by the 
specific emotional state healthy adults were transiently induced in (Converse et al., 2008; 
Yang et al., 2010). In Chapter 3, we looked at the impact of transiently induced feelings of 
guilt, anger, and shame on PT. In Experiment 1 we found that participants induced in a state 
of guilt were better at judging what another person sees than at judging what they see for 
themselves. This other-centred advantage was not found among those induced in a state of 
anger or in a neutral state. As we replicated this effect of guilt on perspective taking, we 
also found that high levels of self-incompetence and shame were concomitant with guilt 
feelings, which prevented us from determining which feeling actually drove the other-
centred effect. In Experiment 2 we induced only feelings of shame and self-incompetence 
and found a completely different effect: The participants of the shame condition had lower 
PT performances than those in the control condition in the sense that they were less able to 
judge what they or the other person sees when the visual contents differed between 
perspectives. These findings provided strong evidence that transient factors such as our 
emotional state can significantly influence PT performance. 
Finally, numerous studies have highlighted that PT can be manipulated by explicitly 
asking adults to imagine the other person’s perspective as their objective of the task 
(Dovidio et al., 2004; Ku et al., 2010), which suggests that motivational factors could also 
affect PT performance. In Chapter 4, we have shown that, although narcissism is 
consistently negatively associated with PT habits, narcissists had higher PT performances 
than non-narcissists. Based on this finding, we argued that, among narcissists, motivational 
factors such as goals of caring about others and self-enhancement are likely to reduce and 
increase PT habits and performances, respectively. 
Altogether, in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 we have highlighted the role of transient factors in 
influencing PT performance, which supports the view that PT is not static but dynamic.  
1.2  Perspective taking is a multidimensional ability 
We have seen in Chapter 1 that the most famous multidimensional model of PT was 
developed to explain PT development and included a core mechanism allowing to impute 
increasingly richer mental states and a selection mechanism allowing to select non-
egocentric mental states to impute (Leslie et al., 2004; Leslie, 1987). Given that in adults 
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the core mechanism is supposed to be full-fledged, PT performance is widely considered as 
resulting solely from the ability to put aside what we see, know, feel, or believe from our 
egocentric perspective (Epley et al., 2004; Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Tamir & Mitchell, 
2010). The ability to put aside our conflicting egocentric perspective has been found to be 
strongly underpinned by domain-general executive control abilities and inhibitory control 
in particular (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Lin et al., 2010; Wardlow, 2013). However, this one-
dimensional view of PT is based on the assumption that our egocentric perspective is 
always the most salient, accessible, or prioritized source of information when inferring 
what other people are thinking or experiencing. Recent studies have however designed PT 
tasks in which the other person’s perspective seemed to be sufficiently salient to be 
computed despite holding a conflicting egocentric perspective and despite receiving no 
instruction to compute it (Kovács et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; Schneider, Nott, et al., 
2014; van der Wel et al., 2014). As it seems that the egocentric perspective is not always 
the most prioritized perspective during PT, it seems relevant to assess the extent one 
prioritizes his egocentric perspective over other people’s perspectives along with the ability 
to handle our conflicting egocentric perspective as two potential dimensions underpinning 
PT performance. 
In this thesis, we assessed PT performance with the visual perspective-taking (VPT) 
task designed by Samson et al. (2010), which allows to separately assess the ability to 
handle conflicts between perspectives and the relative attentional priority given to the 
processing of the egocentric perspective over another person’s perspective. In Chapter 3, as 
we looked at the impact of guilt, anger, and shame on PT, we replicated a previous study 
(Yang et al., 2010) showing that guilt and shame increase and reduce PT performance, 
respectively. Most importantly, we showed that shame specifically affected conflict-
handling performance whereas guilt specifically affected the relative priority given to the 
egocentric versus altercentric perspective. These findings support therefore that these two 
dimensions are functionally relevant in explaining how emotions affect PT performance. 
In Chapter 4, we were interested in assessing how narcissism affects PT performance. 
Because narcissists are prototypically described as self-centred individuals and no study 
ever reported an association between conflict handling and narcissism, we used the VPT 
task instead of a more traditional one-dimensional measure of PT to test this hypothesis. 
We found no impact of narcissism on conflict handling performance but noted a specific 
impact on the relative self-other perspective priority. This finding supports therefore that 
assessing the two dimensions separately allows testing and capturing effects that may have 
been not captured with a one-dimensional measure of PT performance. 
In Chapter 5, we tested the specific hypothesis that there exists a significant and 
independent amount of inter-individual variability on both dimensions. To test this 
hypothesis, we inspected how a large number of participants who completed the VPT task 
would cluster following an algorithm aiming to maximize the explanation of PT inter-
individual variability. We found that participants were clustered in 4 groups of perspective-
takers, two were characterized for being either particularly good or particularly poor at 
Summary, discussion, & conclusion 
handling conflicting perspectives, and two were characterized for particularly prioritizing 
either their egocentric perspective or the other person’s perspective. These results suggest 
therefore that the assessment of inter-individual differences on PT performances (which 
was traditionally scoring performance on a one-dimensional poor-to-good performance 
continuum) should be scaled up in a two-dimensional space defined by the ability to handle 
conflicting perspectives and the relative self-other perspective priority. In addition, 
assessing the two dimensions separately allowed finding a significant predictive effect of 
the relative self-other perspective priority on self-reported everyday life perspective-takings 
habits that could not be captured with the one-dimensional measure of PT performance. 
Altogether, we repeatedly demonstrated the relevance and usefulness to study PT 
performance as a two-dimensional ability as it allows capturing or targeting specific 
impacts of various independent variables and to better characterize individuals’ profiles of 
PT performance.  
In the following section, I will discuss the implications and limits of our findings. 
2. Discussion 
2.1  Generalizability of our findings 
All our findings are based on a single task that measures level 1 VPT. Arguably, asking 
to infer what another person sees, feels, desires, believes, or intends recruits different 
processes and different levels of cognitive resources following the inferential process 
required. Therefore, one can expect that our findings may not extend to PT tasks involving 
other type of inferential processes or to PT performance in real life. However, the 
inferential process of level 1 VPT, which consists in drawing a mental line (of sight) from a 
person to an object (Michelon & Zacks, 2006), is highly efficient (Qureshi et al., 2010), 
develops earliest (Flavell, 2004), and is accessible to non-human animals species (e.g., 
Bräuer et al., 2004). In other words, level 1 VPT requires the most basic inferential process. 
Therefore, measuring level 1 VPT puts us in the best possible condition to reduce to a 
minimum the possibility that the effects of the manipulated variables and the observed 
inter-individual differences were driven by different inferential performances rather than 
different performances on the two dimensions of interests. 
Now, whether these two dimensions reflect a core architecture underpinning any type of 
PT is the key question. In my view, although the information content processed influencing 
the handling of conflicting perspectives or the relative priority given to a particular 
perspective might be domain-specific (i.e., proper to social cognition or to level 1 visual 
perspective taking), the cognitive processes underpinning the two dimensions are domain-
general: The relative priority given to the egocentric and altercentric perspectives is the 
product of top-down and bottom-up attentional processes and the handling of conflicting 
perspectives is the product of executive processes (i.e., monitoring, switching, inhibition; 
cf. infra “Beyond two dimensions”). Hence, I am confident that our findings generalize to 
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other forms of PT. This view is supported by the fact that egocentric biases and their 
relation to executive processes can be found across verbal (auditory and visual) and non-
verbal (visual and tactile) perspective-taking tasks that require to infer other people’s 
intentions (Keysar, 1994), knowledge (Camerer et al., 1989), beliefs (Carlson et al., 1998; 
T. P. German & Hehman, 2006; Newton & de Villiers, 2007), visual experiences (Keysar et 
al., 2000; Lin et al., 2010; Qureshi et al., 2010), and emotions (Gilovich et al., 1998; Silani 
et al., 2013). It is therefore reasonable to think that the common cognitive mechanisms 
present in all these forms of PT are those underpinning the two dimensions studied in this 
thesis.  
In Chapter 3 we reported beneficial and detrimental effects of guilt and shame, 
respectively, on level 1 VPT performance. This pattern of results replicated the findings of 
Yang et al. (2010) who used a PT task requiring to infer the extent of sarcasm in a message 
perceived by a person who has no knowledge of the sarcastic intent of the message. Correct 
performance required to suppress the reliance on the privileged knowledge that the message 
was sarcastic and to infer that the other person has a false belief that the message is sincere 
rather than sarcastic. It would seem therefore that shame and guilt specifically impacted 
cognitive processes common to both the level 1 VPT task and the verbal False Belief task. 
In Chapter 4, we found a significant association between self-reported everyday-life 
narcissistic habits and a specific dimension of level 1 VPT performance; which suggest that 
VPT captures to some extent a real-life facet of interpersonal behaviour. In the same line, in 
Chapter 5, we found a significant relationship between level 1 VPT and self-reported PT 
habits of the everyday life; which strongly suggests that level 1 VPT to some extent reflects 
a real-life facet of PT.  
Altogether, it seems reasonable to think that, although we used a single PT task, our 
findings generalize to other forms of PT in real life and in other PT tasks. However, it is 
important to note that the effects on PT performance in PT tasks requiring more complex 
inferential process are more likely to reflect an impact on inferential processes only and 
therefore these effects might not generalize to PT with other forms of inferential processes.  
2.2  Extending the two-dimensional account outside 
visual perspective taking 
The last decade of research in social cognition has been particularly marked with 
accumulating evidence that we spontaneously process others’ actions and mental states. 
This has been mainly evidenced by showing altercentric interferences, that is, reduced 
performance caused by the processing of information related to another person that is 
conflicting with the adequate completion of the task at hand. For examples, Sebanz, 
Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) used a Go-No Go task in which performance is interfered by 
the spatial incompatibility between the direction in which the picture of a finger was 
pointing (left or right) and the location of the button to press (right or left) when receiving 
instructions to press either the left or the right button (two-choices task). For example, if a 
finger is pointing rightward, it takes longer to press on the left button than on the right 
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button; this interference is called the Simon effect (Simon, 1969). Importantly, this 
interference disappears when only one button has to be pressed (one-choice task). Their key 
finding is that they found that this interference among participants instructed to press on 
only one button when another person placed aside is instructed to press the other button; 
this unexpected interference was interpreted as reflecting the automatic computation of 
another person’s intentions (Sebanz et al., 2003). In another study (Brass, Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), the interference in a two-choices task caused by the 
incompatibility between executed and observed (but irrelevant) finger movements was 
interpreted to reflect the automatic imitation of others’ movements. In a study by Zwickel 
(2009), performance in judging the location of dots was interfered by the incompatibility 
between the location of a dot with regard to the participants’ perspective and a moving 
triangle’s perspective. This interference was however only present when the triangle had 
moved as if it was a social agent; this interference was interpreted as reflecting the 
automatic representation of the triangle’s visual perspective. In a study by Van der Wel and 
colleagues (2014), the interference in participants’ hand movement trajectories by a social 
agent’s false belief was interpreted as reflecting the automatic computation of another 
person’s belief. Whether a person spontaneously (or automatically) computes others’ 
actions and mental states is measured by the size of the altercentric interference.  
We have seen in Chapter 1 that the extent to which a person is egocentrically biased (or 
has poor PT performance) is also measured by the size of the interference but caused by our 
conflicting egocentric perspective. However, we have seen in Chapter 5 that the size of the 
egocentric and altercentric interferences are underpinned by both the relative attentional 
priority given to the processing of the egocentric and other person’s perspective and the 
ability to suppress the interference from the conflicting perspective. Consequently, it is 
likely that the same dimensions underpin the size of the altercentric interference outside 
VPT. If this is the case (but it remains to be tested), three important implications must be 
noted. First, we should consider the possibility that some participants do not show signs of 
being interfered by another person’s actions or mental states because these individuals are 
particularly good at suppressing the interference rather than being particularly ‘insensitive’ 
to others. Second, it is possible that the size of the interference is dependent on the 
availability of executive resources. This latter possibility is actually supported by the study 
of Qureshi and colleagues (2010) who reported increased egocentric and altercentric 
interferences in the VPT task when concurrently completing a task tapping on inhibitory 
control. Third, it is possible that altercentric interferences are influenced by transient factors 
rather than reflecting the enduring sensitivity to others’ actions and mental states. This 
latter possibility is further discussed in the next section in relation to the implicit / explicit 
division of perspective taking. 
In sum, I am confident that this two-dimensional account is highly relevant to explain 
egocentric and altercentric interferences equally well and therefore it should enrich our 
understanding of phenomena of social cognition beyond VPT.  
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2.3  A salience account of the explicit – implicit PT 
division  
 In chapters 1 and 5, we have reviewed the accumulating recent evidence that adults and 
infants seem to spontaneously (or automatically) compute other people’s beliefs (Kovács et 
al., 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Schneider, Nott, et al., 2014; Sodian et al., 2007; 
Surian et al., 2007; van der Wel et al., 2014) and visual perspectives (Samson et al., 2010; 
Santiesteban et al., 2013; A. D. R. Surtees & Apperly, 2012). In other words, it has been 
claimed that they implicitly track others’ mental states. This claim is built on the distinction 
between explicit and implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985) where explicit PT refers to 
conscious and intentional tracking of another person’s mental state while implicit PT refers 
to non-conscious and unintentional tracking. This distinction maps with the 
multidimensional model proposed by Apperly and Butterfill (2009) who proposed that we 
possess two distinct systems to track others’ mental states: a rapid, automatic but 
cognitively limited system and a slow, effortful, controlled but cognitively flexible system 
underpinning implicit and explicit PT, respectively.  
Although I agree that the implicit/automatic versus explicit/controlled division can be a 
convenient classification of behavioural evidences of PT, I think that the same cognitive 
architecture underpins both types of PT. More specifically, the spontaneous tracking of 
others’ mental states may merely reflect the salience of the information pertaining to the 
other person’s mental state. In other words, whether someone will track another person’s 
mental state is probably strongly determined by the presence of transient factors that will 
influence the salience of the other person’s mental state. This view is shared with (T. C. 
German & Cohen, 2012) who encouraged the study of PT “in terms of cues that engage it” 
(p. 47) and stated that these cues could be the stimuli but also contextual information such 
as the task instructions (e.g., “Press the bar the bar when the agent comes in” in Kövacs et 
al., 2010), the repeated exposure to unpredicted probes about mental states, or the 
alternation of mental state-relevant and mental state-irrelevant trials. In explicit PT tasks, 
the most determining cue is the instruction to track the social agent’s mental state; these 
instructions promote top-down biasing towards the social agent’s mental state and thus 
boost its salience. In Chapter 2, we provided evidence that the size of our ‘sensitivity’ to 
where another person is looking at was strongly determined by the presence of particular 
cues that modify the salience of the social agent. I argue therefore that evidence of implicit 
mental states tracking is the result of unique blends of cues that boost the salience of a 
social agent’s mental state. In my view, these blends are like complex recipes, they are hard 
to obtain and replicate and the outcome might be unstable from one person to another. 
Recent efforts have been made to understand the triggering conditions of implicit PT (e.g., 
Meert & Samson, 2013).  
An important argument in favour of the distinction between explicit and implicit PT, 
which led Apperly and Butterfill (2009) to propose two distinct systems underpinning each 
type of PT, comes from findings of contrasting PT performances following that implicit or 
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explicit measures were taken on the same task with the same individuals. Clements and 
Perner (1994) first evidenced this contrast by showing that children seemed to pass the 
False Belief test based on their anticipatory looking (on the location where another person 
should erroneously look for his object) but only half of these children gave a correct 
explicit answer (verbal response or pointing). This finding was replicated several times but 
always with anticipatory looking as an implicit measure (Garnham & Perner, 2001; Low, 
2010; Ruffman et al., 2001). These contrasting performances support that there are different 
systems of PT. However, while it is well known that the point of fixation of the eyes is 
determined by the salience of stimuli (e.g., Van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004), fixation 
does not always lead to conscious access to the stimulus. This failure to consciously access 
processed information is explained by the existence of two different early processing visual 
pathways (for a review, see Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010) but it certainly does not 
advocate for the presence of two distinct PT systems. Within the field of consciousness 
research, it is well known that an absence of awareness of stimuli does not mean that these 
stimuli were not processed (for a review, see Kouider & Dehaene, 2007), even for complex 
stimuli (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011). For example, according to Dehaene and 
collaborators (2006), preconscious stimuli are characterized for having a high stimulus-
driven salience and not benefiting from enough top-down attention (such as the absence of 
instructions to track mental states); these stimuli are sufficiently salient to be self-
maintained temporarily (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006).  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that salience will not explain everything, the high 
salience of the stimuli will ensure that the stimuli will be processed but if the inferential 
process requires top-down voluntary control, as when reasoning with multiple embeddings 
of information (e.g., 2nd and 3rd order ToM tasks), it is possible that the salient stimuli will 
not be processed in mental state representations. Interestingly, even if those stimuli cannot 
be sufficiently processed to become mental state representations, they might still interfere 
with the conscious processing of information relevant to the task at hand such as when 
instructed to make egocentric judgments. Hence, there is a possibility that these 
interferences – that are usually interpreted as implicit or automatic mental state tracking – 
might not reflect the representation of another person’s mental state (i.e., mentalizing) but 
are a rawer form of mentalizing called submentalizing (Heyes, 2014b). This point is 
addressed in the next section. 
In sum, the fact that we observe different patterns of performance following that 
tracking mental state is explicitly instructed or not does not necessarily mean that we 
possess two distinct PT systems – one implicit/automatic and the other explicit/controlled. 
Instead, a more parsimonious (and neurobiologically plausible) account is that whether 
explicit instructions are needed to process a social agent’s mental state is dependent on the 
salience of the information pertaining to the social agent’s mental state (which is 
determined by the combination of stimulus-driven and contextual cues) and on the extent to 
which the inferential process requires voluntary control. 
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2.4  Does automatic perspective taking reflect 
mentalizing? 
Heyes (2014a, 2014b) recently provided a critical analysis of what specific cues led to 
interpretations of implicit and automatic mental state tracking, questioned whether mental 
states were actually inferred, and advocated for replacing the notion of mentalizing by 
submentalizing – “domain-general cognitive mechanisms that simulate the effects of 
mentalizing in social contexts” (Heyes, 2014b, p. 131). This ‘submentalizing hypothesis’ 
has been also applied to the level 1 VPT task we used. For the record,, it was proposed in 
the first studies using the level 1 VPT task in healthy adults (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson 
et al., 2010; A. D. R. Surtees & Apperly, 2012) that the presence of altercentric 
interferences (i.e., interference when judging what we see for ourselves when another 
person sees something different) was reflecting the automatic computation of the social 
agent’s visual perspective. Heyes (2014b) argued that this interference is not caused by the 
social agent seeing something different but by the social agent directing attention towards a 
location detrimental for the task at hand. Accordingly, it has been consistently 
demonstrated in the gaze cueing paradigm that eyes, heads, and bodies efficiently and 
spontaneously orient attention towards where they are directed to, which increases or 
reduces performance in detecting/identifying targets (e.g., discs) following that the targets 
are located where the attention was oriented or not, respectively (Driver et al., 1999; 
Friesen & Kingstone, 1998b; Hietanen, 1999, 2002). Thus, it can be argued that the 
altercentric interference found in the VPT task reflects a mere detrimental orienting of 
attention rather that the representation of a competing visual perspective. 
In Chapter 2, we have shown, however, that the interference caused by the orienting of 
attention in a gaze cueing paradigm is 3 times smaller and less robust (i.e., cannot be found 
with an SOA of 0 ms) than the interference observed in the VPT task. My ‘mentalizing 
hypothesis’ is that the PT instructions, even where required to take only our egocentric 
perspective, would ‘upgrade’ the processing of the social agent and what he looks at from 
attentional orienting to mental state representation. The mentalizing hypothesis is that a 
mental state representation is a stronger competitor with our egocentric representation 
(because of the high target – distractor similarity; Theeuwes, 1992) than a detrimental 
attentional orienting, and this is what causes the stronger interference in the VPT task. 
However, in favour of the submentalizing hypothesis (and our salience account) we found 
in Experiment 3 that merely increasing the amount of attention deployed on the social agent 
(by forcing participants to read a prompt super-imposed on the social agent) has strongly 
increased the size of the interferences both in the VPT and gaze cueing tasks. However, in 
favour of the mentalizing hypothesis, the increased interference in the gaze cueing task was 
still smaller than in the original VPT task and, more importantly, the increased attentional 
deployment doubled the interference usually found in original VPT task. In my view, if the 
interference in the VPT task was already entirely driven by the high attentional deployment 
on the social agent due to contextual cues such as its task-relevance, further increasing the 
attentional deployment could not have doubled the interference. A more plausible 
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explanation of this doubled interference is that two independent factors boosting the 
interference were combined: the representation of what a social agent is looking at as a 
mental state and the increased salience of the information pertaining to the social agent. 
This hypothesis remains however to be tested. 
Given the fact that attentional orienting also occurred with pointing arrows, 
Santiesteban et al. (2013) attempted to show that the interference found in original VPT 
tasks could also be found when replacing the social agent by an arrow, which would 
strongly support the submentalizing hypothesis (since a static arrow is not social agent). To 
test this, they used the version of the VPT task where only self-perspective judgments were 
required (see Experiment 3 in Samson et al., 2010) but half of the time – in a mixed 
randomized order – an arrow was presented instead of a social agent. They found equally 
sized inferences on trials with an arrow and a social agent, which was interpreted as 
strongly supporting the submentalizing hypothesis. However, it is also likely that the 
direction the arrow was pointing at was computed as a mental state because this inferential 
process was already applied half of the time when the social agent was present. Finally, it is 
important to note that we might be in a better position to argue for a mentalizing hypothesis 
in the context of level 1 VPT than in other forms of PT because its inferential process is 
highly efficient and cognitively rudimentary. Therefore, the extent to which the inferential 
process is cognitively demanding and sophisticated qualifies the theoretical plausibility of 
automatic or implicit mentalizing (cf. previous section).  
Altogether, the current empirical evidence cannot determine which of the mentalizing 
and submentalizing hypotheses are correct in the context of the VPT task. Moreover, it is 
also possible that the social agent and what he is looking at are processed at an intermediary 
level between a mere shift of attention and a mental state; which further complicates 
establishing the exact representational level of what the social agent is looking at. 
Nevertheless, even if incoming information did not reach the stage of a mental state 
representation, the spontaneous computation of this information would still show that we 
are tuned to be sensitive to other people’s thoughts and actions; which allows us to have 
adequate social interactions. In other words, it is possible the raw computation of 
information pertaining to others’ thoughts and actions is good enough in many social 
situations. For example, if, while talking, a person in front of me makes an averted eye 
movement, I will probably pay attention to where he is looking at without inferring that he 
must have seen something different from what I can see, which nevertheless will allow me 
to know what he is looking at. Mentalizing would however be necessary to understand why 
he looked in that direction. 
2.5  Beyond two dimensions 
Throughout this thesis we provided a two-dimensional account of PT performance, 
which was a step forward compared to the widespread one-dimensional approach of PT. 
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However, it is beyond doubt that these two dimensions are not enough to fully predict PT 
performance and that these two dimensions can be split in smaller dimensions.  
A first important point to acknowledge is that so far we purposefully disregarded the 
inferential process involved in PT. This was done to focus on the core mechanisms of PT 
(cf. previous section about the generalizability of our findings) but it would be wise to take 
into account the potential factors that may influence performance in inferential processes 
when trying to predict PT performance. Intuitively, in terms of inter-individual differences, 
it seems clear that inferential performance would be greatly influenced by whether one has 
(1) some knowledge or experience of what the other person is going through, (2) learned 
many of the infinite causal relations proper to the social domain, or (3) good reasoning 
skills to apprehend the other person’s situation in its full complexity. Inferential 
performance should therefore be a third independent dimension to assess or predict PT 
performance. 
Further progress in predicting PT performance can be made by fractionating the two 
dimensions we have put forward. The ability to handle conflicting perspectives and the 
relative priority given to the information pertaining to the egocentric perspective versus 
another person’s perspective both encompass several cognitive mechanisms that could be 
assessed separately to predict PT performance. I discuss (and speculate) in turns which 
mechanisms underpin the two dimensions. 
In my view, handling the conflicts between perspectives requires a cascade of executive 
functioning mechanisms. A high emphasis has been put on the inhibition/selection 
mechanism allowing the suppression of information pertaining to the conflicting irrelevant 
perspective, but the working memory capacity, monitoring and shifting abilities are also 
core executive functioning mechanisms (Miyake et al., 2000; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 
2004) likely to be involved in the process of handling conflicts. Before handling a conflict, 
the conflict must be detected. Conflict detection is an independent executive functioning 
mechanism most often referred to as monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Monitoring consists in continuously 
providing signals about the “interest” of pursuing a current activity, or mind-set (e.g., 
attending to what another person is looking at, running straight ahead, or planning to close 
the door). This interest is reduced when (i) a conflict or an error is detected or predicted 
(e.g., what I see conflicts with what the other person sees), (ii) the value of the 
outcome/cost/certainty ratio of the current mind-set has diminished, or (iii) an alternative 
and higher potential outcome or reward is detected (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; 
Dosenbach et al., 2006; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; 
Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Woodward, Metzak, Meier, & 
Holroyd, 2008). This reduced interest signals the need to update what information to 
process or to switch to another mind-set so that the initially expected outcome (e.g., 
successfully judge what another person is looking at) or a more rewarding outcome might 
be attained (Wager et al., 2004); this is achieved by a shifting mechanism usually described 
as a gate that opens to update/switch and closes to maintain information in working 
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memory (Braver & Cohen, 2000; Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2007). Our shifting ability, 
sometimes also referred to as cognitive flexibility, reflects our sensitivity to these signals 
and how quickly we adjust or shift the outdated mind-set with a mind-set from which a 
more rewarding outcome is expected (e.g., inhibit egocentric information; Aston-jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Berridge & Waterhouse, 2003; Briand, Gritton, Howe, Young, & Sarter, 
2007). Finally, the working memory capacity is also critical as it allows to maintain 
information relevant to the current mind-set (e.g., instruction to judge what another person 
is looking at) even if this information is not perceptually available (Baddeley, 1992, 2012). 
Thus, working memory capacity reflects the amount of information that can be maintained 
over time. Finally, inhibition per se is better understood as a mechanism of selective 
attention that biases the neural competition between different sources of information; this 
bias favours the maintenance of, or access to, information relevant to the mind-set (e.g., 
what the other person is looking at) and hinders the maintenance of, or access to, 
information irrelevant to the mind-set (e.g., what I see from my egocentric perspective; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller, 2000). 
In sum, conflict-handling performance is probably underpinned by four sub-dimensions: 
monitoring, shifting, working memory capacity, and inhibition/selection. Theoretically, 
each of these dimensions can be specifically impacted. For example, in the study of Todd et 
al. (2011), priming a focus on dissimilarity or similarity led to higher and lower PT 
performances, respectively; one can expect that the manipulation specifically affected 
monitoring performance in detecting a conflict between perspectives. Furthermore, there is 
also some evidence that emotions can either disrupt the maintenance of information in 
working memory or disrupt shifting and lead to maladaptive distractibility and 
perseveration, respectively (Aston-jones & Cohen, 2005; Briand et al., 2007; for a detailed 
discussion on this topic, see Bukowski, 2009). Disentangling the respective contributions of 
each of these mechanisms might be a challenging avenue of research but would certainly 
extend our understanding of PT. 
As for delineating dimensions underpinning the relative priority given to the processing 
of the egocentric versus someone else’s perspective, there is no sizable dimension to 
pinpoint but rather a myriad of factors influencing salience that can be grouped in broad 
categories. Accordingly, the relative priority given to the processing of the egocentric 
versus someone else’s perspective is not an ability per se but a ratio between the salience of 
the information needed to construe another person’s mental state and the salience of the 
information pertaining to our egocentric perspective. Thus, any ability, sensitivity, or factor 
influencing the salience of stimuli informative to either of the perspectives can be 
considered as an underpinning dimension. Nevertheless, a broad distinction can be made 
between stimulus-driven (or bottom-up) and contextual (or top-down) factors. Among 
stimulus-driven factors, the salience is determined in a bottom-up fashion by how 
rewarding (Sui et al., 2012), arousing (Arnell, Killman, & Fijavz, 2007), contrasting 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980), and abrupt (Jonides & Yantis, 1988) the stimulus is. Among 
contextual factors, the salience is determined in a top-down fashion by how goal/task-
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relevant (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), predictable (Theeuwes & Burger, 1998), or close from 
the locus of attention (Downing, 1988) the stimulus is (for a review, see Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002).. Within this myriad of factors, it is possible that important factors such as 
sensitivity to social reward, emotional sensitivity, or personal goals/ideals/values may 
affect the salience of a large array of stimuli; this avenue of research is wide open. 
2.6  Are the two dimensions independent? 
Along this thesis we claimed that with the VPT task, by crossing orthogonally the 
perspective to take and the level of conflict between perspectives, we could assess the 
perspectives conflict handling ability and the relative self-other perspective priority as two 
independent dimensions underpinning PT performance. However, one could argue that 
these two dimensions are not independent because manipulating the salience of one 
perspective should directly impact the performance in inhibiting this perspective. In my 
view, these two dimensions are underpinned by different cognitive mechanisms and brain 
areas but, in the same time, they strongly interact and recruit overlapping brain areas. The 
extent one manages to inhibit/ignore a stimulus reflects the strength of the task-set (encoded 
goals or instructions) and its influence on posterior cortices through top-down projections 
from the prefrontal cortex to the posterior cortices (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller, 
2000). The extent one prioritizes a stimulus over another reflects its salience, which is 
calculated through the integration of the competing stimuli coming from unimodal areas 
into a salience map that is represented in a multimodal area such as the inferior parietal 
lobule (including the temporoparietal junction and the intraparietal sulcus; Downar et al., 
2002; Itti & Koch, 2000; Mavritsaki, Allen, & Humphreys, 2010). In line with this view, 
Ramsey et al. (2013) collected neuroimaging data during the completion of the VPT task 
and found that the prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobule were both more 
activated when the inhibition of a salient perspective was involved than in the condition 
where the perspective to take is already the most salient perspective (i.e., the other-
perspective/consistent perspective condition). In the same line, in a task in which 
individuals prioritize the processing of their own face over the faces of other people, Sui, 
Chechlacz, Rotshtein and Humphreys (2013) reported that patients who have prefrontal 
damages over-express this self-face prioritization because executive deficits prevent its 
regulation, whereas those who have damages to the hippocampus and fusiform gyrus 
showed a low self-face prioritization because these areas are involved in the self-face 
processing itself. In addition, Sui, Rotshtein, and Humphreys (2013) found, in a task where 
the processing self-related shapes is prioritized, that only the processing of non-self-related 
shapes recruited the lateral prefrontal cortex as the executive demand was higher for these 
less salient stimuli. Finally, I think that the parietal lobule (and particularly the 
temporoparietal junction) functionally sits at the crossing of inhibitory control and salience 
computation, which is why this area is often strongly associated with perspective taking 
(see the meta-analyses from Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013; Van Overwalle, 
2009). However, both the excitatory and inhibitory modulation of this region can lead to the 
Summary, discussion, & conclusion 
enhanced suppression of a salient perspective as it is unclear whether this modulation 
increases the salience or the suppression of the perspective (Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, 
& Bird, 2012; Silani et al., 2013). 
To sum up, the ease of taking another person’s perspective depends on how salient is 
the information pertaining to the other person’s perspective and this salience is typically 
(but not always6) computed in the temporoparietal junction by integrating incoming 
processed information from posterior areas. However, this salience can be voluntarily 
biased through top-down projections from the prefrontal cortex representing our goals. 
Hence, the two dimensions we hypothesized to underpin PT performance rely on 
functionally and neurally distinct mechanisms although a strong overlap exists as well. 
2.7  Perspective taking under emotion 
In Chapter 3, we found that shame and guilt affect PT performance. Emotions are not 
unusual events and if emotions fluctuate, so might PT performance. This implies that any 
investigation of PT performance should control for participants’ emotional state if they aim 
to obtain an accurate ‘baseline’ assessment of PT abilities and to insure good test-retest 
reliability. In addition, strong emotional feelings are highly concomitant with many mental 
disorders and therefore might be the causal factor of the social cognitive deficits reported in 
disorders such as depression (Segrin, 2000) and schizophrenia (Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, 
& Catts, 2001).  
In everyday life, when we are interacting with others, we continuously have to take the 
perspective of another person in order to understand and to be understood by the other 
person. Being conscious of the impact of emotions, ubiquitous in social interactions, on this 
ability could help inter-individual communication. Realizing the impact of emotions on PT 
abilities is particularly important in professions in which inter-individual communication 
(and thus PT) is central such as psychologist, judge and teacher. For instance, a 
psychologist may be prone to emotions towards his patient, which can influence his 
abilities to understand him. Conversely, emotions felt by a patient will influence his ability 
to understand his psychotherapist and probably the overall efficiency of the 
psychotherapeutic process. Therefore, impact of emotions on PT abilities is an important 
variable which has to be taken into account in many professional and social situations. 
Surprisingly, only 2 published studies have investigated the impact of emotions on PT so 
far, I am hopeful that this thesis will allow attracting attention to this new and promising 
avenue of research. 
                                                 
 
6
 The exact location of the multimodal integration of the incoming stimuli depends of the sensory properties 
of the stimuli such as the modality (e.g., tactile vs. visual) and the type of processing required (e.g., object 
recognition vs. spatial location). 
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2.8  Future studies 
Given that, first, research on what influences PT performance in the healthy adult 
population has only recently emerged and, second, we provided evidences challenging two 
traditional approaches of the study of perspective taking, the possibilities for future studies 
are wide open. I will focus on several questions that particularly caught my attention. 
Can we generate implicit and automatic perspective taking by manipulating salience? I 
have argued earlier that the presence of implicit or automatic PT does not reflect the 
existence of a distinct PT system but instead reflects the existence of particular blends of 
stimulus-driven and contextual cues that boost the salience of information pertaining to the 
perspective of another person. This should be tested by showing a progressive increase of 
the magnitude of altercentric interference while progressively adding cues that boost the 
salience of the other person’s perspective.  
How generalizable is the two-dimensional account? Given that the two dimensions 
reflect executive abilities and attentional factors, I expect that the effects found in the VPT 
task should also be found in other social cognitive tasks. For example, Silani, Lamm and 
collaborators (2013) developed an empathy task with an experimental design similar to that 
of the VPT task in the sense that it crosses the perspective to take with the level of conflict 
between perspectives; this task could therefore be used to test this hypothesis and more 
generally to assess what influences empathy along the two dimensions. 
Does social sensitivity reflect poor inhibition skills? It would be interesting to assess the 
role of executive abilities in predicting the size of altercentric interferences outside 
perspective taking as well. The finding of a significant role of executive performance in 
automatic computation, or sensitivity to others’ thoughts and actions, would encourage the 
use of our two-dimensional account outside VPT and qualify the extent to which these 
interferences are social and automatic. 
Is there a linear relationship between measured perspective-taking performance and 
social wellbeing? In Chapter 5 we have delineated four groups of good perspective-takers: 
one group was particularly good at handling conflicting perspectives and another strongly 
prioritized the processing of the other person’s perspective. It is possible, however, that 
extremely high scores on these dimensions might not be associated with good real-life 
interpersonal skills. Accordingly, we could speculate that being hypersensitive to others’ 
views either reflects or causes reduced social wellbeing (e.g., abnegation). Moreover, 
interferences reflecting spontaneous sensitivity to others’ thoughts and actions could, 
theoretically, be entirely suppressed if a person is good at it. Will this person experience 
social wellbeing if he proficiently suppresses all the subtle social cues that are irrelevant to 
his task at hand? In sum, there might a non-linear (probably quadratic) relationship between 
PT performance and social wellbeing.  
How does motivation impact perspective-taking performance? So far no study has 
looked at the impact of motivation on PT performance (see, however, a qualitative study by 
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Gehlbach, Brinkworth, & Wang, 2012). In Chapter 4, we provided evidence that narcissists 
are good at perspective taking although the opposite pattern was found when measured self-
reported habits. This contradiction is likely to be explained by the fact that self-reports 
measured prosocial motivation while the VPT task measured actual abilities; however, this 
hypothesis and the role of motivation in general should be investigated or at least controlled 
in future studies.  
3. Conclusion 
What influences perspective-taking performance in healthy adults? Decades of research 
were dedicated to the understanding of how perspective-taking abilities develop and what 
makes us more or less likely to engage in perspective taking. A particular focus on 
performance in the healthy adult population has emerged only recently and especially 
points out the importance of domain-general executive abilities, which underpin the ability 
to suppress our conflicting egocentric perspective and select information pertaining to 
another person’s perspective. However, current approaches to perspective taking heavily 
rely on the assumption that perspective taking is a static characteristic and a one-
dimensional construct. For this reason, perspective taking is being studied as if performance 
does not significantly fluctuate from one situation to another or over time, and performance 
is scored along a one-dimensional continuum ranging from poor to good. 
This thesis aimed to enrich our understanding of what influences perspective taking by 
challenging the assumptions that perspective taking is a static and one-dimensional ability. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we provided evidence that transient factors such as drawing attention 
towards a person or feeling ashamed or guilty significantly affect perspective-taking 
performance. In addition, in Chapter 4 we have highlighted the potential role of 
motivational factors on perspective-taking performance, which could explain why we found 
that narcissists are not impaired at perspective taking despite the fact that self-reports of 
perspective-taking habits suggest the opposite. These findings strongly challenge the view 
that perspective-taking performance is a stable characteristic and encourage the 
investigation of perspective taking as a dynamic ability. 
We also provided evidence that perspective-taking performance is not solely 
underpinned by the ability to handle conflicts between our egocentric perspective and the 
perspective of another person but also by the relative priority given to the processing of the 
egocentric perspective relative to another person’s perspective. Across the Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 we found that each of the two dimensions can be specifically affected or associated 
with factors such as guilt, shame, narcissism, and self-reported perspective-taking habits. 
Moreover, we found in Chapter 5 that individuals strongly vary on both dimensions so that 
some people are characterized as being either particularly good or particularly poor at 
handling conflicting perspectives, and other people are characterized as strongly prioritizing 
either their egocentric perspective or other people’s perspectives. These findings deeply 
challenge the view that perspective taking is a one-dimensional construct by showing that 
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the salience of our egocentric perspective relatively to another person’s perspective is 
actually highly variable across individuals and situations.  
Finally, while investigating what influences perspective-taking performance, this thesis 
repeatedly demonstrated the theoretical relevance and usefulness of studying perspective 
taking as a dynamic and multidimensional ability. This approach paves the way for a richer 
understanding of perspective taking but also of other phenomena in social cognition. 
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Appendix A: What does reflect the high 
difficulties to judge from one perspective 
over another? 
 
 
So far we have underspecified the cognitive processes underlying individuals’ relative 
ease in taking one perspective over another. Technically, this measure reflects the 
difference of performance between judging the number of discs (0 to 3) visible in a scene 
from the participant’s perspective (i.e., in the whole scene) or from the perspective of a 
social agent (an actor or an avatar) presented sideways in the middle of the scene (i.e. in a 
fraction of the scene; see Figure 2). However, it is unclear whether the performance 
difference reflects facilitation for taking one perspective or a difficulty for taking the other. 
In addition, this difference was calculated by merging trials with conflicting and non-
conflicting perspectives. Thus, what leads some individuals to be better at judging from one 
perspective over another deserves some explanations.  
We propose that the relative ease in taking another person’s perspective over our 
egocentric perspective (or inversely) is essentially driven by how attention is deployed on 
the visual scene between the social agent and the discs to count. However, given that the 
same visual scene is repeated across trials, to what extent this attentional deployment is 
guided by bottom-up or top-down salience of the social agent and the discs is still unclear. 
However, there is little doubt that participants anticipatively deploy their top-down 
attention based on which perspective they are prompted to take and where they expect the 
social agent and the discs to appear.  
When they are prompted to take their egocentric perspective, they should spread their 
attention to include the two peripheral locations where the discs can appear. Thus, when the 
visual scene appears they should immediately compute the overall number of discs present 
in the scene. However, depending on the top-down and/or bottom-up attentional salience of 
the social agent, the computation of the discs can be interfered by the competing 
computation of the social agent and what the agent is looking at. Furthermore, if the 
perspectives are conflicting (i.e., inconsistent condition), this interference can be even 
higher because the computation of the social agent subsequently orients attention towards 
where he is looking at, which then leads to the computation of the looked at discs and yield 
an altercentric discs count that conflicts with the egocentric discs count. These interferences 
are called altercentric interferences. Thus, the magnitude of the altercentric interferences is 
highly dependent on the amount of attention allocated to the social agent. In support for this 
hypothesis, we found in Chapter 2 that forcing participants to deploy their attention to the 
location of the model by super-imposing task instructions on it strongly increased the extent 
of this interference. 
Appendix A 
Conversely, when prompted to take the other person’s perspective, participants should 
centre and focus their attention on the middle of the screen, where the model will appear. If 
the extent of attention anticipatively deployed on the social agent and the attentional 
salience of the social agent are too low, the attentional orienting towards where the model is 
looking at might not be so beneficial to the processing of the looked at discs. Furthermore, 
if the perspectives are conflicting (i.e., inconsistent condition), the occurrence of irrelevant 
discs at the opposite location of where the social agent looks at might interfere with the 
computation of the social agent and the discs he looks at. Critically, if the looked at discs 
count is not enough prioritized, a conflicting and competing discs count corresponding to 
what is seen from our egocentric perspective is likely to strongly interfere with participants’ 
performances. These interferences are egocentric interferences. 
It is noteworthy that the ability to handle interferences is involved in measuring the 
relative ease in taking one perspective over another, which are supposed to be independent 
dimensions. However, given that the executive functions are identically needed to handle 
egocentric and altercentric interferences (Qureshi et al., 2010), the only factor leading to a 
higher difficulty to suppress interferences from one perspective over another is how 
attention is deployed between what is seen from our egocentric perspective and what is 
seen from the other person’s perspective.  
In sum, the higher difficulties in judging from one perspective over another reflect how 
someone deploys his attention between what is seen from his egocentric perspective and 
what is seen from the other person’s perspective. In other words, it reflects the relative 
salience of information pertaining to the egocentric perspective versus another person’s 
perspective, or how self-centred or other-centred individuals are. 
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Appendix B: Effects of sadness and 
happiness on visual perspective taking 
and gaze cueing 
 
 
Henryk Bukowski, Maxime Résibois, Emmanuelle Rochard, Dana Samson 
Institut de recherche en sciences psychologiques, Université catholique de Louvain, 
Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium 
1. Experiment 1 
This experiment was aimed to test the impact of sadness and happiness on PT 
performance. Before completing either a visual perspective-taking (VPT) task or a False 
Belief (FB) task, participants watched a video clips inducing a sad, happy, or neutral mood. 
Then, after completion of either the VPT or FB task, participants recalled a personal event 
congruent with the emotional tone of the video clip and completed the other PT task. 
Before the end of the experiment, participants completed an exit questionnaire assessing 
how they after watching the video clip and recall the personal event. 
1.1  Method 
1.1.1 Participants.  
Sixty-two healthy individuals were randomly assigned to one of the three mood 
induction conditions, with 19 participants in the sadness condition (13 females), 21 
participants in the neutral condition (13 females) and 22 participants in the happiness 
condition (16 females; mean age: 20.42, age range: 19-27). Participants participated in 
return of course credits. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the 
Psychological Sciences Research Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain.  
1.1.2 Material and procedure.  
After having signed the consent forms, participants were allocated to one of the 3 mood 
conditions (sadness vs. happiness vs. neutral) and one of the two order conditions (VPT-
then-FB vs. FB-then-VPT) in a counter-balanced order. Those in the VPT-then-FB 
condition, read the instructions of the VPT task, watched a video clip completed the VPT 
task, recalled a personal event congruent with emotional tone of the video clip, completed 
the FB task, and then completed an exit questionnaire assessing how they felt after each 
emotion induction. Those in the FB-then-VPT condition completed the FB task after 
watching the video clip the FB task, read the instructions of the VPT task, recalled a 
personal event, completed the VPT task and the exit questionnaire. 
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Emotional induction.  
Participants were invited to watch video clips of 2 m and 43 s. In the sadness and 
happiness conditions, the video clip was a succession of less than 3 s video extracts in 
which all characters expressed the same targeted emotion and on which a musical 
background of the targeted emotional tone was added (Sadness: “Never meant to Belong” 
by Shirō Sagisu, 2005; happiness: instrumental version of “Toss the feathers” by the Corrs, 
1995). The video extracts came from unpopular video clips found on internet that contained 
people expressing sadness or happiness. The video extracts were arranged in ascending 
order of emotional intensity (e.g., from lamenting sighs to mourning cries). We used these 
two video clips instead of movie extracts to reduce to minimum the potential biases caused 
by the familiarity each participant could have with the video clips and the semantic context 
(i.e., the specific story and values conveyed) proper to each movie extracts. In the neutral 
condition, we used a video clip from the database of Gross and Levenson (1995) that shows 
a prototypical computer screensaver with coloured polygons moving slowly and without 
sound. We conducted a pre-test study on sixty-three participants to assess the induction 
efficacy of the video clips and found that these video clips induced successfully and 
specifically the targeted discrete emotions. 
Visual perspective-taking task.  
In VPT the task (adapted from Samson et al., 2010), participants saw pictures of a 
human avatar positioned in the centre of a room with red discs displayed on one or two of 
the side walls. The avatar was seen sideways facing either the left or the right wall. The 
principle of the task was to judge whether a prompted number (ranging from 0 to 3) 
matched the number of discs visible from the prompted perspective, which could be either 
the participant’s perspective (self-perspective condition) or the avatar’s perspective (other-
perspective condition). The number of discs visible in the room could be the same for both 
perspectives (consistent perspectives condition) or different (inconsistent perspectives 
condition). The prompted number could match or mismatch the number of discs visible in 
the room from the prompted perspective. The task included a total of 130 trials, evenly 
spread across 4 experimental conditions (2 (Perspective: self- vs. other-perspective) x 2 
(Consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent perspectives)) and divided into 2 blocks of 52 
trials plus a set of 26 practice trials. Like in the original study by Samson and colleagues 
(2010) we included 10 filler trials to avoid anticipatory responses (see the original study for 
details). In addition, because mismatching trials in the consistent condition always 
displayed number prompts irrelevant to any perspective and thus were particularly easy to 
process, mismatching trials were unbalanced in terms of performance difficulty with 
matching trials and were thus not analysed. Trials within each block were presented in a 
randomized order. The task lasted around 12 minutes. The task ran on E-prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA), with the exact same timing of events as in the 
original study by Samson and colleagues (2010; see Figure 1).  
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False Belief task.  
In the FB task (adapted from Birch & Bloom, 2007 (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Converse et 
al., 2008), participants read a short story about a character called Vicky who placed an 
violin in a blue box out of 4 possible boxes, left the room, and then came back to reach for 
her violin. Participants read that one of two possible events happened in the room while 
Vicky was absent: In the true belief (TB) condition, another character, her sister Denise, 
came in the room and changed the position of the 4 boxes but did not move the violin from 
the blue box. In the FB condition, the Denise changed the position of the boxes AND 
moved the violin from the blue box to the red box. Participants were instructed to judge the 
likelihood (in percentages) Vicky would reach for his violin for each of the 4 possible 
boxes after she re-entered the room. Correct PT performance in both the TB and FB 
condition requires the participants to judge most likely that Vicky will look for her violin in 
the blue box. However, in the FB condition, if participants fail to inhibit their privileged 
knowledge of where the violin really is, they should judge likely that Vicky will go to the 
red box. In this study, instead of using the FB and TB conditions as a between-subject 
variable as it was used in the original paradigm, participants completed both conditions 
subsequently in a counter-balanced order. However, in the second condition, the reference 
to Vicky was replaced by Andrew who was present as his brother.  
Exit questionnaire.  
In order to insure that the emotion inductions were successful, the participants 
completed at the end of the experiment a questionnaire asking about how they felt after 
watching the video clip and after recalling the personal event. The participants rated to what 
extent they felt a series of (1) 12 emotions (items adapted from Wallbot & Scherer, 1986), 
(2) 13 body sensations (items adapted from Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) and (3) 
11 action tendencies (items adapted from Youngstrom & Green, 2003). All ratings were 
made on a 7-point intensity scale where 0 meant “Not at all” and 6 meant “Strongly”. 
2. Experiment 2 
2.1  Method 
2.1.1 Participants.  
Ninety-one healthy individuals were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions 
with 30 participants in the sadness condition (25 females), 30 participants in the neutral 
condition (26 females) and 30 participants in the happiness condition (28 females; mean 
age: 21.28, age range: 19-33). Participants participated in return of credits course. The 
study was approved by the ethics committee of the Psychological Sciences Research 
Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain. 
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2.1.2 Material and procedure.  
The procedure was similar to the one presented for Experiment 1 except that the FB task 
was replaced by a gaze cueing task, 3 questionnaires were completed at the beginning of 
the experiment, and the training session for both the VPT and gaze cueing tasks were 
completed before the emotion induction. After having signed the consent forms, 
participants completed the following questionnaires: the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI; Davis, 1980), the Positive And Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; D. Watson & Clark, 
1988) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1960). 
Questionnaires prior emotional induction.  
The PANAS is a self-report questionnaire using a 5-point intensity scale ranging from 
“Not at all or very slightly” to “Strongly” on 10 positively and 10 negatively valenced 
emotional states (D. Watson & Clark, 1988). The initial emotional state of participants was 
assessed since it has been shown to influence perspective taking (Converse et al., 2008; 
Singer et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2010).  
Empathy and perspective taking were assessed with the IRI (Davis, 1983), a self-report 
questionnaire composed of 28 statements about their personal experiences and habits in 
social and emotional situations on which participants had to rate their extent of agreement 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The IRI is 
divided in 4 subscales: perspective taking, fantasy (i.e. self-absorption in fictions), empathic 
concern, and personal distress.  
The BDI (Beck, 1961) is a self-report questionnaire containing 21 series of 4 statements 
among which participants must choose the one corresponding to the participant’s state in 
the past few weeks. Depression was assessed because a few studies have reported impaired 
empathy and perspective taking among clinically depressed individuals (Kerr, 2003; Lee et 
al., 2005; Y. Wang et al., 2008; Wolkenstein et al., 2011).  
Visual perspective-taking task.  
Identical to Experiment 1. 
Gaze cuing task.  
Participants saw first a fixation cross display for 750 ms followed by a 500 ms blank 
delay. They then saw a picture of an avatar positioned in the centre of a blue room facing 
either the left or the right wall (see Figure 1). One or two red discs were displayed on the 
left or the right. Participants were instructed to press within 2 s on the key “1” or “2” when 
respectively 1 or 2 red discs appeared on the screen. Directly following the participant’s 
response, a feedback “Correct”, “Incorrect”, or “No response” was presented for 1 s. “No 
response” feedback were presented after 2 s had elapsed without response from the 
participant. 
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In half of the trials, the avatar faced the location of the red disc(s) (consistent orientation 
condition) whereas the avatar faced the opposite wall the other half of the trials 
(inconsistent orientation condition). As in the VPT task, the interference due to the 
conflicting orientation of the avatar is measured by subtracting performances between the 
inconsistent and consistent orientation conditions. However, while a significant consistency 
effect is found in the VPT task when presenting the red discs simultaneously with the 
avatar, a small delay is usually presented in the classic gaze cueing paradigm (optimally 
300 ms; Frischen et al., 2006) to find a significant consistency effect. For this reason, we 
introduced a delay (also referred as Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA)) of 300 ms in half 
of the trials (SOA 300 ms condition) whereas the discs and the avatar were simultaneously 
presented in the other half (SOA 0 ms condition). There were 48 trials in each of the 4 (2 x 
(Consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent orientation) x (SOA: 0 vs. 300 ms)) experimental 
conditions. The task lasted approximately 12 minutes and contained 2 breaks. 
Exit questionnaire.  
Identical to Experiment 1. 
